The Emergence of Community Radio in the United States: A Historical Examination of the National Federation of Community Broadcasters, 1970 to 1990

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by

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A DISSERTATION

Presented to the School of Journalism and Communication and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Spring 2007
“The Emergence of Community Radio in the United States: A Historical Examination of the National Federation of Community Broadcasters, 1970 to 1990,” a dissertation prepared by Michael William Huntsberger in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the School of Journalism and Communication. This dissertation has been approved and accepted by:

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The National Federation of Community Broadcasters is the oldest and largest organization of community-oriented, nonprofit radio stations in the United States. Nevertheless, only a handful of scholars have considered the NFCB and its place in the history of mass media in the U.S. In the years leading up to and following the establishment of the NFCB in 1975, the public policy environment that guided the activities noncommercial radio, and all of American mass media, changed dramatically. This study provides a historical account of the NFCB during these formative years, and examines the political, economic, and social forces that propelled the organization during this period. The study examines the conflicts of idealism and realism, intention and action that shaped the NFCB in its first years, and delineates the relationship of the NFCB to the
political economy of mass communications media in the U.S. The study explores the role of dissent in the prevailing political economy of communication, and demonstrates how issues of power unfolded in one sector of American broadcasting. The study relies on qualitative and historical methods, employing a combination of document analysis and in-depth interviews to gain a broad understanding of the origins and evolution of the NFCB. The study demonstrates the decisive power and control over the political economy of public broadcasting in the United States held by the U.S. Congress, and the efficacy of the open marketplace for public radio programming envisioned by the founders of the NFCB. The study addresses one of the significant historical controversies in American community radio, finding that contemporary Low Power FM radio services have benefited from the policies advocated by the NFCB in the 1980s. The study concludes that community broadcasters provided the talents, knowledge, skills, and abilities to push public radio in new directions, to become more open to change and more responsive to listeners. In the process, the National Federation of Community Broadcasters moved from the margins to the mainstream of public radio policymaking in the United States.
CURRICULUM VITAE

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University of Oregon, Foundation Scholarship, 2005

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PUBLICATIONS


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to the members of my committee, Dr. Julianne Newton, Dr. Daniel Pope, and Dr. Janet Wasko, for the guidance and encouragement they provided over the course of this project. I am especially grateful to my advisor, Dr. Alan G. Stavitsky, whose patient mentoring and enthusiastic support of my studies inspired me throughout my graduate career. To all my instructors, advisors, and colleagues at the University of Oregon, thank you for your contributions to my efforts.

I want to express my gratitude to Carol Pierson and Ginny Berson at the National Federation of Community Broadcasters, who graciously allowed me to delve into the extensive records of the NFCB in Oakland, California. Thank you to Tom Connors and Karen King at the National Public Broadcasting Archive, who hosted my research at the University of Maryland and provided invaluable assistance in my search for documents. Thank you to John Crigler for his assistance with locating key historical evidence, and especially to Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford, who responded to dozens of requests for information and documentation from their personal records. To all of the people who consented to be interviewed for this project, thank you for the generous donation of your time, and your enthusiasm for my research. Without your participation, this project would not have been possible.

This research was supported by several travel and research grants from the School of Journalism. Thank you to the members of the Graduate Affairs Committee for your
support. I am particularly grateful for the award of the Glenn Starling Fellowship in Telecommunications, which allowed me to travel to Maryland and consult primary evidence that otherwise would not have been available to the project.

Finally, I am grateful to my friends and family for their support of my work, and especially to my son Eric and my wife Karen for the love and care they shared with me on every step of this long, complicated, and often arduous journey. Thank you for making this dream come true.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Recent advances in mass communication technology have made it possible for millions of people to produce and distribute their own mass media content. With a personal computer, a microphone, and an Internet connection, it is now possible for millions of people to record their thoughts, feelings, and experiences and distribute them over the World Wide Web. Personal, portable computing technology has revolutionized communication, and empowered citizens around the globe to communicate on a mass scale.

There was a time when such easy access to communication technology was unthinkable. In the time before personal computers and public networking, access to the tools and techniques of media production was available only to the few -- trained and licensed specialists who had to secure the approval of government authorities before they were allowed to program and operate radio and television broadcasting facilities. In that past era, when three national networks dominated the television industry, and scores of commercial interests controlled hundreds of radio stations, there was practically no opportunity for ordinary citizens to gain access to broadcast facilities for the purpose of producing and distributing their own programs. In the 1960s, the voices and images available to the listeners and viewers of America’s broadcast channels were
overwhelmingly white and male, representative of the views, interests, and concerns of
the nation’s ruling elite.

Between 1970 and 1990, National Public Radio [NPR] emerged as the first
attempt to provide a publicly financed, nationwide, noncommercial broadcast radio
service to the United States. Nearly half a century after the emergence of the “American
System” of advertiser-supported, commercial broadcasting, NPR was established to
produce and distribute information and cultural programming for its member stations
across the country from its headquarters in Washington, D.C.. As cost-conscious
commercial operators shed their news functions in favor of less labor-intensive and more
cost-effective programming alternatives, NPR became the preeminent provider of radio
news and public affairs programming in the U.S. NPR continues this tradition to the
present day, the recipient of numerous citations for journalistic achievement, including
the DuPont-Columbia and numerous Peabody awards.¹

The alternative

During the same twenty-year period, another organization of noncommercial
broadcasters emerged alongside NPR, intent on developing a national presence for
independent, locally controlled and programmed ‘alternative’ radio services. Unlike
NPR, however, the National Federation of Community Broadcasters [NFCB] remains
unknown to all but a handful of Americans. The members of the NFCB pursued this path
in part by intention, and in part by circumstance. But in spite of its low profile, or
perhaps because of it, the NFCB has played an important role beneath the very public
surface of U.S. mass media through its influence on the nation’s broadcasting policies
and programming. NFCB radio stations were among the first to serve several sectors of the nation’s increasingly diverse population with news and cultural programming. In some cases, NFCB stations recognized and served the needs of citizens in isolated rural area long before their own government identified those needs. Some of the founders of the NFCB emerged as leaders in the nation’s public broadcasting sector. In the process, they changed the mission and scope of the American system of public broadcasting. This study provides a historical account of the early years of the NFCB, from the events that led to its formation through its first years of operation, and examines the political, economic, and social forces that shaped the organization during this formative period.

The National Federation of Community Broadcasters is the oldest and largest organization of community-oriented, nonprofit radio stations in the United States. From its establishment in 1975, by representatives of a small group of noncommercial educational [NCE] stations, the NFCB has grown to represent the interests of more than 250 community broadcasting licensees and associated agencies located in nearly all fifty states and overseas. Today, the stations of the NFCB are “large and small, rural and urban, eclectic or targeted toward specific communities … distinguished by their commitment to localism and community participation and support.”

The NFCB has navigated a turbulent sea of change over the past thirty years: The membership has expanded and diversified, as have many of the individual member stations. The organization has experienced triumphs and challenges. The public policy environment that shapes and guides noncommercial radio, and all of American mass media, has changed. Most significantly, the political, economic, and social assumptions
and conditions that surround and inhabit community radio and the broadcasting industry have changed dramatically. Nevertheless, only a handful of scholars have considered the NFCB and its place in the history of mass media in the U.S.

The founders of the NFCB were a remarkable group of broadcast activists. Some envisioned an opportunity to develop a more democratic form of mass media, bringing voices that had historically been excluded from broadcast radio – the young, the old, women, ethnic groups, people of color, and non-English speakers – to the public. Others wanted to bring radio to geographically isolated areas that were not served by other NCE stations, or in some cases had no broadcast services of any kind. Some sought to build independent havens for discussion and experimentation that could exist beyond the economic and political pressures of the marketplace of U.S. mass media, while others wanted to secure a viable position for community radio within that marketplace. All of these individuals brought enthusiasm, determination, and vision to the project of building a national organization for community broadcasting services. Most of them had little practical experience with broadcasting and mass media, beyond what they had learned in their own enterprises. Yet this group built an organization that has propelled American community radio from an isolated phenomenon in a few localities to a nationwide presence in scores of communities across the country.

As the organization grew and matured, its leaders implemented a set of goals and objectives that shaped the development of NCE radio across the country. At the same time, the nation’s public policy approach to broadcasting experienced a radical shift, as the practices established in the relatively progressive years of the New Deal, the New
Frontier, and the Great Society sputtered and were finally overtaken by more conservative, market-centered approaches to mass media regulation and social policy. In this dynamic period, the NFCB emerged as a force in national policymaking, promoting an ambitious agenda for change in the designation, allocation, and distribution of resources for noncommercial broadcasting. Concurrently, NFCB improved the fortunes of its members, and helped to establish dozens of new community radio services across the U.S. Yet in hindsight, some of the most vocal and energetic activists in community radio claim that the NFCB failed in its intended purposes, succumbing to “strong institutional pressures towards professionalization and bureaucratization, [and] undermining efforts at grassroots communications.”

This study seeks to untangle the threads of idealism and realism, intention and action that shaped the NFCB in its first years, and clearly delineate the relationship of the NFCB to the political economy of mass communications media in the U.S. The study explores the role of dissent in the prevailing political economy of communication, and demonstrates how issues of power unfolded in one sector of American broadcasting.

The context of the NFCB

The NFCB was not the first organization to represent the interests of those who sought to increase the role of private citizen activists or noncommercial interests in American radio broadcasting. Though the Radio Act of 1912 excluded amateur radio operators from broadcasting activities, some organizations continued to lobby government authorities for increased access to the spectrum for individuals, and continuing partnerships between amateur, military, and commercial broadcasters.
NFCB followed in the footsteps of several organizations that sought to represent the interests of institutionally based, noncommercial educational broadcasters, including the National Advisory Council on Radio in Education [NACRE], and the National Association of Educational Broadcasters [NAEB]. The decade prior to the formation of the NFCB had seen the passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, followed in 1970 by the establishment of National Public Radio and the Association of Public Radio Stations. Such organizations served the needs of large, well-established NCE stations, most of them licensed to colleges and universities. The NFCB was created, in part, to represent a group of stations that did not conform to this prevailing model of NCE broadcasting.

The Federation began as an initiative of the first National Alternative Radio Convention, held in Madison, Wisconsin, in June, 1975. The following August, representatives of 17 “community-oriented broadcast organizations” met in Columbia, Missouri, “to create a national organization that would represent their interests at a national level, provide services that could only be achieved on a cooperative basis and facilitate an efficient use of their all-too-scarce resources.” Seeking to improve the institutional, economic, and political fortunes of “a growing number of non-commercial, listener supported [radio] stations,” the group established the NFCB to “foster the development of public policy…seek an equitable distribution of federal funds…facilitate exchange of program materials…publicize our activities and represent our interests…[and] assist the organization of new and innovative broadcast stations throughout the country.”
Guided by this set of ideological and strategic commitments, the NFCB established offices in Washington, D.C., and Champaign, Illinois, to “represent a spirit and force that has long been absent from American broadcasting...[and] work for the growth of vibrant, responsive and human broadcasting.” The Washington office, under the direction of St. Louis community radio station manager Tom Thomas and his partner Theresa [Terry] Clifford, pursued the Federation’s ambitious public policy agenda, developed in consultation with the organization’s members. The Champaign office, directed by Thomas’ brother Bill, was the hub of a program distribution service, acquiring content from producers, duplicating, and disseminating tapes to community radio stations around the country. These founding executives played crucial roles throughout the first fifteen years of the NFCB, even after their formal relationships with the Federation ended.

From the outset, the NFCB faced a host of logistical, financial, and political challenges. The member stations of the NFCB operated on the margins of American broadcasting, with little capital, minimal facilities, and small audiences. Radically different from the dominant commercial model of broadcast service in both form and content, many of the Federation’s participants believed that their noncommercial status would “insulate them from the influence of the profit motive and the capitalist marketplace, thus enabling them to develop alternatives to the dominant commercial broadcasting formats and structures.” Over its first fifteen years, as the NFCB became a force in noncommercial broadcasting and public policy, the organization would test, and be tested by, this set of assumptions.
Within months of the organization’s establishment, NFCB took on a host of thorny internal issues. The members continually wrestled with the terms and conditions that might characterize community radio and define the appropriate ideological and practical requirements for membership. Dedicated to the advancement of those who had historically been absent from radio broadcasting, the organization struggled to find methods to actualize that commitment in its membership, services, and programs. When the dues assessed from members proved to be an inadequate financial base, the Federation’s staff had to develop the skills and expertise with government and foundation funding opportunities. These issues, and many more, shaped the capacities of the NFCB, and contributed to the outcomes of the organization’s initiatives.

At the same time, NFCB faced an equally daunting external agenda. In the years between 1975 and 1990, the NFCB Program Service confronted successive and rapid developments in technology, as audio distribution moved from reel tape and telephone lines to digital recorders and satellites. The noncommercial portion of the FM spectrum became increasingly competitive, as religious, educational, and public radio agencies maneuvered to occupy available frequencies across the U.S. Concurrently, the administration of President Ronald Reagan brought wholesale changes to the government’s approach to the oversight and financing of public broadcasting. Some of the most pervasive change took place at the Federal Communications Commission [FCC], as Chairman Mark Fowler embarked on a program to systematically deregulate broadcasting, eliminating such long-standing policies including program documentation requirements, community ascertainment procedures, and the Fairness Doctrine. These
circumstances would fundamentally restructure common understandings of the terms and conditions that drove broadcasting in the U.S., especially the rhetoric of “the public interest, convenience, and necessity” that has been part of U.S. communications policy since the Radio Act of 1927.\textsuperscript{xv}

**Significance of the study**

This study is significant for a number of reasons. In general, little scholarly literature explores the topic of community radio in the United States. Most often, the topic has been subsumed within the broader study of noncommercial, educational, and public broadcasting or nonconformist, alternative, and underground radio. Though alternatives to corporate, commercial broadcasting have existed since the earliest days of radio, few researchers have chosen to focus on the theory of locally controlled, citizen-programmed radio, and the stations and agencies that put the theory into practice. A small body of literature focuses on the Pacifica Foundation and its licensed FM stations in five major markets, but these studies do not speak to the NFCB specifically, or to the scores of community radio services in cities, towns, and rural localities throughout the U.S that are not affiliated with Pacifica. Fairchild examines the broader field of community radio through case studies in the U.S. and Canada, while a handful of articles provide survey information about American community radio or examine specific subtopics, including Mahler, Salter, Barlow, and Bekken.\textsuperscript{xvi} A more comprehensive investigation of the formative years of community radio and the NFCB by Bergethon is now more than 20 years old.
This study is also significant because it examines a body of evidence that has not been explored by other scholars. While a few of community radio’s important founders, most notably Lewis Hill and Lorenzo Milam, have shared their thoughts and experiences in written and oral forms, the vast majority of those who were present during NFCB’s formative years have never had the opportunity to share their stories with academic researchers. Similarly, few researchers have consulted this history as it was originally documented in the papers and publications of the NFCB, particularly in the periodic newsletters that have been published regularly since the organization’s inception. This project seeks to fill in the historical record by consulting, documenting, and interpreting these primary sources.

Finally, this study is significant because it narrates a history that echoes through the contemporary emergence of grassroots, Low Power FM [LPFM] radio. Ironically, the FCC’s efforts in the 1970s to eliminate protections for low power FM signals, structured in direct response to the concerns of the NFCB, contributed to the public discontent and disillusionment that spurred the Commission to rewrite interference rules and create a new class of FM service in 1999. Today, these LPFM stations face many of the same challenges encountered by the NFCB and its member stations in their formative years, including organizational development, capitalization, public telecommunications policy, and mission issues. Through the examination of this period in American mass media history, this study provided insight into the continuing evolution of LPFM and other emerging grassroots media, such as Internet-based streaming audio and on-demand audio program production and distribution (“podcasting”).
At a time when historic conceptions of service to geographic localities are being supplanted by models of pervasive, globalizing media, this study resonates with contemporary issues in the political economy of mass media. In 1975, the NFCB was established to promote the role of decentralized and independent media in the service of liberal democratic principles, anticipating the work of contemporary scholars who focus on concentration of ownership and control, demassification of the audience, personalization of content, and especially the role of mass media in democratic society. The NFCB provides a case study of how these issues and principles play out within the constraints of the marketplace and political system. The NFCB pursued this mission at a point in history where those constraints were re-forged by a new generation of policymakers who were dedicated to weakening the ties between government and broadcasting, and expanding the influence of the market. This unique confluence of political, economic, and social forces provides the NFCB with a significant place in the history of mass media in the U.S.

**Overview of the study**

This project is organized in three sections. Chapters II through IV summarize the existing literature relevant to the topic, and detail the theoretical framework, research questions, and research methods employed in the investigation. Chapter V through VIII take a generally chronological approach to the historical developments that led up to the establishment of the NFCB, following the evolution of the organization through the winter of 1990. The final chapter discusses the research findings, the limitations of the
project, the implications of the research for current issues in mass media and communication, and offers directions for future research.

The literature reviewed in chapter II falls into four broad categories. The review begins with an examination of work drawn from the body of mass communication scholarship that examines the ownership and control of mass media agencies and systems, including the work of Smythe, Murdock and Golding, and Mosco. Building on this foundation, the chapter surveys efforts to document the history of the radio industry in the United States, and looks more specifically at the body of scholarly literature on the history of American noncommercial radio, including the work of Blakely, Rowland, and Witherspoon, Kovitz, Stavitsky, and Avery. After a brief consideration of literature that explores other radical and alternative traditions in mass media, the chapter turns to scholarly efforts to compile the history of community radio in the U.S., including the studies undertaken by Lasar, Barlow, Lewis and Booth, Walker, and Fairchild. The chapter closes with a treatment of those studies that treat issues in community radio within the framework of mass media, society, and cultural studies.

Chapter III details the theoretical foundations of the study, beginning with a summary of the variety of theoretical approaches scholars have taken to the study of broadcast media, and asserts the appropriateness of critical political economy as a framework for the investigation of the NFCB as a public policy advocacy agency. The chapter develops an operational definition of community radio, and explains how this definition frames the historical circumstances, issues, and events detailed in the study.
The chapter closes with the statement of the four research questions addressed in the following chapters.

Chapter IV provides a description of the research methods employed in the investigation. This project is a historical study, relying on qualitative methods appropriate for historical research. The study relies on in-depth interviews with 35 individuals who were either directly involved with the establishment and development of the NFCB, or were engaged in the broader public radio industry in the years framed by the study. The research also relies on the analysis of more than 4,000 pages of documentary evidence, including nearly every edition of the periodic newsletter of the NFCB, published continuously from the organization’s founding in 1975. In addition, the study examined a variety of contemporaneous documents, including transcripts of congressional testimony, policy and position papers, meeting minutes, memoranda, financial statements, annual reports, and other artifacts from the Federation’s annual conferences and business meetings.

Chapter V offers an historical examination of the issues, events, and people that contributed to the foundations of community radio in the United States. Between the invention of radio broadcasting and the end World War II, a succession of educators, policy makers, and broadcast activists worked unsuccessfully to establish a system of noncommercial broadcasting in the context of the prevailing American system of privately owned, advertiser supported radio and television service. With the authorization of NCE channels in the postwar years, a number of individuals and agencies worked to finance, build, and operate noncommercial broadcasting outlets,
including the first community radio stations. The work of three pioneers of unconventional radio services - Lewis Hill, Lorenzo Milam, and Jeremy Lansman – inspired a generation of radio broadcasting activists to create community radio stations around the country.

Chapter VI narrates the story of NFCB’s establishment, from the organization’s founding in the summer of 1975 through the organization’s participation in the second Carnegie Commission study of public broadcasting. In this period, the key figures in the founding of the organization began to craft the formative agenda for national policy, and bring together the resources required to operate a program distribution network for community radio stations. In this period, the founders established key relationships with other public broadcasting advocates and agencies, and struggled to address the ambitious goals of the Federation with meager financial resources. Consequently, the NFCB turned to outside agencies, including well-established private foundations, to gain financial support for the organization’s projects and policy agenda.

Between 1978 and 1984, the NFCB became one of the most active agencies in public broadcasting. Chapter VII discusses the first years of the Reagan administration and the bold attempts of free market conservatives to deregulate the entire broadcasting industry and systematically de-fund the American public broadcasting system. In this challenging environment, the NFCB built a record of success before the FCC on issues of channel allotment and authorization, and in negotiation with other key agencies of public broadcasting, especially NPR and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. When a major debt crisis at NPR threatened to bring down all of public radio, NFCB participated
in the first major restructuring of the public radio system. At the same time, changes in
technology challenged the NFCB Program Service, as distribution moved from tape to
satellite. The chapter closes with the departure of Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford from
the NFCB.

Chapter VIII opens with the NFCB’s difficult transition from the founders to new
leadership. Overseeing the organization from 1984 to 1986, Carol Schatz brought strong
professional skills and experience to the NFCB, but found it difficult to assume the
leadership of the independent-minded members and operate within the severe financial
constraints of organization’s meager resources. In 1986 and 1987, the NFCB was on the
brink of collapse, when key members emerged to take control of the organization, and
found a new leader to take control of the NFCB’s finances and re-energize the
Federation’s policy agenda. Rededicated to the organization’s founding goals under the
leadership of Lynn Chadwick, the NFCB joined other agencies to press the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting for major changes in policy that allowed a more diverse public
radio system to serve more diverse audiences.

The final chapter discusses some of the outcomes of NFCB’s first fifteen years,
and examines the implications of the organization’s history on the present state of public
broadcasting, mass media, and communication. The conclusion outlines the limitations
inherent in the study, and suggests approaches that future research may take to enhance
the findings of the present project, or augment those findings with investigations of
people and issues that deserve more extensive investigation.
While the pressures of the prevailing political economy of the broadcasting industry in general and of public broadcasting in particular compromised the founding principles and objectives of the NFCB to some extent, the persistence and resourcefulness of the Federation’s leaders and members allowed them to accomplish an ambitious agenda. The history of the NFCB provides a blueprint for those presently involved in efforts to establish more democratic approaches to mass media that serve the interests of citizens, rather than the apparent desires of consumers or the profit motives of commercial interests. In an era when activists call for initiatives at the federal, regional, and local levels to reform the media and make them more responsible to the civic and cultural needs of their audiences, the formative history of the NFCB demonstrates that it is possible for a small group of intelligent, energetic, and committed people to influence the national expression of public service and the public interest.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The literature relevant to the historical development of the NFCB cuts across four broad areas of inquiry: (1) The ownership and control of mass media assets and structures; (2) the historical development of noncommercial radio in the U.S.; (3) the institutional, political, economic, and social development of community radio and the NFCB; and, (4) cultural studies of mass media and society.

Ownership and control of mass media assets and structures

Unlike neoclassical economics, which often describes economic activity through static models, critical political economy examines issues of mass media ownership and control within the broad, dynamic context of social movements. In particular, political economy views markets as sites of social interaction and activity, rather than naturally occurring products of entrepreneurial initiative. By examining the actual processes and outcomes of economic behavior, political economy calls into question the neoclassical paradigm of the “invisible hand” that guides market activity.

Smythe (1960), a former Chief Economist of the Federal Communications Commission, was among the first to apply the principles of political economy to the mass media sector. For Smythe, the purpose of the political economy of communication was “to evaluate the effects of communication agencies in terms of the policies by which they are organized and operated.” Smythe identified the key concerns as policy on the quantity and quality of goods or services; policy on the equality in the distribution of
services; and patterns of capitalization, ownership and control. Observing the industrial history of the American television and film industries, Smythe demonstrated how ownership interests have asserted control over the market, even as some forms of operational and program control were exercised in the arena of public policy. Smythe (1977) also asserted that audiences of commercial mass media content supply content providers with uncompensated labor, in the form of consumer attention. This attention, documented by audience research firms, constitutes a commodity that is sold to advertisers. For Smythe, the primary purpose of this “consciousness industry”xxi was to acculturate audiences into appropriate consumer behavior, for the benefit of media ownership interests.

Another political economy tradition arises within the context of European noncommercial, state-owned mass media. Murdock and Golding (1973) observed that the mass media “can only be understood in the light of historical process and economic necessity.”xxii Looking primarily at print media, Murdock and Golding observed concentration as evidenced by horizontal (across levels of production) and vertical integration (into other related areas of manufacturing, production, and distribution). They also observed the increasing diversification of media enterprises, including cross-ownership of media properties, and the internationalization of mass media, exporting media products and gathering foreign investment. They found that these patterns “establish the general and systematic constraints on information and leisure provision which result from the necessities of survival and profitability.”xxiii The political economy of mass media constructs information as a commodity, and constrains access to and use
of information by common citizens, thus constraining public debate. While they identified local press agencies as sites of decentralization and resistance, Murdock and Golding contended that “much of this remains in the realm of fantasy, part of grasping at straws of a fighting national press.”

Garnham (1986) asserted that the strength of noncommercial media lies in the separation of political and economic forces. In the political realm, individuals are defined as citizens, working within a communal structure of rules and laws. The object of political engagement “is essentially social and the legitimate end of social action is the public good.” In contrast, individuals in the economic realm are defined as producers and consumers. The object of economic engagement is self-interest, operating towards the goal of private advancement. Garnham argued that this contradiction cannot be resolved, and that mass media provide the best example of the contradiction because they operate in both realms simultaneously. Beyond issues of ownership and control, Garnham found clashes of value systems and social relations, as state-owned noncommercial media engage in an accelerating competition with private, commercial providers.

Beyond simply identifying patterns of ownership and control, Gandy (1992) asserted the critical approach of political economy is important to identify and explore “inequality in the provision of information goods and services, distortions in the labor market, and biases in the coverage of issues of social importance.” Gandy identified how imperfections in the communications and information markets tend towards instability, concentration, and monopoly. Further, Gandy contended that the state is
incapable of acting as an objective and unbiased regulator of communications markets and infrastructures, based on the existence of “a never-ending stream of examples of state involvement on behalf of particular interests.” And, he asserted, “institutions, not individuals, are the dominant forces in the political economy.”

Mosco (1996) provided a substantive analytical framework for considering the social, economic and political issues of mass media in modern society. Building on Smythe’s work, Mosco asserted that content and audiences act as commodities in the mass media marketplace. Mosco also identified the process of spatialization, or the ability of mass media enterprises to work across and break down geographic and social boundaries. In addition, Mosco described the process of structuration, or the media's ability to manifest, influence, and perpetuate social structures, relationships and classes. Mosco’s concepts of commodification, structuration and spatialization provide a three-dimensional map for locating communications in terms of social customs, processes and practices.

Peters (1997) examined the relationship between political economy and culture within the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas. For Peters, the metaphor brings to mind goods valued or devalued, bought and sold by bare-knuckled entrepreneurs seeking personal gain through the satisfaction of utilitarian needs. But unlike wheat, corn or soybeans, ideas are the prevailing currency of communication. More powerful than any commodity, the essential and critical substance of human communication is simply too valuable to be subjected to the rough-and-tumble machinations of markets that are never free or fair.
In his scholarship on alternative media organizations, Hamilton (2000) found that the issues of commercialism and professionalism represent a “deep and powerful set of conventions on which capitalist societies rest that alternative media and communication must resist and absolutely challenge.” Calling into question “the corporatized, professionalized definition of public broadcasting, which casts doubt on just how participatory and politically vibrant such a practice can be,” Hamilton called for more democratic forms of communication, characterized by reduced reliance on capital, broad citizen participation, spontaneous forms of organization, and integration into the common practices of daily life. “Such goals would help to erase the division between producers and consumers and become popular means of cultural organizing and exploration instead of individualized media products to consume.” These insights echo many of the founding principles of the NFCB.

Historical development of noncommercial radio in the U.S.

The consensus view of American broadcasting, articulated in such survey texts as Head and Sterling (1998), chronicles the ascendancy of commercial radio, propelled by the inventions and initiatives of private entrepreneurs and national corporations. In this narrative, the broadcast media in America “provide the classic example of a predominantly permissive or laissez-faire system.… The industry argues that resulting commercialism creates more lively, popular, and expertly produced programs than are usually found elsewhere.” Noncommercial broadcasting services have little effect on this system: The whole of community radio is summarized as “several hundred noncommercial FM stations and a growing number of low-power AM stations … lumped
under the *progressive format*, which mixes live and recorded music and talk, usually at the whim of the presenter. Later, Sterling with Kitross (2002) offered a more generous account of noncommercial broadcasting within this prevailing paradigm.

Beginning with the efforts of educators and other pioneers of wireless communication, this history documents the many challenges and few successes of American noncommercial broadcasters in both radio and television. Identifying contemporary noncommercial services as “the public broadcasting alternative,” Sterling and Kitross nevertheless situated noncommercial broadcasting within the market system, as “a stepchild of commercial radio and television.”

Barnouw’s three-volume history of broadcasting in the U.S. provided a more detailed and critical investigation of the development of radio and television broadcasting, from its inception through the postwar period. Barnouw chronicled radio’s initial technical and institutional development (1966), the rise and consolidation of the national radio networks (1968), and the prominent transition from radio to television in public policy and culture (1970). This narrative focuses on contests for control of American broadcasting, first among government, educational and commercial interests, and later among industrial interests aided by government regulators. These circumstances allowed first radio, and then television, to achieve immense popularity and power as national communications media. While Barnouw’s approach favors industrial and political movements over sociological effects, the work clearly documented how industrial power shaped U.S. mass media markets, and demonstrated the difficulties
encountered by noncommercial broadcasters and the FCC, especially under Newton Minow, to secure spectrum for NCE services. xxxviii

In the first decade of the 20th century, the invention and development of radio was undertaken by a variety of academic researchers, and amateur tinkers of all sorts, usually acting alone, or in small groups. Douglas (1987) documented how private citizens, acting as amateur radio operators, played a paramount role in the technical and practical development of radio during this period. Douglas (1999) also demonstrated how radio was constructed as a male-gendered medium, a characteristic that would become a focus of the NFCB’s efforts to broaden participation.

McChesney (1993) documented how the interests of noncommercial agencies were systematically eclipsed by the forces of national, commercial broadcasting between 1928 and 1935, as the U.S. adopted a more comprehensive approach to broadcast regulation. McChesney particularly cites the Federal Radio Commission’s General Order 40, and the reallocation of more than 90 percent of the spectrum. McChesney explains that directive, in combination with the FRC’s designation of high power, advertiser-supported, network-controlled stations as the best expression of service in the public interest, relegated other services to secondary status as “propaganda” stations. Services licensed to labor unions, social organization, and educational institutions were forced to reduce power, share time, and scramble to find financial support for their services. McChesney demonstrated how the actions of the FRC and private broadcasters particularly threatened stations licensed to schools, colleges, and universities.
In his consensus history of American public broadcasting, Blakely (1979) offered a narrative of principled and hardworking individuals who labored for decades to establish and promote broadcast services that would serve the educational and cultural interests of American citizens. In Blakely’s history, noncommercial broadcasting operates beyond the marketplace of mass media, overcoming a series of funding and operational challenges through partnerships with government and private agencies, especially the Ford Foundation. These efforts culminated in the passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, and the subsequent formation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting [CPB], the Public Broadcasting Service [PBS], and NPR.

In the introduction to his edited volume on the state of public broadcasting, Cater (1976) documented two fundamental, unresolved issues at the heart of the U.S. approach to noncommercial radio and television services. The first was the Carnegie Commission’s intention to develop public broadcasting through locally controlled, independent stations and production centers, in contrast to highly centralized commercial networks. While such a plan was philosophically sound, in practice it “goes directly against the laws of broadcast economics, and has set public broadcasting at war with itself in trying to budget scarce resources.”xxix The second was the haphazard and generally neglectful approach to long range funding for public broadcasting agencies and services, and the resultant political pressures that emerged through repeated cycles of short-term and stop-gap federal appropriations. Asserting that “money seldom comes without strings,” Cater observed, “public broadcasting’s future weal will lie in being alert
to undue influence from any source." These issues of localism and financial control would figure significantly in the evolution of the NFCB.

While educational broadcasting found support from philanthropic interests in the postwar period, Rowland (1986) asserted that the reasons behind this support were not entirely altruistic. While Ford may have been interested in serving the greater good, the foundation’s grants to educational broadcasters also supported the elitist principle of cultural advancement, by embracing public television's capacity to expose the masses to the content of high culture. In turn, some in the philanthropic and educational communities believed that these influences would contribute to a society of more educated citizens, who could advance the goals of commercial enterprise in their capacities as workers and consumers. While private support spurred the establishment of educational broadcasting facilities, and paved the way for the first public funding of noncommercial broadcasting facilities in 1962, Rowland echoed Barnouw and foreshadowed McChesney, asserting that noncommercial broadcasting has historically been shortchanged by U.S. public policy.

Within their concise history of educational and public broadcasting, Witherspoon, Kovitz, Avery, and Stavitsky (2000) focused on the conflict that arose in the 1980s between public broadcasting’s mission-driven services and the desire of public broadcasters to secure a larger share of the mass media market. While most noncommercial broadcasters rejected the use of audience surveys and ratings data as “creeping commercialism,” during this period “CPB and increasing numbers of stations embraced audience research as a tool for assessing programming and fundraising."
This issue would be particularly troublesome for the NFCB, pitting those individuals in the organization who were most committed to overcoming the dominant paradigm of the market against those who believed survival and prosperity lay with a market-centered approach.

The issues of localism and local service have been equally difficult for the NFCB. Stavitsky (1994) documented the shift from services targeted at geographically defined audiences to those delineated by demographics and psychographics; the parallel development of the public policy debates that accompanied the historic use of the spectrum for 10-watt FM stations; and the contemporary debate over spectrum allocations for Low Power FM services (with Avery and Vanhala, 2001). As an advocate for public policy, the NFCB was substantially engaged with both of these issues during its formative years, and both shaped the character and direction of the organization.

A related body of literature explores historical forces and events that contributed to the broader development of other nontraditional and noncommercial media in the U.S. Kessler (1984) traced the historical threads of dissident American media from the founding of the republic through the postwar period. Focusing on the publications of the utopian socialist movement, abolitionists, suffragists, labor radicals, ethnic communities, and pacifists, Kessler demonstrated how social and political dissidents have used media to reach key constituencies, articulate ideology, and expand the marketplace of ideas in the U.S. These publications presented new ideas to the public, and perhaps more important, offered a location for identity, expression, and support for disenfranchised groups and individuals.
Tracy (1996) offered a concise history of the postwar radical pacifist movement, and the impact that these groups and individuals had on social dissent in the U.S. through the 1960s. The author asserted that the radicals’ resistance to traditional analysis of labor and class issues, and traditional leadership structures, privileged an anti-authoritarian philosophy that became “a key contributory factor in the ultimate unraveling of the political left in the late 1960s.” Tracy briefly records the involvement of Lewis Hill, who would later establish the Pacifica Foundation, with David Dellinger’s magazine, Direct Action, articulating Hill’s belief that the American public would never share the radical pacifists’ goal of nonviolent revolution.

Peck (1985) offered a personal recounting of his involvement with the underground print media of the 1960s. Underground papers, staffed for the most part by young, white, middle-class Americans with little background in journalism, offered a different view of the era’s political turmoil and counterculture movement. But for the most part these papers, dependent on advertising revenue, failed to attract the audiences necessary to endure in the marketplace. At the same time, Peck demonstrated how some of these efforts survived as community media, targeting race, gender, environmental and other particular issues. Such issue consciousness would shape the NFCB in its early years, articulated in some cases by individuals who had been a part of the earlier underground print movement.

Community radio and the NFCB

Few scholars have explored the role and mission of the NFCB. Most often the NFCB is considered in the context of other noncommercial broadcasting institutions, especially the
Pacifica Foundation.

**Pacifica.** Founded in San Francisco, California in 1946, the Pacifica Foundation and its five radio stations have provided both a model and a locus of institutional power for American community radio, and played a crucial role in determining the nature and direction of the NFCB. Because the history of the NFCB and Pacifica are intertwined, this body of literature sheds light on many of the people, events, and issues that shaped the Federation.

The individual most frequently identified as the intellectual force behind community radio in the U.S. is Lewis Hill, Pacifica’s founder and the first general manager of KPFA FM. A radical pacifist who came of age between the world wars, Hill believed that ongoing dialogue, disseminated over noncommercial radio, could overcome political and economic differences, and contribute to social consensus. Reasoning that such a radio station could be financed by voluntary contributions from the audience, Hill delineated his theory of listener-supported radio in a report to the primary underwriter of educational and noncommercial broadcasting in the 1950s, the Ford Foundation’s Fund for Adult Education (1957). The report details Pacifica’s philosophy of citizen-centered broadcasting, the station’s operations, facilities and programming, and tracks the stations efforts at “promotion” (fundraising), which had never been attempted in noncommercial broadcasting. Hill also explained Pacifica’s intention to engage an audience of individuals through a wide range of programs. Hill’s ideology would infuse all efforts that followed in American community radio.
Ragan (1963) provided the first descriptive study of the Foundation and KPFA radio, offering a detailed analysis of Pacifica’s articles of incorporation and by-laws, and a focused discussion of the advantages and limitations of the listener-supported model. Concentrating on Pacifica’s economic issues, the study did not touch on the broader organizational or political issues faced by Pacifica, or on the historical context of the organization’s development.

Stebbins’ study of Pacifica (1969) concentrated on the organization’s political and social history, and especially its ongoing difficulties with federal authorities. Utilizing document analysis and interviews with the individuals engaged at Pacifica stations, Stebbins documented Pacifica’s engagement with the FCC, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and other political entanglements. A listener survey documented the reality of Hill’s listener-sponsor theory and supported the connection between listener sponsorship and editorial independence.

Lumpp (1978) offered a thorough examination of Pacifica’s place in the broader scheme of alternative media in the U.S, grounded in communications and social theory. The study located Pacifica’s ideological and operational characteristics on a twelve-point continuum to demonstrate how the organization established priorities and reached decisions, and how these characteristics are played out in Pacifica’s programming, especially in relationship to labor and free expression issues. While the historical focus is clearly secondary, the work established the importance and relevance of Pacifica within the larger framework of mass media and society. Though it is contemporary with the Federation’s, the work makes no mention of the NFCB.
Concentrating on Pacifica’s contribution to the understanding and interpretation of the First Amendment, Land (1999) examined Pacifica’s underlying ideology in the context of moral philosophy. The study covered the pacifist movement, the early history of noncommercial radio, the establishment of KPFA, and the conflicts and challenges of the 1970s that led Pacifica away from Hill’s vision of radio dialogue into uncritical, constituency driven programming. Demonstrating Pacifica’s role as a microcosm of progressive political movements and a champion of dissent in a democratic society, Land asserted that passionate speech has the moral and intellectual power to overcome the brutality of war. The author’s enthusiasm and admiration for the subject were clearly evident: His analysis of Pacifica’s crusade does not touch on the personal costs paid by those who were caught up in the organization’s contentious internal battles over elitism, marginality, and economic survival.

Lasar (2000) offered the most comprehensive history of the Pacifica Foundation and its five radio stations. The author documented the experiences that contributed to Lewis Hill’s dedication to the ideal of peaceful dialogue, the ideological nature of Pacifica, its interpersonal, political, and financial struggles, and the organization’s emphasis on unfettered personal expression. Based on document analysis and extensive interviews with Pacifica’s principal figures, Lasar illustrated how patterns of internal conflict were repeated regularly over thirty-five years. Lasar’s history centers on the value conflicts that emerge in an organization of idealists, radicals, artists and professional broadcasters, detailing how Hill’s ideal of dialogic pluralism has been
replaced by uncritical and uncontested advocacy statements from particular constituencies.

Though none of these studies specifically references the NFCB, they catalog a body of ideologies and issues that characterize the NFCB and its member stations. In addition, because the Pacifica Foundation and its five stations marshal substantial financial resources and serve relatively large audiences in major markets (New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington D.C., and Houston), they have had a significant impact on the Federation’s position and direction throughout its history, particularly after the Pacifica stations became members of the organization.

Community radio beyond Pacifica. Where Lew Hill promoted the concepts of voluntary association and listener-supported radio to serve the goals of Pacifica’s centralized organization, Lorenzo Milam sought to develop noncommercial stations that would be controlled directly by the communities they served (Barlow, 1988). After volunteering at KPFA in the 1950s, Milam established a series of volunteer-operated, noncommercial radio stations across the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s, operating under distinctive call signs including KRAB (Seattle); KBOO (Portland); KCHU (Dallas); KTAO (Los Altos, California); and KDNA (St. Louis); and licensed to nonprofit organizations with such idiosyncratic names as the Nathan B. Stubblefield Foundation and the Pataphysical Broadcasting Foundation. In Sex and Broadcasting (1971) Milam claimed, “broadcasting as it exists now in the United States is a pitiful, unmitigated whore … perpetuated by nitwits who should know better.”

Taking broad swipes at commercial, religious, and educational broadcasters, the FCC, attorneys, and authority in
general through 345 pages of self-published text, Milam nevertheless offered a comprehensive, step-by-step guide to licensing, financing, building, and operating a community station that “should be a live place for people to sing and dance and talk: To talk their talk and walk their walk and know that they (and the rest of us) are not finally and irrevocably dead.” Milam’s mixture of critical understanding, compassion, and anti-authoritarianism was equally evident in his attempts to convince the FCC to place limitations on reservations noncommercial spectrum for religious and institutional broadcasters (as Allworthy, 1975) and in his essays on a variety of topics in radio (1986).

One of the first scholarly and critical discussions of community radio can be found in Fortunale and Mills (1980), who offer one chapter summarizing issues in noncommercial radio in the context of a culture dominated by television. Fortunale and Mills briefly describe Milam’s role as “the resource center of this new radio,” as well as Milam’s relationship with NFCB President Tom Thomas, one of the key figures in the history of the organization. Fortunale and Mills provide a single paragraph describing the founding goals of NFCB “to promote sharing of ideas and programs among member stations and to give those scattered stations a voice in Washington.” The authors devote the greater portion of their examination to National Public Radio.

Bergethon (1982) compared and contrasted a variety of characteristics of Pacifica and other community radio stations. Through historical document review, interviews, and a mail survey, Bergethon described the variety of funding sources, programming, volunteer involvement, and market characteristics. Noting that the field had been collectively self-defined, Bergethon relied on the NFCB’s criteria for membership to
structure a scholarly definition of community radio. The result was a self-referencing
descriptive study that invited a deeper investigation of the NFCB and its relationship to
the broader sphere of mass media control.

Barlow (1988) asserted a more ideological definition of community radio, based
on noncommercial status, local involvement in program production, and democratically
governed operating practices and processes. For Barlow, the commonality in U.S.
community radio stations can be found in “the same broadly defined ideological
orientation and … the same social constraints in their day-to-day operations. In addition
to community involvement, their ideology champions progressive politics, alternative
cultures, and participatory democracy.” In this view, the NFCB exists to coordinate
the development of community stations around the U.S., cooperating with NPR in
“something of an unwritten ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with respect to the demarcations of
the public radio domain.” The tensions observed by Barlow, between artistic and
political motivations, and the clashing styles and objectives of grassroots activists and
national leaders (including the NFCB), form a basis for further investigation.

Bekken (1998) was more outspoken for the ideology of participatory democracy,
and more strident in his criticisms of the institutional constraints that are “reshaping
community radio.” In this view, federal policies that encourage signal expansion, local
revenue development, and audience growth have led to circumstances where “it is no
longer possible for many listeners to hope to participate in running their ‘community
radio’ station.” Bekken was especially critical of the NFCB’s efforts to advance a
“professional broadcasting ideology” on behalf of community radio’s station managers, at the expense of community activists and volunteers.

Lewis and Booth (1990) investigated the forms and structures of community radio in many nations, including the U.S. Finding that the purposes of community radio are generally expressed in commitments to local control, community access (especially for those who have been excluded from the mass media), and clear statements of intent, they asserted: “For the NFCB, the key features of community radio can be summarized as: an element of control by the local community, typically in a board of management; a commitment to community access, especially for those normally excluded from the mass media – women, ethnic groups and people of color, the elderly and young people. This policy implies the use of volunteers. In turn, this requires a training program. Paid staff and volunteers should have a voice in policy, which implies the definition of a clear purpose to which all can relate.” While the authors observed the importance of FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson in advancing the Federation’s media reform agenda during the 1970s, they were otherwise silent on the institutional development of the NFCB.

Like Bekken, Fairchild (2001) took issue with the NFCB’s policy initiatives of the 1980s. Finding fault with NFCB’s cooperation with the FCC, CPB and Pacifica on several issues, Fairchild claimed that NFCB ignored community radio’s ideological commitments to grassroots activism, choosing instead to serve “the self-interest of those who were most able to divide the spectrum up among themselves and influence policy-makers to transform self-interest into law.” This “collusion of the FCC, NFCB,
Pacifica, and the CPB on numerous issues is merely symptomatic of a larger split within and between the progressive media establishment and more locally focused grassroots agitation."⁵⁴ Relying on secondary evidence, Fairchild’s analysis focused almost exclusively on the control of the means of production and the needs of content producers, while giving less attention to the organizational, financial, and audience service concerns that formed the foundations of the NFCB.

Similarly, in his historical narrative of alternative, underground, and unlicensed “pirate” radio on the commercial and noncommercial bands, Walker (2000) briefly summarized the early evolution of the NFCB, and the Federation’s role in the “subversion of community radio” by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.⁵⁵ While he acknowledged that the leaders of the NFCB “almost certainly believed that they were doing what was best,” Walker contended that the Federation’s willingness to accommodate CPB requirements and directives in order to obtain grants for some stations exerted a corrupting influence on community radio.⁵⁶ Asserting that NFCB “sometimes seemed to be lobbying for the Beltway’s interests inside community radio,” Walker demonstrated how “federal aid has brought with it incentives to professionalize, to centralize, to homogenize. Whatever its effect on individuals stations, its net effect on community radio has been poor.”⁵⁷ However, Walker limited his investigation to particular sites of ideological conflict, giving less attention to the broader landscape of political, economic, and social forces that were at play within the NFCB during the period from 1975 to 1990.
Mass media, society, and cultural studies

The social and cultural consequences of mass media, and radio broadcasting in particular, have captured the attention of communication scholars for a century. This body of research examines the relationships that exist among ideology, content, audience experience, and the meaning found in mass media content.

Dewey’s (1925/1988) theory of knowledge centers the processes of communication in the human imagination. For Dewey, the process of receiving and interpreting messages in the imagination “terminates in a modification of the objective order, in the institution of a new object that is other than a merely added occurrence. It involves the dissolution of old objects and a forming of new ones in a medium which, since it is beyond the old object and not yet in a new one, can properly be termed subjective.” Dewey’s sentiments presaged Lew Hill’s ideology of dialogue and community building.

In this view, communication fundamentally shapes community and social intercourse, and provides the bedrock of participatory democracy. Concurrently, Dewey (1927) conferred power to the spoken word, conversation, and dialogue:

“The connections of the ear with vital and outgoing thought and emotion are immensely closer and more varied than the eye…. There is no limit to the liberal expansion and confirmation of limited personal intellectual endowment which may proceed from the flow of social intelligence when it circulates by word of mouth from one to another in the communications of the local community.”

These sentiments presaged Lew Hill’s ideology of dialogue and community building.
Where Dewey was enthusiastic about the democratic capacities of communication, the scholars of the Frankfurt School, as demonstrated by Adorno and Horkheimer (1947), were fundamentally elitist and pessimistic in their considerations of culture, society, and radio in particular, which “turns all participants into listeners and authoritatively subjects them to broadcast programs which are all exactly the same.”

By turning the products of artistic processes, particularly music, into commodities of the mass market, “the fusion of culture and entertainment that is taking place today leads not only to a deprivation of culture, but inevitably to an intellectualization of amusement.”

Echoing the concerns for public access and free expression that emerged in the U.S. in the 1920’s, they noted how “private broadcasters are denied any freedom. They are confined to the apocryphal field of the ‘amateur’, and also have to accept organization from above,” prohibiting “any trace of spontaneity.” Such concerns reverberate with the NFCB’s efforts to expand the role of private citizens as producers, and bring authentic voices to the broadcast spectrum.

Williams (1961) asserted that the understanding of any culture begins with the discovery and understanding of the patterns of belief and behavior that characterize its members. Analyzing the development of mass communication, in the form of the written and printed word, and its relationship to the development of culture, Williams contended that the process of communication forms a circulating narrative that transforms unique individual experience into the collective cultural knowledge. For Williams, the institutions and structures of political economy are one part of the larger fabric of many cultural conventions. Williams asserted that the American system of corporate,
commercial mass media leads to “massification,” dividing culture into powerful elites and an apathetic, disengaged public.\textsuperscript{lxiv} Williams contended that public broadcasting in the United States operates “in the margin, or as a palliative,” rather than a primary service.\textsuperscript{lxv}

Unlike Williams, Hoggart (1972) was concerned with manifestation and variety of culture reflected in forms of speech. In his comparative study of the British Broadcasting Company [BBC] and the common speech of citizens in several areas of Great Britain, Hoggart explored the multiple meaning contained in spoken language, asserting that “inside our own society … we have a code book for reading the signals that society provides.”\textsuperscript{lxvi} Hoggart criticized the noncommercial BBC as an elitist institution for its isolation and its lack of connection with the daily experiences of common citizens. In his critique of broadcasting, Hoggart called for institutions that were insulated from the political system, encouraging artistic and intellectual freedom and a diversity of voices. These sentiments would later emerge in the early rhetoric of the NFCB.

Representing a second generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists, Habermas (1962/1991) examined the relationship of the state and civil society, and the origins of democracy. Habermas asserted the progressive power of intersubjective communication in the public sphere, a conceptual space where individuals come together to discuss and work out social problems. Habermas viewed the public sphere as an extension of the private realm of the family, and as a mechanism to defend the private citizen from the power of the state. For Habermas, the media exist to capture and distribute information,
in order to both document and inform the public sphere, rather than distracting the public from engagement with powerful elite interests.

Hilmes (1997) specifically applied these cultural studies perspectives to the historical development of radio in the U.S, examined as set of social practices. Building directly on the legacy of Dewey, Williams, Hoggart, and Habermas, Hilmes demonstrated that “radio was in many ways unique from any preceding or subsequent medium in its ability to transcend spatial boundaries, blur private and public spheres, and escape visual determinations, while still retaining the strong element of ‘realism’ that sound – rather than written words – supplies.”\textsuperscript{lxvii} Processed in the human imagination, these elements create the basis for the sort of community that the founders of the NFCB envisioned through their collective activities.

While this body of cultural studies literature offers powerful insights into the relationships of mass media producers, content, and audiences, it also touches on considerations that go far beyond the NFCB’s role as an institution of public policy.
CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Though the National Federation of Community Broadcasters is closely associated with many agencies of the mass media, the NFCB has never owned and operated broadcast stations, engaged in the production of programs, or distributed content to consumers. Rather, the NFCB is primarily an advocacy agency, created to serve the needs and advance the interests of its constituent members. Those members, in turn, are mass media agencies, or more specifically, nonprofit, noncommercial, broadcasting stations controlled and programmed by groups of citizens, generally described by circumstances of geography. Given this unique and complex relationship, a wide range of theoretical approaches could be appropriate to consider the people, events, and issues that characterized the NFCB in its formative years. This chapter summarizes these approaches, and asserts a framework based on the political economy of communication as the most suitable for analyzing the forces that shaped the NFCB between 1975 and 1990. The framework provides the basis for a series of questions that guide the research and support the overall purpose of the study.

An overview of mass communication theory

In the first four decades of the 20th century, as the phenomenon of radio broadcasting developed rapidly from experimentation through maturity to become a dominant social force, scholars of philosophy, sociology, and political science offered
numerous theories to account for the medium’s power and influence. Ranging from the functionalist explanations of Cantril and Allport to the searing critiques of Adorno and Horkheimer, scholars explored radio’s capacity for shaping and guiding public perception, sentiment, and understanding. Encouraged and underwritten by Westinghouse, the Columbia Broadcasting System, and other privately held industrial concerns eager to expand their audiences and their advertising revenues, research in the United States focused on marketing and audience behavior, with less consideration of the more complex issues of ideology, representation, and social control.\textsuperscript{lxviii} It was only after World War II that scholars turned their attention to the nature, function, and influence of radio broadcasting organizations and institutions. By that time, the dominant forces in American broadcasting – especially the commercial networks, and the regulatory structures that supported them - were firmly cemented in the political, economic, and social architecture of the U.S.

Peters describes three broad traditions in the scholarship of mass communication theory.\textsuperscript{lxix} Each draws on previous work in other disciplines, and all three approaches have been employed to scrutinize the radio medium. The first, the liberal social science tradition exemplified by the research of Lazarsfeld, Katz, and Merton, considers communication and interpretation as phenomena of a consensus social reality, built on Lasswell’s linear model of information transmission and reception. Firmly associated with quantitative methodologies, this body of effects-oriented literature shares a pluralist view, “that the ‘power’ of media rises and falls, conceptually, as a function of the importance attributed to the intervening processes of selectivity and interpersonal
This body of functionalist theory can be characterized by investigations of such topics as persuasion (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955), diffusion (Rogers, 1962), agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), and uses and gratifications (Blumler and Katz, 1974). Though very narrowly applied, evidence of the effects tradition can be found today in the quantitative audience studies conducted by the Nielsen and Arbitron companies, and in the efforts of public radio and television broadcasters to understand the behaviors of the noncommercial audience, as documented by Stavitsky (1993, 1998). These approaches to research wield “additional power in the realm of noncommercial media,” asserts Stavitsky, where “the broad application of audience research reflects the tension between the imperatives of those who fund the service, whether they be consumers or corporations, and traditional conceptions of public broadcasting’s social role.”

The second tradition, distinguished by the work of Dewey, Park, and Carey, emerges from the foundations of social philosophy and cultural studies. Grounded in theories of epistemology and social anthropology, this body of theory considers communication and interpretation as phenomena of cultural meaning making. Using qualitative methods pioneered by the Chicago School to undertake the open-ended, interpretive analysis of complex social relations, these scholars explore the relationship of communication to the development of culture, through investigations into such topics as symbolic interaction (Blumer, 1969) and cultivation (Gerbner, 1967). In the present day, these interpretive traditions and techniques have been co-opted into the service of marketing research by Accudata and other firms to investigate audience loyalty to
particular communication channels and programs. However, broadcasters have rarely exhibited an interest in applying these traditions to more fundamental questions related to the efficacy of communication systems.

The third tradition, characterized by the scholarship of Adorno, Williams, and Smythe, builds on the keystones of ethics and social philosophy; and political, economic, and social criticism. Originating in schools of European literary and cultural scholarship, the body of critical theory focuses on mechanisms of social and cultural control, through critical examinations of the ideology of capitalism and the hidden assumptions of liberal pluralism. Grounded in socialism or Marxism, the critical approach to mass communication relies on interpretive and historical methods to delineate and explain manifestations of power and resistance across the contested landscape of social reality. All but absent from contemporary industrial research, the critical perspective continues in the present day through the academy, broadly considering aspects of the control, production, distribution, reception, and use of mass media.

McQuail subdivides the body of critical theory between “culturalist” and “materialist” perspectives. Within the culturalist approach, McQuail identifies those theories that give primary attention to “the subjective reception of media messages as influenced by the immediate personal environment,” and “the influence of social factors on media production and reception and the functions of media and social life.” The cultural studies approach is characterized by audience-centered examinations of the content and reception of media messages. In contrast, within the materialist perspective, McQuail identifies those theories that give primary attention to “the structural and
technological aspects of the media,” and “the political-economic and material conditions of the society.” The political economy approach is characterized by studies of the structures and technologies of the media of mass communication, with particular attention on markets, ownership, and the means of production.

A substantial body of critical cultural studies scholarship emerged from the United Kingdom during the post-World War II era, asserting that the structures and functions of communication and artifacts of mass media are manifestations of the ongoing processes of human culture. These scholars, and their successors, locate the power of meaning making primarily with the members of the audience, who are actively engaged in the reception, interpretation, and utilization of mediated texts. Williams (1961) explored the historic development of mass media as a cultural force, demonstrating that individuals have always folded the content of mass communication into the fabric of daily life. Similarly, Hoggart (1972) observed the processes of common language use within local communities to demonstrate how the mass media (and particularly the British Broadcasting Company) was actually integrated into the reality of daily life in Britain. Within the Birmingham School, Hall (1980) studied the process of reception in detail, theorizing that the audience has the capacity to construct preferred, negotiated, or opposing meaning in media messages. While the body of critical cultural theory offers powerful insights into the relationship of audiences to media content, such reception-focused investigations offer less insight into the structures and processes that make it possible to bring content to the audience, or perhaps more significantly, assure that audiences are available to receive and influence that content.
Developed concurrently during the postwar era, the scholarship of critical political economy brings the issues of production and distribution to the forefront, by focusing on the agencies of mass communications, and their capacity to propel the processes of meaning making through the establishment, extension, and perpetuation of power. Built on the foundations of classical political economy and history, the political economy approach examines the mass media of communication as a function of the economic base, focusing on the institutions and infrastructures that create and control mediated content, direct and constrain the choices of the audience, and ultimately exert power over society and culture.

**The political economy of communication**

The study of political economy encompasses the broad consideration of the manifestations, measures, and relationships of power within and across social institutions. Domhoff describes power as the ability “to realize wishes, to produce the effects you want to produce. It is one of the basic dimensions of all human experience, whether at the interpersonal, group, or societal level.” With respect to the mass media, the theory of political economy provides a framework for understanding power within and among media institutions, their functions, their relationship to other social institutions, and the role these media institutions play in shaping and focusing social, political and economic power. The theory of political economy investigates the power of individuals, agencies, and institutions to instigate, finalize, or implement decision-making processes that carry consequences for other individuals, agencies, and institutions, and particularly examines the role of the state as an agent of political, economic, and social power. These
examinations explore how power influences relationships across social classes and
groups “by determining who successfully initiates, modifies, or vetoes policy
alternatives.”

In the years leading up to World War II, Adorno and the scholars of the Frankfurt
School of Applied Social Research, working within the context of Marx’s theories of
political economy and history, turned their critical attention to the emerging phenomenon
of radio. Drawing on Durkheim's conceptualization of the mass society, and the historic
European traditions of elite arts and culture, Adorno criticized the use of radio technology
for the distribution of products of mass culture, specifically popular music, to a mass
audience, and the inconsiderate intrusion of radio programming into the fabric of
society. Concerned about the diffusion of the commercially produced music through
markets controlled by private capital and the state, Adorno warned that “light music”
could be “perceived only as background,” leading to “declining taste” and contributing
nothing to the advancement of culture. Adorno articulated the establishment of the
"culture industry," where objects of personal expression and art were recast as packaged
goods to be bought, traded, and sold in commercial markets. Though Adorno’s
dichotomy of high art versus mass culture now seems old fashioned and antidemocratic,
his critical theory remains relevant for its articulation of the conflict between personal
expression and industries of mass communication.

Echoing Adorno’s insights into the relationship of producers, content, and
audiences, Smythe offered a more specific account of the political economy of mass
communication, focusing on “the structure and policies of these communication agencies
Smythe identified four key policy areas that recur across cultures: 1) Policies governing the production of goods and services (“the ‘what goods and services’ and, in part, ‘for whom’ questions”); 2) policies governing the availability of communication services or goods, as influenced by intervening factors such as geography or social class; 3) policies governing the quality of goods and services, such as professional standards and practices, or aesthetic criteria, and; 4) policies governing the allocation and distribution of goods and services, and particularly the equality of services available to individuals. Applying this framework to the U.S., Smythe observed that the early radio industry revealed an “ambiguous pattern of basic economic control being vested in industrial empires of electronic equipment manufacturers, while operational control of program and business policy matters was subject to public regulation.” In this view, Congress in 1927 created a system of public policies that envisioned widely distributed, easily accessible broadcast services emerging from profit-making industrial structures capable of exerting control across the four aspects of production, distribution, access, and quality.

Building on this framework, Smythe subsequently offered a detailed account of the role assigned to audiences by industrial interests. Examining the relationship of commercial media enterprises, advertisers, and mass media consumers, Smythe theorized that the primary product of mass media was the uncompensated labor of audience members, acquired, marketed, and sold by newspapers, television networks, and other content providers to advertisers. In Smythe’s model, the reception activities of the audience provide data for mass media companies. Packaged and sold in the advertising
market, audience research carries a high value for suppliers of products and services, eager to gain insights into consumer perception and differentiate themselves from competitors. The audience performs two essential economic functions, as a market for consumer products and services, and a primary product of the mass media industries. These industries “produce people in audiences who work at learning the theory and practice of consumership” and “produce public opinion supportive of the strategic and practical policies of the state.” Those “strategic and practical policies” include the regulations that specify the availability, allocation, and socially acceptable use of the electromagnetic spectrum for radio broadcasting.

Examining the capacity of mass media to influence both public perception and public policy, Murdock and Golding contended, “it is not sufficient to simply assert that the mass media are part of the ideological apparatus of the state; it is also necessary to demonstrate how ideology is produced in concrete practice.” In this view, mass communications are simultaneously integrated into the industrial economic base, and the ideological superstructure. Criticizing Smythe’s “preoccupation with the relations between communications and advertising,” Murdock offered the alternative view that the industries of mass media “are in the business of selling explanations of social order and structured inequality and packaging hope and aspiration into legitimate bundles. In short, they work with and through ideology – selling the system.” Observing that Smythe had almost entirely overlooked non-advertising based media, Murdock demonstrated how noncommercial media, particularly state-operated concerns such as the BBC, “relay the ideologies that legitimate them.” With specific regard to the products of mass media,
these ideologies also serve to frame the limits of socially acceptable programming and presentation.

For Murdock and Golding, the complex relationships of state policies and industrial structures exist to perpetuate four fundamental characteristics of modern mass communication: 1) *Growth*, which sustains the economic vitality of capitalist enterprises; 2) *consolidation*, or the ability of these enterprises to capture, focus, and expand the processes of power; 3) *commodification*, or the ability to constitute mediated messages as goods for the markets of commerce, and 4) *state intervention and control*, which legitimates the previous characteristics.\(^{\text{xlvvi}}\) Applied to the ideal of an accessible and democratic system of mass communication, these characteristics provide “the basic yardstick against which critical political economy measures the performance of existing systems and formulates alternatives.”\(^{\text{xlvii}}\)

In addition to the processes of commodification, Mosco’s analysis of the political economy of communication identified the forces of *spatialization* and *structuration* in the political economy of communication.\(^{\text{xlviii}}\) Spatialization expands the notions of horizontal integration and power consolidation, incorporating concepts of geography and sociology into political economy to examine “the decline of time-space dependency” and “focus on the growth of time and space as elastic resources.”\(^{\text{xlix}}\) Arguing for a wider view of concentration, Mosco contends that this “broader form of concentration analysis shifts attention from the sheer number of conduits into a market, to the diversity of content provided by whatever number of channels.”\(^{\text{xci}}\) Within this argument, Mosco discusses the industrial practice of building strategic alliances based on cross ownership
among enterprises with shared goals and objectives, often with the encouragement of state regulators, and points specifically to the intervention of the state in the creation of the Radio Corporation of America.\textsuperscript{xci} For Mosco, the processes of the state are “important for creating the form of regulation that governs industry and the social field, including oppositional forces with a relationship to the industry” [emphasis added].\textsuperscript{xcii}

Mosco describes structuration as “the process by which structures are constituted out of human agency, even as they provide the very medium of that constitution.”\textsuperscript{xciii} Specifically, structuration is the systematic ability to manifest, influence, and perpetuate social structures, relationships, and classes through the instruments of the state and the media. For Mosco, the mechanisms of structuration are specifically historical, arranging resources in a manner that grants power and privilege to particular groups, especially along the lines of social class. Mosco points to adjustments of U.S. communications policy in the 1980s as an example of the power exerted by commercial interests over noncommercial media:

This [class power] was reflected in noncommercial electronic media as government funding for public broadcasting eroded, forcing the system to greater reliance on corporate support that introduced a significant degree of market power (including the first real advertisements) to what was largely a system whose program decisions, though regularly contested, nevertheless reflected public concerns that addressed people as citizens and not just as consumers. With a greater reliance on corporate and charitable giving, public broadcasting came to embrace the programming interest of those class constituencies that took up more of the funding responsibility.\textsuperscript{xciv}

Through this case, Mosco provides a concrete illustration of Smythe’s characterization of the allocation of communications resources within the realm of politics. Garnham identifies this as the problem of “universalism. I mean by this that the
scope of a political decision structure must be coterminous with the scope of the powers it aims to control.” For Garnham, the scale of state and industrial power far exceeds that of citizens in modern democratic political systems. Arguing that processes of democracy depend on the participation of informed citizens across all sectors of society, Garnham asserts that the more appropriate role for mass communication is to act as a bridge between the spheres of private and public life.

In summary, the scholars of political economy demonstrate how the forces of commodification, spatialization, and structuration, operating through the agencies of the state and private capital, constrain the production and distribution of mass communication. Contrary to neoliberal economic theories, political economy scholars contend that there is no ‘invisible hand’ guiding the exchange of goods, services, and ideas in the free markets of mass communication. Rather, the ability to constitute, direct, and extend the power of mass communication is held by state and commercial interests, whose authority and influence constitute “the common sense, taken-for-granted reality in society.” Taken together, these aspects of the political economy of communication form a broadly appropriate theoretical framework for considering the complex interactions of the agencies of community radio, the state, the broadcasting industry, and the audiences they are intended to serve.

**Theories of the community and broadcasting**

Writing at the dawn of the popular radio era, Dewey’s broad theory of knowledge considered human communication to be a key element in the formation and development of culture and political life. For Dewey, the terms common, communication, and
community shared much more than a Latin root: They were manifestations of the malleability of human thought, and the complexity of shared meaning. Forming “the natural bridge between existence and essence,” communication supplies “the tool of tools,” capable of turning the phenomena of the external world into objects of knowledge with meaning “which are infinitely more amenable to management, more permanent, and more accommodating, than events in their first estate.”

Dewey contends that the nature of reality is fundamentally indeterminate to the individual. The process and the resolution of meaning making takes place through the shared practices of communication, which allow human beings to develop a common understanding of a reality. Only through the act of communication can people make sense of the world, and create culture: “When the introspectionist thinks he has withdrawn into a wholly private realm of events disparate in kind from other events, made out of mental stuff, he is only turning his attention to his own soliloquy.” For Dewey, “soliloquy is the product and reflex of converse with others; social communication is not the effect of soliloquy.” Dewey locates the process of meaning making in conversation: “If we had not talked with others, and they with us, we should never talk to and with ourselves. Because of converse, social give and take, various organic attitudes become an assemblage of persons engaged in converse, conferring with one another, exchanging distinctive experiences, listening to one another, over-hearing unwelcome remarks, accusing and excusing. Through speech,” asserts Dewey, “a person dramatically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many roles, not in
successive stages of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama. Thus mind emerges.\textsuperscript{cii}

For Dewey, acts of communication are the first and foremost step in the processes of public participation, community building, and democracy. As in the family and the neighborhood, Dewey asserts that the foundations of community making reside in face-to-face intercourse, where the intimacy of exchange leads to shared views and deeply held feelings of attachment:

A man who has not been seen in the daily relations of life may inspire admiration, emulation, servile subjugation, fanatical partisanship, hero worship: but not love and understanding, save as they radiate for the attachments of a near-by union. Democracy must begin at home, and its home is in the neighborly community.\textsuperscript{ciii}

Dewey was particularly sanguine about the capacity of spoken language to close the gaps of human perception and build bridges of common understanding. Unlike written speech, the continuous and dialogic qualities of conversation allow for the ongoing and cumulative transmission of knowledge and ideas, delivered directly to the locus of understanding free from the objectified and mediating interference of the printed word:

The connections of the ear with vital and outgoing thought and emotion are immensely closer and more varied than the eye. Vision is the spectator; hearing is the participator. Publication is partial and the public which results is partially informed and formed until the meanings it purveys pass from mouth to mouth.

Dewey believed “there is no limit to the liberal expansion and confirmation of limited personal intellectual endowment which may proceed from the flow of social intelligence when that circulates by word of mouth from one to another in the communications of the local community.”\textsuperscript{civ} The exchange of spoken thought, Dewey asserted, gives “reality to
public opinion. We lie, as Emerson said, in the lap of an immense intelligence. But that intelligence is dormant and its communications are broken, inarticulate and faint until it possess the local community as its medium.\textsuperscript{cv}

Dewey’s theories of communication and public experience provided the philosophical bedrock for the scholars of the Chicago School: Embracing the biological concept of human ecology, Park and Burgess defined community in terms of territorial organization and mutually interdependent relationships.\textsuperscript{cvi} This simple but elegant definition embraces all of the qualities asserted by later social theorists, and by social activists who would attempt to manifest Dewey’s ideals of dialogic communication and community building through the instrument of radio broadcasting.

Habermas (1991) locates the origin of public participation in the polis of the Greek city-state, “constituted in discussion (lexis), which could also assume the forms of consultation and of sitting in the court of law, as well as common action (praxis), be it the waging of war or competition in athletic games.”\textsuperscript{cvii} Participation in the political activities of the polis was dependent on citizenship, conditioned by the ownership of property, and the necessity of controlling an autonomous private household (including slaves, whose labor freed the members of the polis from the requirement to perform productive labor). The open, unrestricted discourse of citizens in this public sphere constituted the only discursive form of participation in the processes of civil society, in contrast with the mechanisms of the state and the marketplace. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the growing power of mercantile capitalism made possible the accumulation of personal wealth independent of state-sanctioned land grants, the locus of
personal freedom and opinion development shifted from the public sphere to the private realm of the household and family, establishing an oppositional relationship between the interests of the state and the interests of citizens. This opposition is crucial to Habermas’ conceptualization of modern public discourse:

Because, on the one hand, the society now confronting the state clearly separated a private domain from public authority and because, on the other hand, it turned the reproduction of life into something transcending the confines of private domestic authority and becoming a subject of public interest, that zone of continuous administrative contact became ‘critical’ also in the sense that it provoked the critical judgment of a public making use of its reason."\textsuperscript{cviii}

Crucial to the constitution of this bourgeois public sphere was the emergence of an independent press, capable of reporting to citizens on the political affairs of the state and civil society. But, as the functions of the press evolved from observation and reporting to commentary and criticism, the private owners of the press themselves became participants in the political discourse of the public sphere:

As soon as privatized individuals in their capacity as property owners ceased to communicate merely about their own subjectivity but rather in their capacity as property owners desired to influence public power in their common interest, the humanity of the literary public sphere served to increase the effectiveness of the public sphere in the political realm. \textit{The fully developed bourgeois public sphere was based on the fictitious identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals who came together to form the public; the role of property owners and the role of human beings pure and simple.}\textsuperscript{cix}

Concurrently, the communicative abilities of the press objectified the people, products, and manifestations of political and social life through the processes of reporting and criticism - publicity. In Habermas’ view, the continuing influence of pervasive
publicity (particularly advertising) has transformed the public sphere from a site of citizenship to a site of consumerism, particularly in regard to political participation:

Because private enterprises evoke in their customers the idea that in their consumption decisions they act in their capacity as citizens, the state has to ‘address’ its citizens like consumers. As a result, public authority too competes for publicity.\textsuperscript{ex}

Habermas’ theory of the ideal public sphere envisions authentic communication as the center of a rational-critical discourse, leading to social integration rather than domination. Commenting on this ideal, Calhoun (1997) asserts, “communication, in this context means not merely sharing what people already think and or know, but also a process of potential transformation in which reason is advanced by debate itself.”\textsuperscript{cxi}

Though he criticizes Habermas for the inconsistencies in his historical representations of the public sphere,\textsuperscript{exii} and his “tendency to dichotomize public and private,”\textsuperscript{exiii} Calhoun concludes that Habermas’ strong normative view of “the public” provides a robust and viable framework for critical study, including the consideration of citizen-centered broadcasting.

Head, Sterling, Schofield, Spann, and McGregor (1998) assert “to broadcast means to send out sound and pictures by means of radio waves through space for reception by the general public.”\textsuperscript{cxiv} This neat, textbook definition takes for granted four fundamental problems of political, economic and social power inherent in the practice of radio broadcasting: 1) The \textit{content} of broadcast programming; 2) the \textit{nature and intentions} of content producer(s); 3) the \textit{nature and intentions} of the ‘general’ public, as radio listeners, and; 4) the \textit{relationship} of listeners to the processes of content production
and distribution. The theory of the political economy of communication asserts that these problems are addressed through capitalist structures that recast content and audiences into commodities in the markets of mass media.

Williams (1975) proposed a different view of radio and television content, as the byproduct of social communication through broadcasting, providing “a form of unified social intake.” Observing a “deep contradiction” in the dominant industrial model “of centralized transmission and privatized reception,” Williams asserted that the social functions of transmission technology had been “largely limited to relay and commentary activities.” Williams noted:

> When there has been such a heavy investment in a particular model of social communications, there is a restraining complex of financial institutions, of cultural expectations and of specific technical developments, which though it can be seen, superficially, as the effect of technology is in fact a social complex of a new and central kind.

Building on Williams’ scholarship, Hamilton (2000) contends that the economies of communication “are not machines that run themselves: Rather, they are composed of and put into practice through working human relationships, and it is the mutual understanding, acceptance, and practice of a specific set of relationships that comprise the basis of social order. The production, circulation, adoption, and defense of these mutual understandings can be seen as the basic process of society, of communication.”

Claiming that alternative organizational structures might better serve the social and political needs of citizens in a democracy, Williams called for “public service of a different kind, controlled democratically by local communities,” and serviced by independent content producers. More broadly, Hamilton argues for “alternative media
[to] enable alternative communication, which together make possible the articulation of a
social order different from and often opposed by the dominant.\textsuperscript{cxxx} For Hamilton, the
power of state and commercial media institutions is indicative of “a characteristic set of
social relations brought about and maintained through certain kinds of cultural
organizations.”\textsuperscript{cxxi}

The theoretical approaches to social and political issues in mass communication
identified by Dewey, Williams, Mosco, and other scholars were applied in the field of
radio broadcasting by Lewis Hill (1958). In the years following World War II, Hill set
out to challenge market-based conventions of radio broadcasting, based on the theory that
“the entire operation of an educational or cultural radio station can be supported by its
audience, removing altogether any reliance upon advertising or parent-institutional
support.”\textsuperscript{cxxii} Seeking “a method of sustaining communication for its own sake”
(emphasis Hill), Hill’s experiment required “a non-profit, non-commercial base of
operations, abandoning the commodity concept of broadcasting.”\textsuperscript{cxxiii} To challenge the
force of commodification, the radio station’s content “was conceived unit by unit, to be
of special interest to a definite minority of the audience, and little or none was oriented to
‘mass’ audience interest.”\textsuperscript{cxxiv} Hill regarded this deliberate specialization and
fragmentation of content to be “indispensable [sic] to the working of the theory.”\textsuperscript{cxxv}

To achieve the desired specialization and appeal to select audiences, Hill provided
content producers with “unusual personal freedom in the selection and creation of
program materials.”\textsuperscript{cxxvi} Hill contended that such broad personal discretion insulated
producers and the organization from commodifying influences and market pressures that
“supervened on the imagination and discretion of the persons responsible for broadcasting.”

“These conditions were felt to be a sine qua non for successful programming,” and were “also seen as having fundamental importance to the uniqueness of communication and response which the theory envisioned between the station and the audience.”

In scholarly terms, Hill sought to overcome the commodifying influences of the market identified by Smythe and Mosco, by presenting more personal, and personalized, content through a noncommercial channel.

Lorenzo Milam worked under Hill’s tutelage in the early 1950s. Enthusiastic about the ability of radio broadcasting to influence the course of public policy, Milam envisioned a similar station in Washington, D.C., “so that people in power can be exposed to the alternatives.”

Disenchanted by the dynamic of professionally operated commercial broadcasting, Milam turned to common citizens as “one of the rich antennae you have in the community” to achieve through radio broadcasting the sort of authentic dialogue and community building articulated by Dewey half a century earlier.

In terms of the political economy of mass communication, Milam intended to confront the force of spatialization by creating locally owned and controlled structures that served the geographically bounded populations under their signals. Concurrently, Milam sought to overcome the force of structuration by reaching across social classes to engage citizens, as both listeners and producers, in new social relationships. Though he saw no particular need to label this unusual form of radio, he subtitled his book on the subject *A handbook on starting a radio station for the community*, and referred consistently in the text to “community radio.”
**Defining community radio**

While the concept of a radio station controlled by local citizens emerged as early as the 1920s (Wurtzler, 2003), the term “community radio” has become shorthand for a variety of structures, practices, and ideologies related to the organization of noncommercial broadcasting agencies, and the subsequent content produced and distributed by these organizations. While these descriptions draw commonly on the theories of Hill and Milam, scholars seeking to define community radio have emphasized different qualities and characteristics in their representations.

In his descriptive study of community radio organizations in the U.S., Barlow asserts, “The most salient characteristics of these radio stations are their noncommercial status as broadcast outlets, their avowed policy of local community involvement in their programming, and the democratic organization of their institutional procedures and practices.” While Barlow clearly draws on the ideologies of Hill and Milam, his observations place particular emphasis on internal commitments to grassroots political movements and processes, claiming, “In addition to community involvement, their ideology champions progressive politics, alternative cultures, and participatory democracy.” Hill did not express this ideology overtly in his theory of listener sponsored broadcasting. Rather, Hill articulated his political beliefs in the articles of incorporation of the nonprofit Pacifica Foundation, the institutional basis of Hill’s experiment in noncommercial radio. Through radio broadcasting, Pacifica committed to “engage in any activity that shall contribute to a lasting understanding between nations and between the individuals of all nations, races, creeds and colors; to gather and
disseminate information on the causes of conflict between any and all of such groups; and through any and all means compatible with the purposes of this corporation to promote the study of political and economic problems and of the causes of religious, philosophical and racial antagonism.

Where Hill chose the nonconfrontational language of disseminating information and promoting study to “contribute to a lasting understanding between nations and between individuals,” Barlow expresses the ideology of community radio in more forceful terms: “The community radio movement is strategically involved in the struggle to forge a democratic medium that links together progressive forces in the United States.” In contrast to Hill’s cerebral idealism, Barlow ascribes a more directly political purpose to community radio.

Fairchild (2000) characterizes community radio through the relationships of “constituent elements” and a variety of “core tensions.” Within Habermas’ model of a public sphere, Fairchild depicts community radio in terms of the constituencies engaged in the organization, production, and reception of content. Class, race, gender, and political orientation provide some of the most prominent descriptions of these constituencies, but they are also described in terms of their relationship to a station, for example, as critics, contributors, volunteers, producers, managers, or as agencies of the general public in the form of state regulators. For Fairchild, as these constituencies come into contact and attempt to work together, the conflicts that emerge describe and constrain the power structures of community radio. Without articulating a specific
definition of community radio, Fairchild’s assessment engages and expands on the elements of political ideology articulated by Barlow.

Lewis and Booth (1990), in their examination of community radio structures in the Americas, Europe, Australia, and Asia, offer a less overtly political view, emphasizing the engagement of grassroots culture. Asserting that “community is defined geographically, as well as in terms of interest, language, cultural, or ethnic groupings,” Lewis and Booth demonstrate how community radio tends to serve audiences that share common identities and interests. These commonalities are made manifest in the participation of local citizens as organizers and content producers: “While the commercial and public service models both treat listeners as objects, to be captured for advertisers or improved and informed, community radio aspires to treat its listeners as subjects.” This representation reflects the listener-centered frame of reference articulated by Williams.

In summarizing the key features of U.S. community radio, Lewis and Booth identify five elements that distinguish this form of broadcasting:

- an element of control by the local community, typically in a board of management.

- A commitment to community access, especially for those normally excluded from the mass media: women, ethnic groups and people of colour, the elderly and young people.

- The use of volunteers, supported by a training program.

- A voice in policy for both paid staff and volunteers.

- the definition of purpose to which all can relate.
Taken together, the preceding insights define community radio as a set of social, political, and economic practices. Within this frame of reference, Hill emphasizes noncommercial, nonprofit structures and personal expression. Milam stresses the participation of a diverse group of private citizens. Barlow asserts democratic political ideologies and distance from market pressures. Fairchild privileges marginalized, underrepresented, and dissenting constituencies. Lewis and Booth focus on the shared values and beliefs of producers and listeners. As demonstrated by these scholars and theorists, community radio operationalizes Dewey’s “neighborly community” and Habermas’ public sphere through nonprofit, noncommercial structures that provide democratic environments for diverse groups of territorially bound, mutually interdependent citizens to communicate their values and views through the medium of radio broadcasting for the purpose of developing common understandings, operating at an ideological distance from the structures, pressures, and interests of capital and the state.

Representing the common interests of more than 250 community radio stations and related concerns, the National Federation of Community Broadcasters provides an institutional expression of these qualities within the political and economic structures of U.S. broadcasting. The NFCB advocates in the arenas of public policy (the state) and funding (capital) to support principles of diversity (population), localism (territoriality), and public service (interdependency) on behalf of its membership (nonprofit, noncommercial structures). These activities provide a direct link between U.S. community radio structures and the political economy of mass communication.
Political economy and the NFCB

A substantial body of political economy research investigates the ideological foundations and historical developments of mass media institutions, applying a pro-social and ethical perspective to the interactions of human enterprise, technology, capital, the state, and the markets for information commodities. These analytical and critical perspectives are equally relevant to understanding the formative history of the NFCB as a public policy and advocacy organization constituted to promote an agenda of social and political change. Political economy’s focus on the relationship between markets, mass media institutions, and the state provides an appropriate frame of reference for evaluating the efficacy of NFCB’s public policy agenda, and examining the consequences of the organization’s various initiatives.

The framework of political economy suggests that two forces played a significant role in shaping the NFCB’s development. The first of these is a consequence of the mass media marketplace: While the ideology of Hill and Milam asserts that noncommercial radio’s capacity for authentic communication, dialogue, and community-building avoids the pressure of commodification, later critics suggest that the NFCB’s policy agenda moved community radio directly into competition for audiences with public and commercial broadcasters. This study seeks to determine how the forces of capital, competition, and “massification” shaped the Federation’s intentions and actions.

The second force emerges from the public policy and regulatory contradictions that arise when the noncommercial interests of citizens clash with the market driven interests of mass media producers and consumers (including producers and consumers of
community radio. While free market ideologues have advocated initiatives to dismantle public oversight of broadcast services in favor of the market’s “invisible hand,” privileging the interests of owners and consumers of regional and national commercial media, the NFCB pursued policies that were intended to enhance the role of geographically bound communities of common citizens in shaping the structure and content of citizen-centered radio through noncommercial institutions. This study explores how the intersection of these disparate approaches to mass media public policy influenced the historical evolution of the NFCB.

From the outset, the founders of the National Federation of Community Broadcasters set out to “foster the development of public policy at the legislative, regulatory, and administrative levels,” and “seek an equitable distribution of federal funds appropriated to noncommercial radio.” In doing so, the NFCB began a process of accruing and wielding political power, on behalf of members who themselves had generally little power, especially audio artists, counterculture activists, and ethnic minorities. This process, based in the mechanisms of political economy, provides a starting point for investigating the NFCB’s formative development.

**Research questions**

The preceding review demonstrates that there is a significant gap in the existing literature with respect to the historical relationship of NFCB and community radio in the United States to the broader political economy of communication. Within this framework, utilizing the techniques of historical research and analysis, this study investigates the NFCB between 1975 and 1990, concentrating on the organization’s
formation and development, and its organizational and policy initiatives. The study engages four research questions:

**Q1: What political, economic, and social forces contributed to the establishment of the NFCB?**

The emergence of the NFCB followed a series of dynamic historical circumstances and events, beginning with the invention of radio in the early 20th century, and including the entrenchment of the American commercial system of broadcasting in the 1930s, the post-World War II economic boom, and the turbulent political and social movements of the 1960s. This question examines the political, economic, and social conditions that set the stage for development of community radio and presaged the formation of the NFCB.

**Q2: Who were the principal architects of the NFCB, and what were their original goals and intentions for the organization?**

The founders of the NFCB were a unique group of social activists, political organizers, and artists, each moved by the causes of free expression, community engagement, and social justice. This question explores the personal and professional histories of these individuals, and captures their motivations and intentions for starting a national organization to promote community radio.

**Q3: What were the most significant issues faced by the NFCB in the organization’s formative years, and how were they approached by the organization?**

The NFCB quickly faced a host of internal and external issues that consumed the time and energy of the founders. Within the Federation, the small staff wrestled with issues of communication, finance, and membership, while the external agenda addressed a host of regulatory and legal issues, including licensing, program distribution, and
content restrictions. This question examines the relative immediacy and priority of these issues, and the extent to which these issues influenced the organization’s direction.

**Q4: How did the values, goals, and direction of the NFCB change during these formative years, and how can this history inform contemporary issues in mass media?**

While the NFCB generally achieved success with its original initiatives, critics including Bekken, Fairchild, Sakolsky, and Walker suggest that the Federation failed to protect the noncommercial interests of citizens and communities from the power and influence of America’s mass media marketplace. This question explores these criticisms in the context of the historical evidence, and suggests how this history could provide insights into contemporary mass media issues, including the emergence of LPFM radio, contemporary movement reform and democratize mass media, and the advent of new technologies that place the tools of media content production and distribution directly in the hands of citizens.

Through these questions, this study will explore the complex interaction of community radio with the structures and mechanisms of capital and the state that have dominated the landscape of broadcasting in the U.S. since the 1920s. In the process, the study reveals aspects of the character, quality, and efficacy of U.S. broadcasting, and the viability of community radio within the context of “the American System.”
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

Studies in critical political economy have “traditionally given priority to understanding social change and historical transformation,” manifested in society as either “a deepening and extension of fundamental tendencies,” or “the fundamental rearrangements of social structures and processes.” The process of social change takes place when dominant and generally long-standing patterns of political, economic, or social reproduction are confronted by phenomena that challenge, disrupt, or transform prevailing structures and relationships. Similarly, the process of historical transformation emerges at the intersection of continuities, in the form of “patterns that extend across time,” and contingencies, or “phenomena that do not form patterns.” These transformative processes reveal political, economic, and social forces at work in human events and structures, shaped by the continuities and contingencies of time, space, ideology, and human behavior. The scholar’s task is to develop a valid interpretation of human events from the fundamentally continuous and qualitative data of human perceptions, intentions, actions, and responses, as they were played out in the context of unique historical circumstances.

This study relies on qualitative, and particularly historical methods, to investigate the formative development of the NFCB. Historical methods allow for the observation and interpretation of a wide range of particular, but indivisible data for the purpose of constructing a summary assessment of historical patterns and outcomes. Beyond the
fundamental journalistic questions of who, what, where, when, why, and how, historical methods allow scholars to recapture “the spirit of the times surrounding the study, to comprehend the feelings, persuasions, and emotions that were once real, to grasp how things happened” and “to comprehend past consciousness.” More specifically, historical investigations of recent issues, events, and actors can provide access to “the complexity of social interactions as expressed in daily life, and the meanings the participants themselves attribute to these actions.” To accomplish these objectives, this study relies on a combination of in-depth interviewing and document analysis techniques to achieve an understanding of the origins and evolution of the NFCB.

**In-depth interviews**

The practice of ethnomethodology reveals evidence of social order, in part, through accounts collected from the members of social groups or organizations under investigation. Captured through reflexive conversation, verbal accounts reveal the ideology, knowledge, skills, and practices that “members know, require, count on, and make use of,” in order to “produce, accomplish, recognize, or demonstrate rational-adequacy-for-all-practical-purposes of their procedures and findings.” Verbal interactions provide evidence of those phenomena that are considered to be “countable, storyable, proverbial, comparable, picturable, representable” expressions, actions, or events. These indexical phenomena manifest the “ongoing achievement of the organized activities of everyday life.” The practices of in-depth interviewing offer an appropriate method for capturing these accounts and disclosing these indexical phenomena.
Interviews provide evidence in the form of oral history, captured in the recollections and interpretations of key individuals from the historical period under investigation. The oral histories of key individuals offer the opportunity for the “historical recovery of the remembered but unrecorded past,” by inquiring about past events, and validating the veracity of information from other sources.\textsuperscript{cxlix} Because interviews are susceptible to the inherent limitations of human memory and personal bias, they are “particularly well suited to understand the social actor’s experiences and perspective.”\textsuperscript{cli} Informants are selected based on their personal experience and expertise with regard to the subject of the study, with the expectation that “the actor’s experience will result in words that can only be uttered by someone who has ‘been there’.”\textsuperscript{clii}

Several previous studies of journalism agencies, and specifically noncommercial broadcasting, have relied on in-depth interviews as the primary tool to gather qualitative or historical evidence from living social actors. Breed (1955) conducted “intensive interviews” of 120 news professionals in the northeastern U.S. to substantiate processes of learning and acculturation in newspaper organizations. Intent on capturing the recollections of more than a score of key figures associated with the establishment the American public broadcasting system, Harrison (1978) recorded and transcribed a collection now housed at the National Public Broadcasting Archive at the University of Maryland. Lasar (2000) conducted interviews with nearly two dozen individuals associated with the Pacifica Foundation and Pacifica Radio over a two-year period, allowing the author to capture the recollections of key players from the organization’s formative years, and offering insight into reams of documentary evidence. To inform
documentary evidence and secondary sources, Walker (2001) interviewed several prominent community radio activists from the 1970s in conjunction with his broader study of underground, unlicensed, and low power broadcasting. McCauley (2004) collected extensive oral histories from many of the founding figures of National Public Radio to provide the preponderance of the evidence in his study of the formative development of the nation’s largest network of noncommercial radio stations.

For this study, many of the selected informants were connected to individual community radio stations associated with the NFCB, and all played key roles in the founding and development of the Federation during the period under investigation. These individuals organized and participated in NFCB’s annual conferences and other meetings, taking part in pivotal debates that shaped the organization’s mission, goals, and objectives. Some drafted planning documents and communications, wrote and edited newsletters, and lobbied federal agencies to support initiatives that would benefit community radio initiatives. Those who worked in stations had direct experience of the conditions and circumstances that led to the NFCB’s formation, and the ongoing local pressures that influenced the Federation’s national policy agenda. These informants were essential to the study to provide insight into the circumstances, processes, and outcomes that shaped the NFCB during its formative years, and to verify, elaborate on, or call into question the documentary evidence.

The study also includes interviews with key individuals outside of community radio to gain a broader view of the NFCB, and to capture external perspectives on the Federation and its contributions to the development of mass media and society. Some of
these individuals were associated with the federal agencies that were lobbied by the NFCB, while others left community radio to pursue professional ventures in public or commercial broadcasting or other industries. These informants responded to the assertions and insights of those who were most directly engaged in the work of the NFCB, and provided critical insight into the evidence gathered from other sources.

Though the interviews relied in part on standardized questions, the conversations also pursued spontaneous lines of thought and inquiry with each individual, for the purpose of gathering particular memories and reflections that informed other data or provided insight into the particular subject at hand. Whenever possible, interviews were conducted in person, though limitations of time, distance, and availability required that 22 of the 41 interviews be conducted via telephone. Initial interviews typically lasted about one hour, with follow up sessions of 10 to 30 minutes. Interview documentation consisted of audio recordings captured on minidisk, and full or partial transcriptions of most of the conversations, supplemented by field notes compiled as soon as practically possible following each encounter. The University of Oregon Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects/Institutional Review Board originally approved the required research protocols for this study in April 2004 (#C1-477-04, Community radio in the U.S.: History and ethnography; renewed April 2005; approved for dissertation research, February 2006; renewed March 2006).

**Document analysis**

As articulated by McCombs and Shaw, agenda-setting theory asserts that an audience’s perception of the relative importance of issues, events, or participants is
affected by how, and in what order, they are presented in published accounts. This ordering, or salience, does not necessarily shape the audience’s opinions, but it does influence where, how, and in what manner the audience focuses its attention. Closely related to the theory of agenda setting, the process of framing describes how producers contextualize references in content, and how an audience uses these references to similarly assess and interpret content. According to Entman, frames provide the mechanisms to “define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, [and] suggest remedies.” Key textual elements in the framing process include the use of particular words, phrases, or references, placement of text in documents, and the manner in which information is disclosed across a series of documents. Frames help to organize and clarify communication between content producers and consumers: They do this, in part, by monopolizing, emphasizing and fragmenting the terms of meaning. For this reason, McQuail suggests that “particular frames need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.” Beyond the issues, events, and circumstances framed in texts, documents can reveal the influence the social, economic, political, and social forces. Shoemaker and Reese assert that documents allow the researcher “to infer things about phenomena that are less open and visible: the people and organizations that produce the content.”

Documents provide key pieces of historical evidence “because they are the ‘paper trail’ left in the wake of historical events and processes.” Documents record the ideology, initiatives and products of an organization; track its activities; record the actions of key people; provide evidence of standards of belief and behavior; and offer representations of the organization and its participants to internal and external audiences.
Because they record past events, documents provide an opportunity, within the limitations of reliability and accuracy, to reconstruct events from the past that cannot be observed directly. Documents provide a fixed source of data that can be easily compared to data gathered through observation and oral interaction. Perhaps most important to this study, documents “reflect certain kinds of organizational rationality at work. They often embody social rules – but not necessarily the reasoning behind the rules – that govern how members of a social collective should behave.” These phenomena are the historical manifestation of the study’s theoretical framework.

Within the realm of media and communication studies, the framing capabilities of newspapers have received more attention than newsletters or other forms of advocacy media. Lomicky (2002) employed content analysis in a historical study of the frontier Women’s Tribune, a Nebraska-based suffragist newspaper. Categorizing the content of two constructed volumes, Lomicky’s study demonstrated that the Tribune consistently framed issues within a feminist ideology that reflected the political and social beliefs of editor and publisher Clara Bewick Colby. Similarly, Johansen (2001) employed textual analysis to explore “the first true employee journal in North America.” Published by the Massey Manufacturing Company of Toronto, the Trip Hammer served as a platform for the owners of a farm implement company to communicate their Chautauqua-inspired social and moral values to the firm’s employees. Johansen demonstrates how the publication’s content served as a response to the political, labor, and social upheaval of late 19th century industrialization and urbanization
In his descriptive study of KPFA, Ragan (1963) relied on documentary evidence found in the pages of the station’s Folio magazine as the basis for his analysis of the organization’s mission and initiatives. In addition to consulting issues of Folio, Lasar examined a wide variety of internal documents found in the Pacifica Archives, especially the founders’ internal and external correspondence, proposals and reports to funding agencies, and written communications from listeners. In comparison with Ragan’s narrow content analysis, Lasar’s broader historical evaluation provides a more contextualized and substantive account of Pacifica’s importance to the history of mass media and society in the U.S.

The documents relevant to this study were derived from both primary and secondary sources. Primary documentary sources consisted of materials that provided contemporaneous descriptions of issues and events with limited opportunity for interpretation by the author[s]. In addition to the direct textual evidence, primary documentary sources provided contextual evidence through their origin, appearance, location, and circulation. In this study, the primary documents consisted of records and publications of the NFCB, and other documents from related organizations and institutions.

The primary sources included the Federation’s articles of incorporation and operating by-laws; minutes and other records of association meetings and events; the Federation’s periodic newsletter; memoranda and other correspondence of the Federation’s executives and staff members; and periodic reports to members, the press, and constituent groups. Although the discourse within these documents necessarily
reflected the biases of their authors in the representation and interpretation of events and
issues, they provided some of the best and most consistent evidence of the course of
historical events, and for understanding the political, economic, and social evolution of
the NFCB. The vast majority of these documents are currently housed at the offices of
the NFCB in Oakland, California. Additional materials are located in the National Public
Broadcasting Archive in the Hornbake Library at the University of Maryland; and in the
collection of the law firm of Garvey Schubert Barer in Washington D.C.

Other primary sources consisted of private or public documents
contemporaneously published or otherwise distributed by individuals and agencies
related to the NFCB during the period in question. These records consisted of documents
from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and National Public Radio;
correspondence, publications, and other documents originating from the NFCB’s
constituent stations; and documents created by individuals with allied interests in the
social, technological, or institutional development of community radio, including
independent producers and media activists. Government documents, from agencies such
as the U.S. Congress, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (and its descendant agencies), also provided additional
evidence that contributes to the understanding of the NFCB.

Primary sources were considered as qualitative data, and interpreted using
qualitative textual analysis methods detailed by Startt and Sloan, Howell and Prevenier,
and other historians. Authenticity was determined through processes of external
criticism, including author identification, and verification of textual legitimacy.
Interpretation was accomplished through processes of internal criticism, employing standardized criteria to establish textual genealogy and credibility, assess terminology in context, ascertain intent and competence, and place the evidence in the overall chronology of historical events. While these methods could only approximate historical truth, they provided a clear picture of “how the sources left by the people who then lived constructed their reality.”

Secondary sources provide restatement, interpretation, and analysis of the evidence found in primary sources. Secondary sources provide a means for locating additional primary sources. In addition, though they are not contemporaneous with issues and events, secondary sources provide descriptions and explanations that enlighten the current study. Because secondary sources represent “evidence selected by another person, and perhaps for a purpose other” than the one identified for this study, each was viewed within the context of its original publication, and considered for its particular contribution to understanding the subject. The secondary sources for this study included books, academic journals, online articles, and industry, trade, and consumer periodicals.

**Organization and analysis of the data**

This study relies on the grounded theory approach to data analysis to “bring order, structure, and interpretation to the mass of collected data. It is a messy, ambiguous, time-consuming, creative, and fascinating process” that proceeds in a non-linear fashion by examining data through many cycles of consideration and reconsideration. Employing mutable analysis structures and comparative methods to reveal patterns and singularities in qualitative data, grounded theory provides insights into the complex interaction of
circumstances, events, personalities, and relationships that emerge in the process of constructing historical narrative.

Consistent with the grounded theory approach, consideration and reflection on the data took place in conjunction with the processes of data collection, utilizing Althiede’s ethnographic content analysis techniques of “reflexive movement between concept development, sampling, data collection, data coding, data analysis, and interpretation.” During this initial phase of the research, field notes, interview recordings, and transcripts were periodically reviewed, and reflections captured in brief written asides and more extensive summaries and commentaries. Composed during periods of reflection, these ‘meta-notes’ provided a running account of the character, motivations, or expressions of individual actors; the meaning of texts; initial indications of repetitive phenomena or key contingencies; and notable details arising from the researcher’s experience. These in-progress writings provided a basis for the subsequent and more formal procedures of categorizing and coding the raw data.

As data collection proceeded, multiple timelines were developed to organize the sequence of concurrent and consecutive historical events, chart periodic movements and initiatives in community radio and the NFCB, locate and establish the relationship of key events, and develop a summative chronology of the historical phenomena in question. The master chronology became the primary tool for assessing the temporal sequence of events such as meetings and communications; observing the geographic proximity of concurrent phenomena; and tracking collateral political, economic, and social developments that influenced the formation and advancement of the NFCB. The
chronology also provided a mechanism for uncovering inconsistencies and conflicts in the various historical accounts under consideration.

The first phase of coding focused on establishing a range of data categories. This involved the reflexive designation of variables that emerged from the primary documents, interview transcripts, field notes, and accompanying commentaries. These first stage variables included terms or phrases, categories of common experience, key events or incidents, collaborations, adversarial relationships, emotional recollections and responses, and instances of reflection. Relevant data was roughly coded into these first stage categories, providing the basis for the final, formal categories used to code the project data.

A final scheme of 18 low-inference and high-inference categories formed the basis for coding discrete blocks of textual data. Low-inference categories, including demographics, professional roles, and institutional links offered a quick and generally recognizable method of organizing topical information. High-inference categories, including political, economic, and social themes, initiatives, and relationships, emerged from the process of data collection and consideration, requiring a recursive process to establish and capture broader patterns of significance. This process began during the data gathering phase of the study, and continued through the secondary coding phase in an open, inductive, and reflexive manner to work out the specific relationships of individual phenomena and generalized categories of data.

Over a period of six months, the data was reduced down to manageable blocks, coded and entered into pertinent categories. The data blocks included indexical
phenomena such as expressions of belief, attitudes, and reaction; key words, phrases, and statements drawn from the transcripts and text-based evidence; as well as that information captured directly in low-inference categories. The resulting instruments were periodically reviewed for evidence of conflict and agreement among the various sources, and summarized to form the basis for a historical narrative of the NFCB’s formative period.

**Limitations**

The most obvious limitation facing this study is one of scope: It was tempting to conflate the story of the NFCB with the collateral stories of the organization’s constituent members. In some instances, explanations of historical occurrences were tied to people, events, and issues that emerged through other organizations. The NFCB’s public policy positions and initiatives directly reflected the intentions, interests, and needs of the Federation’s member stations. For example, the evolution of community-based public radio stations in Alaska contributed directly to the organizational and economic course of the NFCB in its early years. A full account of this complex web of ideologies, structures, and actions exceeded the scope of the present research. To the extent that it is possible to do so, this study focused on the story of the NFCB, with limited explorations of related phenomena.

Though this study was concerned with issues of noncommercial radio broadcasting, it did not examine radio programming, audiences, and the broader cultural impact of community radio in any detail. In part, this reflects the political economy framework, but it is also a consequence of the subject itself: The NFCB did not engage
in program production, nor did it develop systematic strategies for audience service. While NFCB facilitated such activities, these concerns were the province of individual stations. Though the cultural consequences of community radio in the U.S. provide rich opportunities for research, such considerations were generally beyond the scope of this project. This study is limited to the historical development of the NFCB as an agency of public policy, advocacy, and member service.

Another limitation can be found in the nature and degree of access to historical actors and documents. Due to time and budget limitations, some interviews were conducted by telephone, and some follow up inquiries were conducted by email. While such data gathering techniques have become increasingly common, they lack the spontaneity and nonverbal richness of face-to-face contact with informants. Similarly, an unknown quantity of documentation has been scattered around the country, presumably lost or in the possession of individuals or organizations that are no longer connected to the NFCB. While efforts were made to unearth this evidence, most documents were derived from institutional sources, including the NFCB and the National Public Broadcasting Archives at the University of Maryland, or from those individuals and organizations that are willing to take the time to assist in the search for historical materials.

Finally, every research exercise must acknowledge the standpoint of the researcher and the unavoidable limitations of subjectivity. Prior to undertaking scholarly inquiries into community radio, the researcher undertook a long career as the manager of an NFCB member station, and developed collegial relationships with some of the
informants. The early portion of this career spanned the period from 1982 to 1990. While the researcher’s experiences certainly influenced the perception of relevance and importance in the data, they also provided a basis for interpreting and explaining the evidence. Acknowledging that “anything we learn about human social life can have an impact on what we are studying, even to the extent of invalidating what we learned in the first place,” the researcher relies on the understanding that the efficacy of the research depended on careful attention to the scope and method of the research power of social research. Even within these limitations, the relative scarcity of research into the subject, and the implications for contemporary issues in mass media, invited scholarly investigation into the formative history of the NFCB.
CHAPTER V

A PREHISTORY OF THE NFCB

As an advocate for community-based noncommercial radio stations, the National Federation of Community Broadcasters was the first organization of its kind in the United States. But the social, political, economic, and technological forces that led to the establishment of the NFCB can be traced back to the opening of the twentieth century and the earliest days of wireless communication. Thousands of private citizens engaged wireless as a hobby, building their own radio equipment for the purpose of sending and receiving signals in their homes. More organized interests valued the technology for its capacity to carry commercial messages from point to point across long distances. In an environment dominated by individual achievement and private enterprise, entrepreneurs and industrialists raced to harness the power of wireless in order to establish and serve new markets. Few envisioned radio as a technology capable of reaching millions of listeners.

It would take an epic disaster, a world war, and acts of Congress to rein in the chaos that characterized these early years, when radio matured from a scientific curiosity into a national mass medium. Hobbyists, engineers, educators, entrepreneurs, and industrialists jockeyed, and sometimes clashed head on, to claim their positions in “the ether.” By the 1930s, the interests of nationwide, advertiser-supported broadcasting eclipsed those of academics, churches, civil agencies, and common citizens. Civic
programming, noncommercial ‘educational radio,’ and advertising-free broadcasting all but disappeared from U.S. spectrum, languishing until the twilight of the New Deal.

In the prosperous era following World War II, a combination of social, political, and economic forces aligned to allow educators to secure access to the broadcast spectrum. At the same time, a group of wartime pacifists turned to radio as their instrument to achieve world peace, in the vanguard of counter-cultural movements that surged beneath America’s pluralistic façade and challenged the nation’s social and cultural paradigms. Within this fusion of culture, politics, and artistic expression, community radio found its first iterations in cities and towns across the U.S., including Berkeley, Seattle, Portland, St. Louis, and Santa Cruz. This chapter summarizes some of the preceding research into the origins of educational and public broadcasting, and documents some of the key individuals and initiatives that contributed to the founding of the NFCB.

**Wireless before World War I, 1900-1917**

The invention and early development of wireless technology at the beginning of the 20th century has been thoroughly documented many times over, by scholars including Archer, Barnouw, and Sterling and Kitross. But revisionist historians such as Walker and Douglas delineate an alternative narrative of radio’s beginning, populated by the early enthusiasts, “usually young and male, building their homemade sets in sheds, attics, and barn lofts with whatever materials were available,” including oatmeal boxes, soda pop bottles, and tin foil. As the restrained attitudes of the Victorian Age gave way to the bullish and technocratic views of the Progressive Era, “tinkering with radio (like
tinkering with cars) was one way for some boys and men to manage, and even master, the emerging contradictions\textsuperscript{clxix} of the age. These “Radio Boys”\textsuperscript{clxx} were inspired by the very public successes of early wireless entrepreneurs, including Guglielmo Marconi, holder of the first wireless patents, and Lee DeForest, the self-proclaimed “Father of Radio.”\textsuperscript{clxxi} The pioneers were themselves inspired by the earlier scientific and financial achievements of Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, Charles Goodyear, and other individuals who worked “alone or with a few assistants to make great discoveries,”\textsuperscript{clxxii} amassing personal wealth and fame from their inventions and, more fundamentally, from the patents they held.

In the first years of wireless, patents were the only links between the United States government and the inventors, engineers, scientists, and amateurs involved in the development of radio. This arrangement reflected two of the dominant cultural values of era, ratifying the achievement of private individuals and companies, and demonstrating the limited role of the civil government in the affairs of private citizens and industry.\textsuperscript{clxxiii} But these relationships were not without risk. Lone inventors sometimes proved to be difficult business partners: Though most historians believe he was the first to transmit the human voice by radio,\textsuperscript{clxxiv} Reginald Fessenden’s inability to compromise with his financial backers negated his opportunity to profit substantially from his own inventions.\textsuperscript{clxxv} Patent disputes between rival individuals and their related interests became the province of the courts, where legal and financial concerns often took precedence over scientific and technical expertise. Though DeForest’s life was punctuated with claims and counterclaims over patents and licensing arrangements, doubt
remains if he actually understood the science behind his own patents, including his Audion vacuum tube which made possible the transmission and reception of continuous wave signals.

In this environment of bare-knuckle competition and winner-take-all consequences, the achievements of private citizens figured prominently in the wireless phenomenon. Amateur operators, or hams, strove to improve the power and sensitivity of their transmission and reception devices, attempting to pull in signals over ever increasing distances. For these early adopters, the hobby of long distance monitoring, or DXing, started with a rudimentary crystal set connected to a crude headphone, typically fashioned from a Bell telephone receiver. As hams improved the capabilities of their homemade equipment and their own technical prowess, they pulled in increasingly distant signals, carrying the dots and dashes of Morse code. While these messages were intended as to point-to-point communication between a specific sender and receiver, the exploding number of hobbyists valued any signal that came over long distance - the more distant, the better.

The most powerful signals originated from commercial wireless facilities located on ships at sea and on shore in the United Kingdom and North America, owned and operated by the Marconi Wireless Company of Great Britain. Competing technologies arose in other nations, including Germany (Slaby-Arco) and the U.S. (DeForest), leading to interference as multiple operators transmitted overlapping signals. Marconi refused to communicate with rival systems and services, threatening to monopolize the industry. Such international problems required international solutions. In 1903, a
meeting of eight nations called for universal communication between wireless systems. By 1906, 27 nations, including the U.S. agreed to protocols for universal ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communication.

Implementation of these protocols depended on the cooperation of each nation’s government. Convinced by U.S. wireless manufacturers and military authorities that the treaty would inhibit the development of technologies and systems under the control of U.S. interests, the Congress declined to ratify the agreement. In its place, Congress passed the Wireless Ship Act of 1910, duplicating nearly all of the provisions of the 1906 protocol. The act required radio communication equipment and a skilled operator on all vessels carrying more than 50 passengers traveling more than 200 miles between ports. In addition, the act required that installed equipment must be capable of exchanging messages with the systems of other manufacturers. Left out of the act were suggestions to place the Navy in charge of most aspects of radio communication, prohibit commercial control, administer radio through the Department of Commerce and Labor, and deploy government-operated stations in all U.S. territories. “Although none of these suggestions was formally adopted,” observed Sterling and Kitross, “one could trace them in American radio regulation for more than two decades.”

Decades later, the notion of government support for universal service to all U.S. localities would figure prominently in the passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 and subsequent developments in community radio.

As a consequence of the international reaction to the Titanic disaster, 29 nations convened in 1912 to reconsider the 1906 agreement. In response, Congress initially
amended the Wireless Ship Act to require multiple operators, auxiliary power supplies, and extending these requirements to all vessels carrying more than 50 passengers (including traffic on the Great Lakes). Within a month, Congress subsequently passed the Radio Act of 1912, granting authority to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to test and license all operators, license all transmission facilities (“stations”), assign transmission frequencies, and designate hours of operation. Most crucially however, Barnouw notes that the Secretary “could not refuse a license. Such details would in time cause difficulties – in fact, chaos.” One of the first consequences of federal oversight was the separation of the radio frequency band, and the assignment of private amateurs licenses to wavelengths above 360 meters. These frequencies were considered to be undesirable for government or commercial use because of interference issues.

With the Radio Act of 1912, the essential elements of the political economy of American broadcasting were set in place – markets for various forms of information (in addition to Morse Code messages, markets for scientific, technical, commercial, and political expertise); private ownership and control of the development and manufacture of technology (DeForest and other independent scientists and inventors, Bell’s American Telephone and Telegraph, Edison’s General Electric); implementation and distribution by individuals (hams), private companies (American Marconi, DeForest, and others), and public agencies (the Department of Agriculture, the armed forces); and regulation by government authorities (the Department of Commerce, after 1913). A variety of national clubs and organizations, including the American Radio Relay League, attempted
to represent the interests of ham operators and educators. But for the most part, the more powerful and organized forces of capital and the state pushed these to the margins.

**War and free enterprise, 1917-1926**

In the years between 1912 and 1917, the government continued to grant licenses under the terms of the 1912 act, issuing patents for a wide variety of radio apparatus to dozens of private interests. Multiple wireless technologies were controlled by an array of private companies and individuals who saw little reason to cooperate with each other. The result was a flurry of patent litigation. The situation came to an abrupt halt on April 7, 1917, immediately following the government’s decision to send U.S. forces to Europe to fight in World War I. The U.S. Navy took control of all wireless manufacturing, facilities, and operations to facilitate the efficient development and application of reliable wireless systems for the war effort. Amateur operations were banned, but the ownership of companies, factories, and distribution remained in private hands. For Walker, it was “the apotheosis of progressivism, a brief period in which the partnership between big government and big business blossomed into a full-scale authoritarian state.”

America’s involvement in World War I had two fundamental consequences for the subsequent development of radio in the U.S. First, the U.S. military would draft thousands of young men into the armed services to be trained as radio operators for the Navy and Army Signal Corps, creating a vast pool of trained citizens who returned to industrial, civic, and private life after the war, eager to put their knowledge of wireless to work. Second, the government required all radio patent holders, including Marconi and
AT&T (holders of patents for vacuum tube technology), Westinghouse and GE (holders of patents for transmission technology), to cooperate in mandatory cross licensing of their technologies through a patent pool. All stations, equipment, and content were “for the first time, under rigid, monopolistic control,” observes Douglas. Military control and management “brought enormous resources – money, manpower, an integrated and far flung organizational structure – to bear on wireless development.” Encouraged by the efficiencies gained under military authority, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels hoped to maintain government ownership and control of radio communication after the war. But the Navy “not only suffered from a lack of funds and of trained operators (after the volunteers left), but faced a strong and growing clamor for return of government-operated stations to their owners.” Patent holders and ham operators were equally anxious to reclaim ownership of their intellectual and physical property. On the order of President Woodrow Wilson, the hams returned to the air in October 1919, followed by the commercial operators in March 1920. But the Navy, under the leadership of acting Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt, opposed placing powerful long distance transmission facilities once again in the control of Marconi’s foreign ownership. With Roosevelt’s blessing, GE moved to purchase a controlling interest in the American Marconi company, bringing the assets of the most prominent commercial operator under American control. GE subsequently transferred these assets to a new company – the Radio Corporation of America.

 Though the competition of the pre-war era returned, industrial patent holders understood the benefits of cooperation that had been achieved through the wartime patent
pool. In June 1920, RCA formalized a new pooling agreement with GE and AT&T.

With the agreement, notes Barnouw, “these companies staked out areas of interest so that the world of electronic communication, as the conferees viewed it in the early months of the 1920s, might be developed cooperatively, rather than in competition.” As part of the arrangement, AT&T received a block of RCA stock. Similarly, RCA entered into a cross-licensing agreement for the high power transmission technologies controlled by Westinghouse. Through the pooling agreements, RCA assumed control of more than 2000 patents, and precluded competition from its significant industrial competitors. Through RCA’s charter, the government was guaranteed a seat on the company’s board of directors. The business of radio manufacturing and transmission became, in effect, “a government enforced cartel.”

Even as these business interests aligned, amateurs and educators were claiming the radio spectrum for their own purposes. Weather forecasts could be heard daily on University of Wisconsin station 9XM. The students of Charles “Doc” Herrold, operator of the College of Engineering and Wireless in California, returned to the air in 1922, offering voice and music broadcasts for the general public. Radio experimenters in California, Montana, and North Carolina were broadcasting live performances from their homes. Hiram Percy Maxim, organizer of the American Radio Relay League of civic-minded amateurs, championed the formation of radio clubs to facilitate public visibility and political action. All represented fundamentally different approaches to the purpose of radio: For educators, radio provided an application in the fields of physics and electrical engineering, and a tool for agricultural extension
services. For the amateurs, broadcasting was a technology capable of empowering individuals, and expanding the nature and scope of cultural and civic life.

Though it had many libertarian qualities, the public policy of the early 1920’s maintained the allegiances to industrial interests and all of the rigid hierarchies that had been imposed during the Progressive Era and the war. On the one hand, the Department of Commerce under Secretary Herbert Hoover reasserted the government’s authority over radio operations, attempting to assign all commercial and amateur operations to a handful of frequencies. By 1926, the spectrum was clogged with overlapping signals. On the other hand, Hoover could hardly keep up with the explosion of applications for station and operator licenses. Lacking enforcement authority, the Secretary’s authority was routinely ignored. The result was chaos: Interference threatened to choke off every advancement in the emerging markets for radio communication.

Seeking to avoid outright government regulation of the radio spectrum and the nascent industry, Hoover convened a series of Federal Radio Conferences between 1922 and 1925. Fifteen government and industry delegates attended the first conference. By 1925, more than 400 delegates attended the Fourth National Radio Conference, representing station owners, equipment manufacturers, civil authorities, educators, amateurs, and other interests. Hoover attempted to craft the recommendations of these conferences into a form of voluntary self-regulation. For example, the Secretary sought to maintain a class of “clear channel” stations that would allow a few high power stations
to reach most of the country. One justification for these clear channel stations was to assure service to isolated rural areas.

Almost inevitably, these powerful stations became the nation’s premiere broadcast properties, and several affiliated with RCA’s new national network, the National Broadcasting Company – NBC. As a result, the country’s dominant manufacturer of transmission and reception equipment was on the path to achieve parallel dominance in the field of programming and content distribution through a system of ‘toll’ broadcasting. Attempted initially as an experiment by AT&T-owned WEAF in New York, the practice of making airtime available for purchase rapidly evolved into advertiser-supported radio within ten years.

But there was no consensus in the 1920s that radio could be a profitable industry. Though private hams had already been pushed aside, Robert McChesney’s research reveals that nearly one quarter of license holders in 1925 were colleges and universities. “Almost as many broadcasters were affiliated with the other types of nonprofit organizations,” including labor unions, civic organizations, and churches. Commercial operators generally viewed their stations as vehicles for publicity, rather than profit centers. The desire to overcome this economic instability in the private sector would play prominently in the subsequent events that shaped the American system of radio regulation. The general public had to be convinced that radio was an appropriate medium for advertising, according to Susan Smulyan: “The early promoters of broadcast advertising, aware that it was still considered only one financing option among many,
moved to make their strategy less commercial. Alternatives included schemes for government financing through taxes on receivers or vacuum tubes.

The turmoil came to a climax in 1926, when the Zenith Radio Corporation ‘jumped’ to an unassigned frequency, ignoring the license restrictions imposed by the Secretary. Hoover cited the station for violating the terms of its license. The Illinois Federal District Court ruled in favor of Zenith, finding that there was “no express grant of power in the [Radio] Act [of 1912] to the Secretary of Commerce to establish regulations.” A frequency free-for-all ensued, as operators and stations sparred for the best positions on the spectrum. Congress had little choice but to turn Hoover’s guidelines and recommendations into law.

**Hegemony, 1927-1934**

The Radio Act of 1927 set the course of broadcasting in the U.S. for the next two decades, though according to Barnouw, there was never a singular or pivotal “moment when Congress confronted the question: shall we have a nationwide broadcasting system financed by advertising?” Providing the Secretary of Commerce with direct authority over spectrum management and licenses for stations and operators, the act established a five-member Federal Radio Commission, appointed by the president, to consider a wide range of pressing issues. The law allowed the Commission to establish classes of stations and services; assign frequencies and geographic locations to classes and individual stations; regulate the manufacturing and use of equipment, create and enforce regulations to prevent interference; require stations to maintain a variety of operating records; and
gave the FRC the “authority to make special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting.”

The FRC moved quickly to convert all existing radio licenses to 60-day temporary authorizations. Concurrently, the FRC staff, largely borrowed from the Navy and the DOC, set about the complex and controversial task of reallocating the spectrum. Though the FRC’s rules made no explicit distinction between commercial and noncommercial stations, the effect of its authority always favored network and commercial interests, especially those stations that were part of the NBC networks.

The Commission set high engineering standards, such that many low-budget (often noncommercial) stations were denied licenses. The commission forced stations that could not afford to broadcast at least 17 hours per day into awkward and disadvantageous channel time sharing arrangements, causing confusion and frustration for listeners. But most damaging to the noncommercial broadcasters was the interpretation of the vague Congressional mandate to the Commission to carry out its duties “as public interest, convenience, or necessity requires.” Without defining the phrase, the Commission relied on this language to justify a set of “general principles” that strongly encouraged technical precision, regular scheduling, and the assessment of an applicant’s character and financial accountability as part of the licensing process. Most importantly, the FRC’s General Order 40 declared that radio stations should perform a general public service by serving the broadest possible audience with a “well rounded program of entertainment as well as cultural programming.” Stations that chose to serve more particular audiences or interests were identified as propaganda stations.
Though the term was not intended to be derogatory, the Commission asserted “there is not room in the broadcast band for every school of thought, religious, political, social, and economic, each to have its separate broadcast station, its mouthpiece in the ether.”

By embracing these general principles, the FRC established key precedents that would shape the future of radio and other electronic media in the U.S. Asserting there was “not room in the broadcast band for every school of thought,” the Commission embraced a paradigm of spectrum scarcity that significantly strengthened the privileged individuals and agencies that held licenses to broadcast on public channels. This privilege was further enhanced by the Commission’s preference for licensing network-affiliated stations. This assertion would make it difficult for other parties to gain access to the spectrum. By defining public service in terms of a marketplace serving mass audiences, the Commission asserted that the interests of consumers in the market were congruent with those of citizens in a democracy. This assumption would prove false for those citizens outside the prevailing social, economic, and political strata. The paradigm of the self-regulating marketplace also allowed the FRC to embrace a self-defining paradigm of the public interest: Those stations and programs that succeeded in the market would, by definition, serve “the public interest, convenience, or necessity.” In effect, the Commission took the position that broad government intervention was unnecessary to promote the public interest. Large, private companies would fill the void. Ultimately, according to Walker, “the experts, the managers, the military men, the politicians, the patent poolers, the advertisers, the networks – together, they disenchanted radio.”
Dark times, FM, and war, 1935-1945

Under General Order 40, the effects of spectrum reallocation were devastating for nonprofit, noncommercial, and educational broadcasters. Though hundreds of licenses were issued to such parties between 1921 and 1934, most expired or were transferred to commercial operators. Educational broadcasters had themselves to blame, in part, for their circumstances. Unable to unify their advocacy efforts, educational radio stations were represented between 1930 and 1940 by competing organizations, including the National Advisory Council on Radio in Education [NACRE], the National Committee on Education by Radio [NCER], and the National Association of Educational Broadcasters [NAEB]. NACRE sought close cooperation between commercial and educational broadcasters, while NCER and NAEB lobbied to reserve channels for educational radio. As the organizations jostled to assert their political positions, their member institutions saw their frequencies distributed to others through the reallocation process. At the same time, the powerful commercial interests argued successfully “that educational broadcasters should stay on the periphery of the industry and use their commercial counterparts to transmit educational programming.” Ultimately, the results nearly eliminated educational radio altogether: By 1937, just 38 educational stations remained, spread across the country from Massachusetts to Oregon, with concentrations in the upper Midwest and northeastern states.

In 1938, the FCC finally reserved channels for noncommercial use. However, the transmission frequencies, between 41 to 42 megahertz (Mhz), were far higher than those on the widely accepted commercial band. One year later, the reserved channels were
shifted to 42 to 43 Mhz, requiring the few educational stations licensed on these frequencies to move. In addition, the Commission required the licensees to adopt an entirely different transmission system, moving from the widely accepted technology of amplitude modulation (AM) to the more technically desirable but little-used technology of frequency modulation (FM). Invented by scientist and engineer E. Howard Armstrong and patented in the early 1930s, FM provided a signal that was virtually free of the annoying static that plagued AM broadcasts. FM also had the capacity to transmit a broader range of audio frequencies, delivering greater fidelity to the listener.

Armstrong intended to license the technology to RCA, but RCA President David Sarnoff was unwilling to forego the industry’s substantial investment in the proven AM system for the promise of FM. In the “the first instance of bureaucratic collusion between the Radio Corporation of America and the Federal Communications Commission,” the FCC constrained Armstrong’s ability to develop FM broadcasting on his own, labeling Armstrong’s system “utterly impracticable” in the words of one of the commission’s staff engineers. Nevertheless, Armstrong pressed on independently, determined to prove the value of his invention.

Though RCA was unwilling to work with Armstrong, the company’s engineers saw the possibilities available through FM transmission, and started to develop their own applications for the technology. While the relatively low frequencies of audio information could be carried on the lower portion of the radio spectrum, the transmission of images – television – required much higher frequencies: The same frequencies developed by Armstrong for FM radio. By 1938, NBC deployed a mobile television unit
in New York City. Sarnoff presented television to the public the following year at the New York Worlds Fair. As war approached in Europe and Asia, RCA’s technology was valued as well for its military application – radar. Even as commercial television came to the air, “the boom was being put in storage,” say Barnouw. “Precious materials and electronic assembly lines were needed, not for television but for war.” The FCC would not reconsider the issue of spectrum allocation and channel reservation until peace was at hand. In those intervening years, Lewis Hill would refuse military service, endure exile in a government labor camp, become disillusioned with commercial broadcasting, and envision a new kind of radio, dedicated to the cause of world peace.

**Lewis Hill and listener-sponsored radio**

Born in 1919, Lewis Hill was the patrician son of a wealthy Oklahoma oil tycoon. Precocious, articulate, cerebral, and possessing a mellifluous baritone voice, he “played musical instruments with little effort and, according to classmates, often was absent from school yet passed exams easily.” As a child, he assembled crystal radio sets, and showed an aptitude for machines. But to his father Johnson Hill, Lewis was a disappointment, and hardly suited to the rough and tumble life of the oil business. The family’s attempt to reform him at a Missouri military academy had precisely the opposite effect, and Hill “cultivated a lifelong contempt for militarism.” Instead, he went west to Stanford University, where he studied politics and philosophy. Hill was particularly engaged by Soren Kierkegaard’s constructive individualism, and the notion that the authentic individual must stand alone against the crowd to express and act on his principles.
Hill’s elite heritage, temperament, and education led him to the interwar pacifist movement that swept across the US and Europe in the 1920s and 30s.\textsuperscript{ccxix} Led by organizations such as the religiously oriented Fellowship of Reconciliation, under the forceful and charismatic leadership of A.J. Muste, many in the movement connected political action with a strong sense of spirituality. This combination was especially appealing to idealists and intellectuals such as Hill. But as the specter of war grew in Europe and Asia, the threads of American pacifism quickly frayed and unraveled.\textsuperscript{ccxxx}

Spurred on by Roosevelt, Congress passed the Burke Wadsworth Act in the fall of 1940, authorizing universal military conscription. Unwilling to compromise his principles, Hill boycotted military service and registered as a conscientious objector (CO).\textsuperscript{ccxxxi}

Though the draft law recognized CO status, the government treated those who refused military service with disdain. COs were routinely arrested, jailed, and isolated in remote government work camps. Sensing the shifting mood of the era, historic religious groups such as the Quakers attempted to cooperate with government authorities by operating the CO facilities. But more radical pacifists inside the camps chafed at the thought of cooperating with government in any form. In the camps, charismatic leaders such as David Dellinger cast aside communitarian religious ideals for more practical forms of resistance, built on the tactics of individual expression and direct action that had been successfully demonstrated by Mohandas Gandhi.\textsuperscript{ccxxii} Contrary to the government’s expectations, the camps provided a “near perfect environment for refining and confirming ideological commitments, spreading their philosophy and testing theories …” The wartime experience of radical pacifists suggests that radicalism not only survived,
but gained new followers and an enhanced repertoire of tactics at a time when most Americans unhesitatingly celebrated the nation’s commitment to war. For a gifted writer and public speaker such as Hill, this new approach to pacifism was especially appealing.

Following his term of enforced government service, Hill relocated to Washington, D.C., where he found employment as a writer and announcer for the NBC Blue Network station WINX. Reading the continuous stream of war-related dispatches appalled Hill, and the experience further strengthened his commitment to the nonviolent resolution of human conflict. For a time, Hill was active in the Committee for Nonviolent Revolution, a postwar group dedicated to implementing the Gandhian strategies advocated by Dellinger and others. Hill soon questioned whether such tactics could lead to meaningful social change, claiming there was “no ground yet for a non-violent revolutionary organization. The development of such a group must involve certain key intellectuals around the country very deeply; and it is self-evident that these people have no interest in your battle.” Instead, Hill moved to back to California to establish a radio station that would advocate for peace through electronic communication.

In the postwar environment of the San Francisco Bay Area, Hill may have selected the best possible location for his sociopolitical experiment in broadcasting. Throughout World War II, booming defense industries had drawn thousands of people to the area. Propelled in part by a powerful local labor movement, historically conservative city governments in San Francisco and Oakland receded in the face of New Deal politics, reacting “to the dislocations of the Great Depression and World War II by coalescing
around the liberal vision of the American future. In San Francisco, and across the nation, laborers and bankers, blacks and whites, Republicans and Democrats adopted liberalism as an ideology that gave meaning to political activities. Artists, writers, and musicians also found a hospitable environment for their efforts in “a working guy’s town” that was “blue collar, good clean fun. San Franciscans saw themselves as special… There was a spirit in the town, an innate loyalty to the city. Change also came to the campus of the University of California at Berkeley, as thousands of veterans enrolled following the war. Issel asserts that these groups and movements provided a large population of people “committed to universal human rights, linked [through] city government, corporate boardrooms, union headquarters, and social service agencies such as the YMCA and Stiles Hall, the center of liberal student activism at the University of California at Berkeley.

In San Francisco, Hill re-established his connections with Roy Kepler and Richard Moore, whom he had known at the Coleville, California government camp, and others sympathetic to the cause of postwar pacifism. To this group, Hill introduced the possibility of a nonprofit organization dedicated to the proposition that the process of dialogue could lead to the peaceful resolution of human conflicts. In 1946, Hill and his organization established the Pacifica Foundation to engage in any activity that shall contribute a lasting understanding between nations and between individuals of all nations, races, creeds, and colors; to gather and disseminate information on the causes of conflict between any and all such groups; and through any and all means available to this society, to promote the study of political and economic problems, and the causes of religious, philosophical, and racial antagonisms.
The instrument for disseminating this information and dialogue would be a radio station unlike any other. Hill’s vision for the station was simple and powerful, according to Lasar: “First, through dialogue, it would demonstrate the viability of peace in practice. Second, it would introduce listeners to a challenging ideology in the context of familiar and pleasurable sounds.”

The programming would consist of commentary, and discussion by those who might contribute to the dialogue, including social critics, activists, educators, artists, and those involved in society, culture, and politics. Looking to connect with the burgeoning working class communities in the East Bay, Hill intended to establish this station as a high power AM facility station based in the Richmond area, adjacent to the shipyards, refineries, and related industries that employed tens of thousands of unionized workers. Through the radio station, the founders of Pacifica intended to sustain a grand coalition of intellectuals and workers, bound in the cause of a peaceful world through the process of dialogue.

In 1947, Pacifica tendered its first application for permission to construct a broadcast facility to the FCC. The application soon stalled in the commission’s review process, running up against a number of obstacles. Consistent with the history of broadcast regulation in the US, the FCC harbored an entrenched ambivalence towards noncommercial applicants, supported by the industry’s self-serving characterization of “propaganda.” Hill attempted to negotiate these challenges in the application by avoiding the Foundation’s ideological heritage, couching Pacifica’s moral agenda in more traditional terms of educational broadcasting. To complicate matters further, the application required Pacifica to offer a business plan to assure initial costs and long-term
solvent for the organization and facilities. Pacifica had commitments for start-up capital from a handful of major donors, but over the long term, Hill proposed that the station would be supported entirely by voluntary donations from listeners. To date, no broadcaster had succeeded with such a bold plan. Lacking any precedent, the commission had no frame of reference for direct listener capitalization. Based on these concerns, the commission rejected Pacifica’s application. Though the FCC’s documentation is silent on the issue, it also seems reasonable to believe that Hill’s status as a draft resister may have played a part in the commission’s consideration.

Pressed by Pacifica’s organizers and founding contributors to get some sort of the radio station on the air, Hill needed another alternative. He turned to the marginalized FM band: Pressure from commercial interests in television had pushed the Commission to reallocate the spectrum for FM radio to 88 to 108 Mhz just two years earlier in 1945. With FM manufacturers scrambling to adjust to the new spectrum, and few consumers willing to buy the new receivers, the band was wide open for new ventures. FCC policy consultant Charles Siepmann, a former employee of the British Broadcasting Company, argued that FM offered the U.S. a second chance to provide locally produced, high quality programming, free from commodifying influences of advertising and corporate control. But this new technology was known only to a select audience of radio enthusiasts - those who could afford to purchase the new receivers. FM would not reach the broad, working class audience envisioned for the proposed AM service by Pacifica’s founders. Nevertheless, Hill convinced the members of the Foundation to refocus their efforts on the more educated and affluent audience in the Berkeley area that could be
served with an FM signal. In September 1947, Pacifica tendered a new application to the FCC, proposing a 250 watt FM facility in Berkeley. By 1949, Pacifica had its license to broadcast: KPFA FM offered its first broadcast on April 14, 1949.\textsuperscript{ccxli}

Though the affluent Berkeley hills likely had more FM receivers per capita than other parts of the Bay Area, the circumstances of geography, the weak 250 watt signal, and the overall scarcity of FM radios soon caught up with KPFA. Despite ongoing appeals to listeners, the station was chronically short of funds. By August, after weeks without paychecks, most of the staff had quit. For a time, KPFA ceased broadcasting. Hill lobbied for a more powerful transmitter and canvassed the region for new subscribers. His efforts were successful, returning KPFA to the air in the summer of 1951.\textsuperscript{ccxlii} But Hill knew that KPFA needed a long-term solution to guarantee security and stability for the station’s finances.

Hill found his opportunity in a proposal to the Fund for Adult Education [FAE], a program of the Ford Foundation. Recognizing the congruence of Pacifica’s mission with Ford’s goals to promote peace and democracy, Hill lobbied FAE director C. Scott Fletcher to invest in KPFA’s experiment in voluntary listener sponsorship to sustain educational radio. The FAE responded with a grant of $150,000 to Pacifica.\textsuperscript{ccxliii} The funds allowed Pacifica to purchase and install a 10,000 watt transmitter, increasing the listening area fourfold. But more crucially, the FAE grant allowed KPFA to gain a measure of stability, freeing the staff from the ongoing drudgery of raising operating funds. With FAE’s support, KPFA could offer a reliable schedule of music, discussion, and children’s programs. Programs on topics as diverse as Chinese classical music,
American communism, and parenting were regular fare on KPFA, produced by some of the Bay Area’s most noted artists and intellectuals, including Alan Watts, Ralph Ginsberg, Caspar Weinberger, and Pauline Kael. In contrast with the dominant AM programming of the day, KPFA’s “program content was conceived unit by unit, to be of special interest to a definite minority of the audience.” In contrast to Pacifica’s original vision of a vast regional audience, “little or none” of KPFA’s programming “was oriented to the ‘mass’ audience.” Turning the Foundation’s original communitarian mission upside-down, Hill now appealed to the strength and power of the individual:

Freedom to experiment generally, to risk the individualities of new art, to search for new uses of the medium itself, was also seen as having fundamental importance to that uniqueness of communication and response which the theory envisioned between station and audience.

As the grip of anti-communist rhetoric and conformist behavior tightened on American society in the early 1950s, KPFA became a haven for activists, artists, and misfits who shared many of the beliefs and behaviors of the direct action pacifists that Hill had left behind in the east. KPFA became a showplace for controversial rhetoric and individual expressions of principle. Hill regularly struggled to keep this volatile collection of strident communicators and powerful egos focused on KPFA’s broader service and financial goals. Concurrently, Hill revealed his own elitist tendencies in the rhetoric he used to promote KPFA’s highbrow programming to Ford and other financial supporters. The resulting clashes of values and egos were especially hard on the sensitive and cerebral Hill. He threatened to resign on several occasions. In 1953, he made good on the threat, only to return when KPFA descended into anarchy. Though KPFA would survive its turbulent birth, Hill would not live to celebrate the station’s first decade.
During all the years of service to the cause, Hill had been troubled by the ever-worsening pain of spinal arthritis. By 1956, what little medical help was available for the condition was no longer effective. On August 1, 1957, Hill took his own life. Though Hill had endured a series of difficulties during his years with Pacifica, those who knew him agreed that his deteriorating condition was the cause of his suicide. Yet Lasar observes, the legend of Hill’s downfall would be far more powerful than the tragic reality of his demise:

To the larger Pacifica community, Hill’s death became a metaphor for the sacrifice and not infrequent insanity associated with leadership at a community radio station. This became the master narrative of Hill’s final days.

Milam

Like Lew Hill, Lorenzo Wilson Milam was the child of a wealthy family. Milam was born in Jacksonville, Florida in 1933, the son of a successful real estate speculator. Like Hill, Milam was fascinated by radio early in his life. In the late 40s, Milam’s teenage experience coincided with the onset of radio’s transfiguration from a program to a format medium. As national broadcasters shifted their resources and their most prominent programs into the new medium of television, local radio stations searched for new voices and new sounds that might preserve their existing audiences, or attract new ones. For the first time in the South, listeners began to hear programs featuring African American announcers, and hear the jazz, blues, and popular “race records” of the day. The first station that specifically targeted African American listeners, WDIA in Memphis, went on the air in 1949 (under white ownership).
Inspired by the sounds of other cultures, broadcast on AM radio in Georgia and Florida, Milam cultivated a voracious interest in music, engineering, and language.

Milam shared other key experiences with Hill. In 1951, he entered a prestigious university. Where Hill went west, Milam remained in the east, enrolling at Yale. At Yale’s student radio station, Milam got to do a bit of everything – engineering, ad sales, announcing, and news writing. It was enough experience to land a job at a small Jacksonville station, WIVY. He gave up on Yale after just one year. But within a few months, he was incapacitated by polio. For the next year and a half, he endured tortuous treatments in a series of hospitals. Years later, Milam described his experience in excruciating detail:

After electrocuting me carefully (shoulders, thighs, stomach, back) Miss Bland stretches the muscles. With her hands she shifts my legs and forces them into certain positions which are as close to elaborate and exact fainting painfulness as possible. By true magic, she is able to go to work on the muscles which are already on fire, and pull hamstrings and extensors and rotators and quadriceps and opponens so they will not contract. Miss Bland puts me through the tortures of the damned so that my heels will not touch my buttocks for the rest of my life. O Miss Bland, you are killing me, telling me all the while it is for my own good. Kill me now so I can live tomorrow.

Milam eventually found more compassionate caregivers in Warm Springs, Georgia, and his condition improved enough that he was able to move back to Jacksonville. He returned to college for the next six years, “in order that I might set myself apart from the foot-dragger with stained pants and rag-top wooden crutches who pulls himself into the Salvation Army camps of the world.” At the Quaker affiliated Haverford College in Pennsylvania, Milam worked for the campus radio station, and learned
that war – and the killing of people in general – is Not A Good Thing. I was also taught that each of us is responsible for helping to bring peace to the world. I was also taught that each of us is responsible for helping to bring peace to the world.

Milam moved to Berkeley to pursue a master’s degree in English, where he tuned in to Hill’s KPFA. Attracted by the station’s “wonderful mix of music and talk and drama and high art,” Milam volunteered, and was quickly caught up in the spirit of pacifist idealism and the maelstrom of KPFA’s internal politics.

In the late 1950s, American society was haunted by the shadow of atomic annihilation. The draft resisters and peace activists of World War II had coalesced around the anti-nuclear war movement, with a strong presence on college campuses. Ban-the-bomb rhetoric was especially strong on the Berkeley campus and at KPFA, where several pacifists “regularly ran programs on the ghastly threat of nuclear holocaust.” Milam reasoned, “there should be a station like this in Washington, D.C., I thought, so that people in power could be exposed to the alternatives.”

He was “so swept up in the vision that in the spring of 1959, I resigned my studies, resigned my marriage, and took a jet directly to Washington D.C.,” with the intention to build a noncommercial, listener sponsored station like KPFA in the nation’s capital. Cold War ideology and anti-communist hysteria were at their height within the federal government: “It seems that fear of the Great Red Beast had swept through the FCC just about the time I had come to town.”

Milam rented an office on F Street for thirty-five dollars a month and went to work, personally delivering his application for an FM station to the FCC. Backed by a substantial inheritance, he had no trouble demonstrating that he had the required start-up capital in hand. Cold War ideology and anti-communist hysteria were at their height within the federal government: “It seems that fear of the Great Red Beast had swept through the FCC just about the time I had come to town.”
application was quickly bogged down in the Commission’s review procedures. The process was personified by one especially persistent investigator, a “flea-brain by the name of John Harrington.”

He is head of ‘Internal Security’ at the FCC, and he’s heard all about me allright. He has heard from unimpeachable sources that Pacifica Foundation, parent of KPFA, in Berkeley, is teeming with Communists. Since I worked for KPFA briefly, before I came to Washington, and since I obviously enjoyed it, and since I am trying to start a similar station, I am probably a Communist Too.

Milam was not Communist, but he was not the typical applicant. He spent a lot of time hanging around the Commission’s reference room, hobbling around on his crutches, poring over documents. After a time he noticed, “that FM permits were being granted to others who had applied at the same time I had. People who wanted to broadcast mood music, or rock, or fundamentalist religious programming were walking away with permits; average waiting time, two to three months.” Milam enlisted the assistance of a communications attorney, then appealed to U.S. Representative Charles Bennett, from his home district in Florida. Nothing worked. It was clear the FCC had no intention of granting a construction permit for a station to broadcast “interviews and recordings of important speeches and documentaries and news programs that will look at all sides of the issues” in the nation’s capital. He abandoned his efforts and left the country, but not before he’d filed an application to broadcast in Seattle on 107.7 FM. In addition, he retained the services of Michael Bader, partner in the eminent Washington communications law firm of Haley, Bader and Potts. Andrew Haley had been one of Commission’s original staff attorneys in 1934, and had since developed an impressive stable of clients. Milam reasoned that an application for the least desirable channel,
in a city 2800 miles distant from Washington D.C., represented by one of the broadcast industry’s leading attorneys, might have a better chance.

Eighteen months later, Milam received a letter from Bader. With the change of administrations, the FCC was under new management:

Soon enough, my lawyer and I were sitting in the office of the assistant of the new chairman … There was a frequency available in Seattle, Washington. It was mine, if I signed a loyalty oath that I was not a member of the Communist Party, and had never belonged to ‘an organization that plotted the overthrow of the government of the United States’. Milam considered the implications of the loyalty oath, knowing that “thousands of professors, union members and professionals” had sacrificed their careers believing “that our government had no right to ask such a thing of an American citizen.” But on the advice of an old college friend, Milam relented, realizing that “once you get your radio station, you can do or say any damn thing you want – especially about a government that forces good people in a bind like this.” Milam relocated to Seattle, and placed an ad in Broadcasting magazine for an engineer.

**KRAB**

Jeremy Lansman was a radio wunderkind from southern California: By the time he was 12 years old, he’d already been experimenting with telegraph keys, rheostats, crystal sets, and myriad electronic devices for 5 years. His parents relocated to St. Louis, then divorced. Lansman dropped out of high school and migrated west to San Francisco, where he joined the staff of KPFA for a time. Hired as chief engineer for a commercial station in Truckee, CA, he soon found himself in Hawaii, charged at the age of 18 with constructing a new radio station. But Lansman was indifferent to the world of
commercial radio, and once the project was finished, he quit his job, returned to the mainland, and subsequently answered Milam’s ad. Together, Milam and Lansman pooled their legal, technical, and organizational talents to establish KRAB FM, going on the air December 12, 1962.

To some extent, KRAB was inspired by Lew Hill’s mission to promote dialogue through broadcasting. Like KPFA, KRAB was ostensibly funded by listener donations. But unlike KPFA, KRAB was not tied to Hill’s pacifist ideology. Rather, Milam found inspiration in Herbert Hoover’s rhetoric of ubiquitous, democratic radio and “the hopes of education, enlightenment, and knowledge – being transmitted everywhere.”

Like Siepmann, Milam believed that FM provided a second chance for radio to prosecute a genuine public service mission: “We see radio as a means to the old democratic concept of the right to dissent: the right to argue, and differ, and be heard… KRAB is beginning to move towards filling the responsibility abdicated by commercial broadcasters.”

KRAB was unique. The station featured the authentic, unpolished voices of dozens of volunteer commentators and announcers, motivated by a shared passion for radio, “one of the rich antennae you have in the community.” The volunteers programmed everything that was not available on commercial radio, from “an hour of two of Chinese Opera, or Electronic Music, or Gagaku, or Recorder Music, or Music of Sunda, or Scot’s ballads,” to John Birch society member Fredrick B. Exner, alternating with Frank Krasnowsky of the Socialist Workers Party, to panel discussions of indeterminate length, free from “the tyranny of the clock.” At times, listeners might hear extended periods of unintelligible sound occurring away from the
microphone, or even silence - “a five or ten minute break in the middle so our
participants can rest, so our audience can rest, and so that we can open the doors and
clear out the smoke (since our one studio has no ventilation).” Milam called it
Supplementary Radio. Like KPFA, KRAB reflected the character of its founder: Where
KPFA was thoughtful and erudite, KRAB was eclectic and unpretentious. Lacking a
consistent sound, KRAB expressed unity in Milam’s conception of an oasis in a public
sphere de-personalized and commodified by the radio industry, “a single, small voice of
reason in a broadcast band otherwise garish and ugly with commercialism and rank anti-
intellectualism.”

It was also “more often than not a shambles,” due in part to a labor shortage. Though 55
volunteers produced programs, few contributed to the more pedestrian tasks
that could sustain the station’s infrastructure. The KRAB facility suffered from an
“eternally leaky roof,” a “wasted fence and litter enough to convince the average visitor
that perhaps the station does suffer no small poverty:

It is cramped and dirty here at KRAB: our main studio is our office and storeroom,
serves as a library for 2500 records and 196,00 feet of tape; our hot plate and tea pot
make it a kitchen, our books a study, our pillow a bedroom (one of our early rising
commentators came in without knocking and almost stepped on our face.)
Sometimes the papers threaten to choke us.

More threatening was the chronic shortage of operating capital. In the first months,
KRAB offered “three quiet explications per day,” appealing for contributions. Funds
trickled in slowly, at the rate of one $12 subscription per day. Milam covered the
monthly deficits with his personal funds, and drew no salary. “KRAB for 5 or 6
years lived entirely on Lorenzo and what they could raise, and they couldn’t raise shit,” recalled a staff member. cclxxxvii

By November 1963, circumstances forced Milam to accept the inevitability of a more persistent approach. In a 42 hour broadcast marathon, “every half hour, religiously, sometimes for as long as five minutes, there was a heavy appeal for funds.” cclxxxviii Calls for donations were punctuated with a “reading, from memory, of Finnegan’s Wake… the last letters [of doomed German soldiers] from Stalingrad…[and] readings to the music of John Cage.” cclxxxix The event raised more than $1,000 and rescued the station from the financial doldrums. Though pleased with the success of the effort, Milam bemoaned the corruption of KRAB’s noncommercial ideal: “KRAB was established to traffic in ideas, not commerce.” ccxc For Milam, the state of affairs provided a sorry commentary on consumer culture:

We find it depressing to think what contemporary techniques of advertising have done to Americans; even in our own listeners the advertising klaxons have instilled an automatic blab-off: any appeal for money opens the circuits unless it is repeated again, and again, and again. People are dying from an over-profusion of words. ccxci

Despite these misgivings, the marathon revealed KRAB’s power to reach listeners. The drift “between poverty and prosperity” was “the perfect symbol of the schizophrenic nature of listener-supported radio.” ccxcii

Occasional poverty was no match for Milam’s vision. In 1964 a group of disaffected classical music listeners sought out Milam for guidance on starting a listener-supported station in Portland, Oregon. When the group was unable to secure the financing necessary to start a new station or acquire and existing one, Milam agreed to
submit an application on behalf of the Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, the nonprofit licensee of KRAB, in conjunction with Portland Listener Sponsor Radio. Initially, the small, 10 watt facility would simply rebroadcast KRAB in the Portland area. Milam tapped KRAB volunteer David Calhoun to get the new station up and running. Two and a half years later, the northwest’s second listener-supported station, KBOO, was on the air. Local programming followed shortly.

Milam’s aspirations went beyond the Northwest, as well. In 1963, he submitted an application for an available frequency in St. Louis, Missouri. Unknown to Milam, Jeremy Lansman had submitted a competing application for the same channel, eager to operate a station in his old hometown. The two pooled their resources, pitting their energies and expertise against the application of the racially segregated Christian Fundamental Church. Over the next two years, a fierce competition ensued, capped by an administrative hearing that awarded the construction permit to the church. But in the aftermath, Milam, Lansman, and their attorneys demonstrated that the church, in addition to being a racist organization, had materially misrepresented itself. In the end, the license went to Milam and Lansman in 1967: KDNA went on the air in St. Louis two years later, offering an eclectic mix of programs produced by paid staff and volunteers. Some staff lived in the building. Though the station sold commercials, “KDNA was very free form,” recalls former station manager Tom Thomas:

The station was super engaged. It was a lively part of the community. Even the fundraisers were fun. The station was a reflection of the community. Politicians were interviewed on KDNA. Musicians would perform on KDNA, and spread the word about this kind of radio when they traveled. KDNA was musical, and it offered many viewpoints. It was not political.
Like Lansman, Milam was ready for a change, too. Stepping down from KRAB in the summer of 1968, Milam later purchased a commercial station in Los Gatos, California, on the peninsula south of San Francisco. Milam turned the operation into commercial free KTAO, following the same formula he had established at KRAB. This time, his efforts coincided with the lurching social and political turmoil of the late 1960s. Concurrently, America’s historic educational radio outlets were being transformed, thanks to the assistance of the federal government.

**Public broadcasting**

The enterprise that would become public broadcasting in the United States began in the classrooms and laboratories of the nation’s schools, colleges, and universities, nearly concurrent with the invention of radio. In radio’s boom years in the 1920s and 1930s, educational broadcasters had nearly been regulated out of existence. But like the handful of stations that continued to operate into the 1940s, the National Association of Educational Broadcasters had soldiered on, first lobbying the FCC for reserved spectrum on the AM band, and then more successfully for the set-aside of 20 FM channels between 88 and 92 megahertz for noncommercial, educational radio. By June 1947, there were 38 educational FM licensees. The following year, the Commission lowered the financial barriers to educational FM by permitting the operation of very low cost noncommercial stations of 10 watts or less. With the subsequent easing of requirements for individual operator licenses, and enrollments rising in the postwar years, more schools started their own radio stations. Ten years later, the *Broadcasting Yearbook* counted 286 stations in the reserved FM band. But these advancements, like the entire radio
industry, were overshadowed by the rapid ascendance of television as a technological, political, economic, and cultural force.

Bottled up during the war years, television’s explosive growth and penetration into the consumer market was unprecedented. In 1946, there were 8,000 television households in the entire United States. By 1954, the number ballooned to 26 million households, reaching half of the U.S. population. Just twelve years later, in October 1966, the number more than doubled to 58.2 million TV households - 94% of American homes. During the 1948 presidential campaign, the conventions of the two major political parties were covered primarily by radio. By 1952, Sperber asserts, “the tilt had gone to TV… a major media event, broadcast coast to coast. For the first time more Americans were watching than listening in the prime evening hours.” For CBS news editor Robert Skedgell “the circumstances were all turned around. Radio had become a rather small part of the television broadcast, like two ships passing in the night.” “By the time of President Kennedy’s assassination,” notes historian David Farber, “television had emerged as the preeminent medium transmitting the nation’s public life.”

Overwhelmed with applications from commercial interests for television channels, the FCC instituted a freeze on TV licenses in 1948. Over the next three years, the NAEB lobbied to reserve a portion of the proposed television spectrum for educational television [ETV], finding an outspoken ally in the commission’s first female appointee, New York attorney Frieda B Hennock. Hennock’s home was the site of the first meeting of the Joint Committee on Educational Television [JCET], an ad hoc group facilitated by the NAEB. Seizing the moral high ground, Hennock argued that the
interests of educational broadcasters should not once again be ignored in the regulatory process. Hennock’s arguments posed little political risk: At worst, if educational broadcasters failed to use the protected spectrum, the channels would simply lie fallow. Urged on by Hennock, the FCC ultimately reserved 242 television channels as part of its Sixth Order and Report in 1952. Simultaneously, the Order lifted the application freeze.\textsuperscript{ccvii}

At the same time the FCC was considering the television spectrum issue, the Detroit-based Ford Foundation was expanding its philanthropic mission, creating two new programs - the Fund for the Advancement of Education and the Fund for Adult Education. Under the leadership of former University of Miami president C. Scott Fletcher, the Funds provided some of the first substantive funding to advance the cause of ETV, including $90,000 to the JCET to support legal costs associated with the spectrum reservation effort. The following year, the Fund for Adult Education provided start-up financing for the Educational Television and Radio Center, the first national distributor for educational radio and television programs, located first in Ann Arbor, Michigan and later moved to New York.\textsuperscript{ccviii} Fletcher’s interest in educational broadcasting provided a foundation for Ford’s interest in Lew Hill’s later project at KPFA.

Even with Ford’s support, the sheer cost of television facilities and production limited the number of stations. Though the FCC increased the number of reserved channel allocations to 257, by 1960 there were only 49 educational TV stations on the air.\textsuperscript{cccix} Ford’s generosity could only go so far. Members of the NAEB knew they needed an ongoing source of funding. The most likely source was the federal
government. “Television cost so much they had to pay attention to it,” recalled former NAEB Executive Director William Harley. It had to attract the attention of the highest authorities within the governing bodies – the state legislatures, the governors, and so on. The NAEB found a powerful ally in Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson. Through his wife, Johnson had owned radio stations in Texas since the 1940s. Johnson put his knowledge of broadcast media to work in the new postwar politics, employing scientific polling, public relations techniques, and radio advertising in a successful 1948 campaign. Johnson’s political muscle went to work for educational broadcasting in 1956, following a dinner conversation with Leonard Marks, communications attorney for Mrs. Johnson’s broadcasting interests and pro bono attorney for the NAEB. Uncertain of the Ford Foundation’s continuing interest in ETV, Marks persuaded Johnson to spearhead an effort to provide federal funding for building and upgrading educational broadcasting facilities. Over the course of the next 6 years, Marks and others would help the NAEB shepherd the effort through Congress, under Johnson’s watchful eye. The final legislation, the Educational Broadcasting Facilities Act of 1962, provided funds to construct and equip educational television and radio outlets.

With television in the political and cultural spotlight, educational radio remained stagnant. Other than a 1951 Kellogg grant to support audiotape distribution, “educational radio was at a loss for major accomplishments during the 1950s.” The situation came to a head in 1963, when the NAEB, under pressure from its ETV members, reorganized into semi-autonomous radio and television units. University of Michigan radio instructor Jerrold Sandler became the executive director of the National Educational
Radio [NER] division. For his counterpart at the division of Educational Television Stations [ETS], ETV broadcasters successfully lured C. Scott Fletcher over from the Fund for Adult Education. Predictably, the two divisions started moving in opposite directions. Where Sandler “was forced to spend most of his energies to keep the division afloat,” Fletcher went to work through his personal and professional connections to orchestrate events that led to a $500,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The funds underwrote the costs of the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, endorsed by President Lyndon Johnson in November, 1965.

Though the work of the Carnegie Commission focused entirely on educational television, the panel’s deliberations touched on two key policy issues that affected radio as well. The first concern related to the spatialization of national networks and their relationship with local broadcast licensees. Aware that centrally directed radio and television networks dominated commercial broadcasting, the Commission called for a national system to interconnect stations and distribute programs, with final authority for scheduling left in the hands of local authorities. The second policy issue concerned the structuration of any systematic approach to educational broadcasting, and the role of government in financing such a system. Unlike other nation-states, the United States had never provided capital to support the production of content, according to Burke:

The notion of governmental financing of mass media was an unpopular political construct in the United States, on the grounds that sponsorship leads to control. It was finally agreed, however, without much enthusiasm among Commission members, that the Congress should be asked to provide support through an excise tax on television receivers.
In its final report, *Public television: A program for action*, released January 26, 1967, the Carnegie Commission recommended that Congress establish a nongovernmental, nonprofit corporation to receive and distribute public and private capital to support local program production, station interconnection, program distribution, and research for the benefit of individual ETV stations. The new agency would be called The Corporation for Public Television. President Johnson endorsed the provisions of the Carnegie report in his subsequent report to Congress on education and health the following month. Johnson’s recommendations were silent on the issue of financing.

Throughout the Carnegie proceedings, Jerry Sandler had not been idle. Since 1963, the radio division of the NAEB had been working to interconnect several groups of educational radio stations in the Northeast and upper Midwest through telephone lines. Faced with all that was occurring in television, Sandler felt strongly that radio needed some consideration in the Carnegie Commission hearings, but Fletcher and others were wary of derailing the process, and urged Sandler to wait for another opportunity. Sandler reacted, “You can’t put it aside for a later time. The future is now. There is no later time. That argument had been used for years and years and years until the people in educational radio at the time believed it.” Sandler responded by coordinating a conference of educational radio broadcasters at the Wingspread Center in Racine, WI in 1966, and subsequently committed his entire budget to a comprehensive report on educational radio. Published by the NAEB is April, 1967, *The hidden medium: A status report on educational radio in the United States* was distributed to members of Congress, three months after the Carnegie Commission report.
The hidden medium sufficiently impressed members of Congress enough that Sandler was called to testify at the Senate Commerce Committee hearings on the pending Public Television Act of 1967. With Democrats in control of the executive and legislative branches of the government, the legislation moved ahead quickly, carried by the tide of Johnson’s ambitious social agenda and his continuing faith in economic growth. The bill that finally emerged from Congress, establishing the federally funded Corporation for Public Broadcasting [CPB], authorized $9 million dollars to fund operations and programming for public television and radio enterprises. The Corporation’s mission and design would reflect most of the Carnegie Commission’s recommendations. Though the President would appoint the CPB Board of Directors, the private corporation was charged to “assure the maximum freedom of the public telecommunications entities and systems from interference with, or control of, program content or other activities.” On the issue of long range financing, neither the Johnson administration nor Congress followed through on the excise tax initiative: Financing would come through the Congressional appropriations process.

Incorporated in 1968, the CPB turned its immediate attention to television. The office of Radio Activities came into being in June of 1969. In its first year, CPB’s radio budget was $260,000. One third of the funds were designated to support the NER’s tape distribution network. The majority of the remaining funds would be distributed to radio stations that met a set of baseline qualifications: To receive funding from CPB, a station was required to broadcast eleven months per year, six days per week, for eight hours per day, with a minimum output power of 250 watts, and be operated by a staff of three
employees. Seventy-three of the 437 noncommercial, educational radio stations in the U.S. – less than 17% - met the criteria, most licensed to the colleges and universities of the NAEB. With the remaining resources, CPB focused on developing a national network for these qualifying stations. The network, incorporated on March 3, 1970 and funded directly by CPB, was named National Public Radio.  

The Sixties

As the educational radio broadcasters of NER worked to develop their political power, a counter-cultural movement was taking place on the doorstep of KPFA. In the 1950s, social protests were not unusual on the University of California campus: Berkeley had been an intellectual haven for beat poets, artists, peace activists, and radicals since the late 1940s. In the mid-60s, the nonconformists were joined by the first generation of students from the postwar baby boom. Some of these young people emerged as student leaders, including those who had traveled to the Deep South and participated in the decade-long movement to achieve civil rights for African Americans. Affiliated with historic dissident groups like the Congress of Racial Equality [CORE], or more recent organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee [SNCC], they came to Berkeley “with a respect for the power of civil disobedience, a fierce moralism, a lived love for racial equality, a distaste for bureaucratic highhandedness and euphemism, [and] a taste for relentless talk at intense mass meetings on the way towards consensus.”  

When activist Jack Weinberg was arrested in the fall of 1964 for attempting to recruit civil rights demonstrators on the Berkeley campus, Mario Savio and others urged students to strike. “From that moment on, whenever conflicts erupted
between the university and the Berkeley left, KPFA subscribers could count on immediate updates from their station.\textsuperscript{cccxxiv}

The Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley was the vanguard of the clamor that characterized the last half of 1960s: Citizens clashed with civil authorities over the heated issues of the day - civil rights, economic inequality, environmental degradation, the Vietnam War, and the military draft. Catalyzed by protest, new social communities arose, offering alternatives to the broadly portrayed conventions of postwar American life. Countercultural movements explored cultural, political, and economic empowerment for women, ethnic, and social minorities, unconventional approaches to education and community, and new matters and forms of expression in the arts. For many of those involved, it seemed there was grand movement towards “self-definition and self-determination against all forces of management from on high.”\textsuperscript{cccxxv} For others, the agitation threatened the foundations of the American way of life.

Mass media provided a running narrative of the political and social dislocation as it happened. Dissatisfied with the both the substance and style of coverage that appeared in widely distributed print and broadcast channels, observers and activists turned to other forms of communication. Dozens of small newspapers appeared across the country offering sympathetic reports and representations of every aspect of the movement, including the \textit{Los Angeles Free Press}, the \textit{East Village Other}, and the \textit{Berkeley Barb}.\textsuperscript{cccxxvi} Having grown to a network of three stations in the Bay Area, Los Angeles, and New York City, the broadcast counterpart could be heard on Pacifica stations KPFA, KPFT, and WBAI, respectively.
Similar political content might be found where students or their sympathetic advisors controlled the programming on college FM stations, including WGTB (Georgetown University, Washington D.C.), WYSO (Antioch University, Ohio) and WGDR (Goddard College, Vermont). More significantly, FM radio became the showcase for the music of the counterculture, especially extended tracks from long playing albums that were incompatible with commercial AM radio, which had long relied on 2 and 3 minute songs. Though FM radio’s regulatory issues had been put to rest in the 1950s, few Americans listened to FM radio in the 1960s, making advertising sales difficult. Many owners simply simulcast the programming of their profitable AM stations on FM frequencies, until the practice was curtailed by the FCC’s nonduplication rules in 1967, and owners were forced to find other programming alternatives. Absent the competitive pressures of the AM band, programmers working exclusively on FM had more latitude to experiment with content. Consequently, young listeners who sought out commercial FM stations, such as KSAN and KMPX in San Francisco, might be treated to 5 minutes 33 seconds of the Beatles A Day in The Life, or all of Bob Dylan’s Sad Eyed Lady of the Lowlands, running over 10 minutes. Adventurous listeners discovered that such long form music programming was a staple of noncommercial, listener-supported FM stations such as KRAB and KDNA.

In June 1970, the disparate interests of mainstream and underground media converged in Plainfield, Vermont at the new media center on the campus of Goddard College for the First Gathering of the Alternative Media Conference. Organized as a class project by Goddard master’s student and WBAI veteran Larry Yurdin, the
conference was intended to gather “diverse heads together in an attempt to explore the potential in electric media to turn people on, rather than fucking them over by anesthetizing them with the standard garbage presented in most television, AM and FM programming.” The ambitious invitation list included the icons of the counterculture -author Ken Kesey, Zen philosopher and KPFA host Alan Watts, KMPX program director Tom Donahue, and musician Frank Zappa. Those in attendance included spiritualist Baba Ram Das (formerly Harvard professor Richard Alpert and colleague of LSD advocate Dr. Timothy Leary), Realist publisher Paul Krassner, radical political activist Jerry Rubin, and “more than 1500 of the furthest out, most avant garde young radicals working in radio, television, and the printed media.” Pacifica Radio and the Foundation were well represented. Milam brought people from KTAO, as did Lansman from KDNA. It seemed to Lansman that everyone was there:

Who wasn’t? It was somewhat after Woodstock. I think Woodstock must have been on people’s minds. Cultural things happen. It was mostly radio people. The guy who did the Freak Brothers cartoons was there. Larry Yurdin was the organizer. He later got involved with KFAT. The guy who started KPFT in Houston, Larry Lee, was there. I have no recollection of meeting him there.

Lansman’s incomplete recollection of the Conference may reflect the general sense of anarchy that permeated the event. Planned for 1000 participants, the New York Post reported more than 1700 people at the gathering, observing, “It doesn’t take very many to make a crowd in an area whose chief industry is gravestones.” Another reports estimated the crowd at over 2000. Members of the Hog Farm collective provided sandwiches, salads, and lemonade laced with LSD. The audience assaulted the gun-toting leader of one workshop. “Ceremonial copulation was used at another to
demonstrate the uselessness of words,” reported *Atlantic Monthly*: “It was an alternative to the straight world’s convention; problems of identity, not profits, occupied most minds.”

“Like a miniature version of the movement itself, those present acted out the same battles which have been raging within America’s radical subculture,” observed the *Globe*: 

Women vs. men; homosexuals vs. men; hippies vs. revolutionaries; political people vs. cultural people; blacks vs. whites (not too much of this since there weren’t many blacks); electronic media vs. printed media; people who continue to work for commercial enterprises vs. people who’ve dropped out. There was even a conflict between New York people and non-New Yorkers.

In spite of the craziness, the Goddard conference offered the first opportunity for those involved in underground, alternative, and listener-sponsored radio to communicate directly with each other: More than 300 broadcasters shared information on all aspects of their endeavors. An unlicensed broadcaster demonstrated a 10-watt transmitter from the back of his car. Others discussed dealing with the FCC. “Perhaps most important, a lot of FM radio people left the conference with a commitment to rethink their programming.”

Pacifica offered to establish a network to distribute news, feature, and documentary programs to interested stations. After Goddard, broadcasters like Milam and Lansman knew that they were not alone.

**Sex and Broadcasting**

In the flurry of networking that followed the conference, Milam “got goddamned sick and tired of writing up single-space five page letters for all those people wanting to set up alternative, community radio stations.” Instead, he wrote about financing, licensing, and operating a listener-supported station, generously supplemented with his
personal views of the spirit and purpose of radio and the sorry state of commercial broadcasting, in a how-to manual titled *Sex and Broadcasting*. Milam intended the title to scare off aspiring religious broadcasters. Published in June of 1971, the first pocket-sized edition sold quickly, through *The Whole Earth Catalogue, The Village Voice*, and other conduits for counterculture information.

A later, larger edition featured the words “uncensored!” and “unexpurgated!” splashed across a lurid pink cover, and an orange-tinted portrait of the leering Milam.

As Milam published from California, Pacifica’s tape distribution offer had become a project of KRAB. Dubbed “The KRAB Nebula,” the service bicycled tapes around the country to a small group of listener-supported radio stations, from Seattle to Portland (KBOO), Berkeley (KPFA), Los Gatos (KTAO), Los Angeles (KPFK), St. Louis (KDNA), and New York (WBAI). Students at Antioch, Grinnell University, and other schools found *Sex and Broadcasting*, and those college stations joined the Nebula, too. The stations traded program guides, the “occasional bitching letter about some tape going astray,” and exchanged staff “on a random basis.”

But “our experiences are hardly shared,” lamented Milam. “Our experiments never leave our communities.”

Echoing the Yurdin’s Alternative Media Project, Milam asserted, “The greatest interchange of energies comes through knowing and liking someone somewhere else who has access to the tools of their own community.”

Milam proposed a meeting of the KRAB Nebula stations “for the purposes of a conference between existing and proposed radio stations.”
For three days in July 1973, participants in the tape bicycling network gathered in Seattle for the KRAB Nebula Media Conference. Seventy-five people attended, representing 18 groups that were either broadcasting, intending to broadcast, or simply interested in starting a listener-supported station. Milam’s communications attorney Michael Bader was there, along with Al Kramer for Citizens Communications, a public interest firm. The discussions were vigorous, characterized by an intense debate between the lawyers about existing licensees and access to the spectrum. Joining the Nebula members were people from across the U.S. that Milam and the others “had never heard of: Deadringer from Ft. Wayne, Ind; Agape from Dallas; New Wave from Columbus [sic], Mo; Nan Rubin’s group from Cincinnati.”

Like many of the conference participants, Boston native Nan Rubin came to noncommercial radio in college, while she pursued undergraduate studies at Antioch. Inspired by Milam’s visit to WYSO, and subsequently by *Sex and Broadcasting*, after graduation she and her partner searched for FM frequencies to start a listener-supported noncommercial station, first in Minneapolis before settling on Cincinnati. Engaged in an enterprise that had always been dominated by men, Rubin’s feminist perspective and persistent energy exemplified the diversity and difference that this group of independent, community-based, non-institutional organizations brought to the American system of broadcasting.

Like Rubin, most of the conferees were in their 20s. Seattle native Gray Haertig started experimenting with electronics as a boy, collecting radio and other electrical parts, playing around with different combinations and permutations to see how and why things
worked. Growing up in Seattle, Haertig listened to KRAB in the early 60s, then was hired by the station as an announcer while he was still in high school. In addition to hosting classical music programs, Haertig’s technical skills allowed him to work with the station’s chief engineer, Ben Dawson. He “quickly saw that that’s where the interesting stuff was. I started hanging out at Ben’s house, which was ever so much nicer than hanging out at my mother’s house with my mother.” Dawson soon informed Haertig that he was the new chief engineer at KBOO. Haertig and the other engineers provided the conferees with technical expertise and information essential to the process of licensing and constructing a radio station.

From his residence in the Bay Area, Milam chose to travel to the conference by train. Reasoning that he and his fellow travelers from KTAO would need a place to stay during the three days of the conference, Milam gave his American Express card to KTAO volunteer David Freedman and told him to rent “a whole railroad car from Amtrak.” Freedman recalls “about 20” people making the trip. The train ride became a rolling party, passing through “some indefinable beauty of rusting metal, sooty windows, brick warehouses cracked and sagging.” Though no specific plans grew out of the KRAB Nebula conference, the event, like the train ride, made a lasting impression on those who took part.

If David Freedman had aspirations, they were as a poet and a philosopher rather than a broadcaster. A native of New Orleans, Freedman grew up hearing the city’s distinctive styles of jazz and rhythm and blues, delivered on the radio by deejays with names like Poppa Stoppa and Doctor Daddy-o. But he was also adventurous, seeking out
distant stations from Texas and New Mexico on his shortwave-compatible AM radio at home. He was “deep into music” throughout his high school and college years, before moving to the San Francisco Bay Area for graduate study in French literature at Stanford in 1967. At Stanford, he encountered a rich intellectual mix that sparked his interest in more than literature: His professors introduced him to broader French culture, including the music of 20th century French composers such as Olivier Messiaen. He also discovered the emerging FM underground radio scene in San Francisco, exposed to the revolutionary programming on stations such as KSAN and KMPX.

The following year, Freedman received a fellowship to travel to and study in France, where he discovered the intellectually stimulating, noncommercial programming available through services such as the BBC and ORTF, the French national service. Knowing that “radio really had me hooked,” upon his return Freedman hungered for a similar service or station in the U.S. Back at Stanford, he found that station in KTAO, just a few miles south of the Stanford campus. The station, and Milam’s vast collection of music from around the globe, became Freedman’s passion. He spent “7 or 8 hours a day just listening to all the LPs that he had in his library. I was having a ball. I was in my last year at Stanford, and I had to make a decision.” In the end, he found himself scrawling graffiti in the Stanford Library: “It said, it’s blood I want, not ink, and I headed out. I was really bitten by radio.”

Freedman recalls a KTAO meeting in Milam’s back yard: “He had us all circled around the yard – at least 30, 35 people. He said, ‘we’re going to start a new station. It’s going to be in Santa Cruz.’” Such pronouncements could be expected from Milam,
who with Lansman had embarked on several projects around the U.S. Then, Milam said something unexpected: “Freedman’s gonna start it.” With the promise of a construction permit to be provided by Milam, engineering support from Dawson, and no money to live on, Freedman moved to the redwood community of Felton, north of Santa Cruz, and began raising money.

Freedman’s story of the beginnings of FM station KUSP has all the hallmarks of other station start-up stories from the early 70s. “I guess I was like number 10,000 of the people who were circulating around Santa Cruz at the time, pedaling a dream. My hair was down to my ass at that time, and I wasn’t wearing shoes.” Having totaled his motorcycle, he hitchhiked back and forth to Santa Cruz every day. “After 6 months, I had raised all of $35.00.” When the commercial broadcasters came up for their triennial license renewal, Freedman coaxed letters of support for the project from them, along with donations of some vintage World War II broadcasting equipment. He coaxed money out of a family foundation operated by one of Milam’s friends. The station eventually went on the air at 10 watts, broadcasting from a pantry in the back of a restaurant. During his years in Santa Cruz, Freedman never made more that $300 a month. He got by “living on surplus food.”

In the spring of 1975, Milam told Freedman of another gathering of noncommercial, listener-supported stations, planned this time for the Midwest. Still barefoot and scrambling for money, Freedman could not afford to attend. Soon afterwards, fed up with his hand-to-mouth way of life, he left KUSP to go to work for an
audience research firm in Menlo Park. But others, inspired by *Sex and Broadcasting*,
looked forward to the National Alternative Radio Konvention – NARK 1.
CHAPTER VI
FROM IDEA TO ORGANIZATION, 1975 - 1978

While it is tempting to say that the NFCB came from humble beginnings, in fact the founders of the organization brought a rich mixture of social, cultural, and political knowledge and experience to the task of noncommercial radio. Building on the informal grassroots network that coalesced around Milam’s *Sex and Broadcasting* and the KRAB Nebula Media Conference, the founders were tied together by more than ideology: They shared common opportunities and challenges imposed on them by the resource-poor circumstances of their various enterprises. These connections were further reinforced by bonds of friendship, kinship, and partnership: Some of the key players in the initial organization, establishment, and operations of the NFCB shared personal relationships and relied on each other for support and companionship, as well as effort and expertise, as they faced the challenges of organizational development, management, and advocacy. Over a period of nearly 10 years, working on a broad range of strategic policy issues and practical problems, their sustained and persistent efforts provided non-institutional, listener-supported radio with a national presence and a collective identity as “community radio.”

The gang from Grinnell

On Thursday June 18, 1975 the residents of Madison, Wisconsin awoke to cloudy skies. The daytime temperature was in the 70s, typical for the end of spring in the capital city of the Badger State. Over the next few days, as spring gave way to summer, the
temperature rose steadily into the 90s, a harbinger of the sticky heat and humidity that would overtake the city in the coming weeks. Inside the Freedom House alternative school, Bill Thomas greeted people from across the country as they arrived in Madison in response to Lorenzo Milam’s call for “a real national community radio conference.” “We are not alone,” proclaimed Milam. “There are us’s all over with our same concerns, anguishes, triumphs, and aether-bitten personalities.”

Like almost all of the broadcasters who came to Madison, Bill Thomas was in his 20s. Longhaired and wiry, with piercing eyes, he possessed an easy-going manner, a quick wit, a passion for music, and desire to bring people together in a common purpose. His first experience in radio came while he was a student, at the new 10-watt campus station licensed to Grinnell College, KDIC. Offering jazz, blues, and rock music that was generally unavailable in Iowa at the time, Thomas was part of a staff of young volunteers who “were vocal advocates for change.” Like other college stations, KDIC became a haven for young people concerned about civil rights, the draft, and the Vietnam War. To Thomas, it was “a free-for-all.”

During his summer break in 1969, Thomas continued to polish his radio skills at KDNA, 20 miles south and across the Mississippi river from his hometown in Alton, Illinois. KDNA owner Jeremy Lansman “was there all the time,” and Milam was “a presence” who “appeared from time to time.” Inspired by what he’d learned at KDNA, Thomas started a tape exchange network at Grinnell the following fall, circulating tapes out of KDIC to Antioch’s WYSO and on to other stations, in a manner similar to the tape network operated by the NAEB since the 1950s.
In 1972, after graduating from college and losing his student deferment, Thomas was drafted and headed for Vietnam. But as Lew Hill had done during a previous war, he succeeded in gaining an exemption from military service as a conscientious objector. Back in St. Louis, he was unable to convince the CO authorities to allow him to perform his required alternative service at KDNA. Instead, Thomas ended up at a nonprofit community center serving the city’s low income, largely black population. As part of his CO service, he started a 10-watt noncommercial radio station at the community center, serving as the manager of KBDY for a year. In his hours away from KBDY, he worked for KDNA. Once his CO requirements were fulfilled, he followed his wife, Betsy Rubenstein, to Urbana, Illinois where she enrolled at the University of Illinois. While she attended graduate school, he started the process of bringing a listener-supported station to Champaign-Urbana, and stayed in touch with friends and colleagues at other stations and startup projects.

One of those friends was Mike O’Connor, Bill’s Grinnell classmate and a former staff member at KDIC, where he had been “pretty into electronics and recording stuff.”

ccclxix After college, O’Connor and his girlfriend traveled around the US in a Volkswagen van, stopping in St. Louis to visit Bill. They stayed a month, living at “a commune, about a block away from the station [KDNA], where a lot of people who worked at the station lived.”

ccclxxi When O’Connor’s partner was selected to begin a graduate program at the University of Wisconsin in the fall of 1973, the couple decided to spend some of the intervening time with David Freedman in Santa Cruz, assisting him with the startup of KUSP. Though O’Connor “wasn’t really truly a radio engineer,” he “hung out with folks
like Jeremy and the real engineers,” and amassed enough knowledge of equipment installation, studio wiring, and transmission systems to qualify for the FCC’s First Class broadcast engineering license.¹⁺⁺⁺

In Madison, O’Connor found work at WHA, the University’s historic educational radio station and among the first to join National Public Radio. On the side, he joined a nascent effort to start a listener-supported station in Madison. When the project stalled, he struck out on his own. He formed his own nonprofit organization, Back Porch Radio, and tendered an application for a construction permit to the FCC. For advice, he relied on those he knew at other listener-supported stations – Milam, Lansman, and the others who had crossed his path via KRAB, KDNA, and Sex and Broadcasting. By the spring of 1975, Madison had its own noncommercial, listener-supported radio station – WORT. O’Connor served as the manager.

In March 1975, O’Connor joined Thomas and Milam at a gathering of stations in Chicago, where “twenty five people turned up – from a dozen or so stations and would-be stations.” One person introduced the idea of “a conference among three or four community, non-institutional groups that are trying to get radio stations on the air.” Someone suggested that the Pacifica stations should be invited, too. A discussion ensued about possible dates, locations, costs, and topics for such a gathering. O’Connor suggested that Madison would provide a good location near the center of the country, and after “a wave of ennui and a shudder of fear swept over the group,” he offered to find an appropriate venue for the event. Two days after the Chicago meeting, Milam sent a
letter to all of the stations he knew who might be interested in such a conference:

Responses were to be sent to Bill Thomas in Urbana.

At the time of the Chicago meeting, Thomas was trying to revive the KRAB Nebula. The original arrangement was “a round robin, or loop type set-up,” with each station responsible for forwarding tapes on to the next. Lacking a central point of contact, “it would sometimes take tapes more than a year to travel the loop,” and the system broke down over time. To avoid these issues, Thomas proposed a more centralized system for “a possible tape exchange.” O’Connor would duplicate tapes at WHA. Thomas could send them out, though he thought it would be more advantageous to use a station as the single point of contact, perhaps WYSO or Milam’s new station in Dallas, KCHU.

With Milam and Thomas working from the same mailing list, it soon became apparent that the ideas for the Madison conference and “possible tape exchange” dovetailed together neatly, with Thomas coordinating both efforts. Sometime before the end of April 1975, Thomas sent out another letter “to everyone on the possible tape exchange mailing list (the brown one) and the Pacifica stations,” summarizing a number of proposals for conference fees, food, accommodations, and workshops with titles including “frequency searches,” “acquiring donated equipment,” “getting community stuff on the air,” and “getting funds from the gov’t.” The letter closed with “notes and gossip,” including a single sentence about Bill’s brother, the former manager of KDNA, and his wife: “Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford are moving to Washington D.C.”
Like Bill Thomas and Mike O’Connor, Tom Thomas was a Grinnell graduate, one year ahead of his brother. In college, he tried to get an alternative newspaper going on the Grinnell campus. Taller and slightly more reserved than Bill, Tom was a skilled writer and speaker, able to capture and articulate ideas with an economy of language. At Grinnell, Tom met Seattle native Terry Clifford, and the two began a lifelong partnership. In 1971, the couple set off to cross the country in a 1952 Chevy panel truck, intent on establishing a news service for alternative newspapers. Stopping in St. Louis to visit Bill, Tom was impressed by Lansman’s energetic approach to community affairs and public engagement at KDNA.

In the fall of 1971, Tom and Terry moved to New Jersey, where he took up graduate studies in the Woodrow Wilson School for Public Policy at Princeton University. After completing the first year in the Wilson program, Tom opted to take time off, and the couple returned to St. Louis, where Tom assumed the position of News Director at KDNA, and later became the station manager. Terry got a job at the station as well, coordinating the volunteer training program and helping those new to radio to “invent their own wheels.”

As a team, Tom, Terry, and Jeremy Lansman provided a unique set of knowledge, skills, and abilities to others interested in listener-supported radio. Lansman was a resourceful and creative engineer, with a decade’s experience preparing FCC applications. Tom was a powerful writer and speaker, schooled in the policies and practices of government and public policy agencies. Terry was an exceptional organizer,
communicator, and team builder. Together, they were capable of getting start-up projects through the first, difficult steps of applying for an FCC construction permit.

One of the first projects to come their way was Mike O’Connor’s construction permit application for Madison, one of a number of applications prepared on a picnic table by Thomas and Clifford. Lansman contributed to the engineering sections. Concurrently, with Lansman and Milam preparing to sell KDNA, Tom and Terry spearheaded an effort to start new radio and television stations in St. Louis under the auspices of a new nonprofit organization, the Double Helix Corporation. Others on the KDNA staff were interested in going to other cities and towns to start their own projects. After Tom, Terry, and Jeremy attended the KRAB Nebula conference, would-be broadcasters from around the country sought help from St. Louis as well.

By the fall of 1973, Thomas and Clifford were involved in one way or another with several start-up projects. In some cases, they were “giving just a little bit of help at the edges of what they were doing.” In others, they “virtually wrote the application.” They spent hours on the phone talking to applicants, or visiting with those who made the trek to St. Louis to seek their assistance. For “the Milam Sex and Broadcasting folks,” the “construction permit brain trust in St. Louis” provided a central point of contact in the effort to bring listener-supported radio to communities across the country.

By the fall of 1974, KDNA had been sold, and Tom and Terry returned to Princeton, where Tom completed his public policy degree. Brother Bill was in Urbana, working on his start-up project and trying to revive the KRAB Nebula. Mike
O’Connor had WORT up and running in Madison. Across the country, the projects Tom and Terry had worked on were under way. By the time of the Chicago gathering in the winter of 1975, Bill “had a strong sense of a larger movement,” and took up the challenge to bring everyone together in Madison the following summer.

The NARC

In 1957, the Brooklyn Dodgers baseball team packed their bags and abandoned New York for the sunny skies, exploding population, and promising major league sports markets of southern California. Across the river from Brooklyn in Jersey City, Rich McClear was devastated. All of 9 years old, he rebuilt his grandfather’s Silvertone radio and attached it to a long wire antenna, hoping that he might be able to receive the Dodgers’ broadcasts from other National League cities. It worked: He was especially excited when he tuned in the team’s flagship station in Los Angeles, KFI. When he was 11, he was corresponding with professional engineers and subscribing to Broadcasting magazine. At 17, he left New Jersey for St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota, where he worked for the college’s noncommercial educational radio station, WCAL. During the summers, he returned to New York, working as an engineer for WOR, one of the country’s oldest stations and the flagship of the historic Mutual Broadcasting System. All Rich McClear ever wanted “was to be in radio.”

Though he was raised on the east coast, McClear had grown up hearing Pacifica radio on WBAI, the New York FM station that had been given to Pacifica in 1960 by the wealthy, eccentric industrialist Louis Schweitzer. Pacifica’s blend of cultural and issue-oriented programming, broadcast without commercial interruption, was unique in
the New York area. After receiving his bachelor’s degree, Rich and his wife Susan, the daughter of a prominent Minnesota politician, started working on a plan to bring something like Pacifica radio to the rural communities of northern Minnesota. For Rich and Susie, it would be “a rural version of Pacifica that’s better than Pacifica,” providing locally focused, noncommercial cultural and informational programming to a population that had access to few forms of media. Beginning in 1970, Northern Community Radio produced and distributed programs to Minnesota’s noncommercial, educational [soon to be public] radio stations. The McClears also started searching for an FM frequency for a noncommercial FM radio station for Minnesota’s Iron Range.

While visiting friends in Seattle during the summer of 1973, the McClears heard KRAB and quickly realized there was “someone other than Pacifica doing this.” Calling the station, they reached Terry Clifford, who had come home to Seattle for the KRAB Nebula Media Conference, and stayed on as part of an informal staff sharing arrangement that existed between KRAB and KDNA. Though the McClears had missed the conference, their phone call to KRAB brought the McClears into the network of Milam, Clifford, Tom Thomas, and the other people working to establish listener-supported radio stations. The next year, they traveled to St. Louis to discuss their plans for rural radio on the Iron Range with Tom, Terry, and Jeremy. Somewhere along the line, their names ended up on Bill Thomas’ mailing list.

With plans for the Northern Community Radio moving ahead, Rich completed a master’s degree in speech communications and broadcasting at the University of Minnesota in 1975, just as Bill Thomas was generating his correspondence about the
possible tape exchange and the Madison conference. The McClears were in contact with Mike O’Connor and WORT program director Joan Rubel in Madison, and with Fresh Air, a start-up group in Minneapolis. Station initiatives were either underway or broadcasting in Atlanta, Cincinnati, Denver, Pittsburgh, and Columbia, Missouri. Everyone wanted to get together and talk. Everyone planned to be in Madison in June.

The gathering was named the National Alternative Radio Conference - NARC. Mike O’Connor was pleased with the double entendre of the acronym, a pejorative term in the counterculture for an undercover police officer searching out drug-related activities. The conference took place over six days, beginning with informal get-togethers on Tuesday, June 17 and ending with ad-hoc meetings on Sunday, June 23. Most meetings, workshops, and meals took place at Freedom House, an alternative school installed in an aging steel Quonset hut on Madison’s Winnebago Street, three miles east of the University of Wisconsin campus on the peninsula that separates the city’s most prominent natural features, Lake Mendota and Lake Monona. O’Connor chose the site for its meeting rooms, support facilities, and the multipurpose gymnasium. Some conferees camped in sleeping bags on the hardwood floor. Other slept in the homes or back yards of WORT staffers. O’Connor arranged to have the meals catered by one of Madison’s vegetarian restaurants. “The first schism,” according to Rich McClear, “was between the vegetarians and the carnivores.” Someone warned Susie that the couple’s 2-year-old would suffer from a protein deficiency.

The conference was animated, intense, and characterized by the diversity of interests present. Those associated with Milam and Lansman stressed their connections
with their local communities, and their interest in cultural programming. The Pacifica stations had a national mission, and were more overtly political. The Midwest stations existed in the midst of the traditional values of rural America. The west coast stations were more connected to the counterculture. For years, the various threads of listener-supported radio had been spun from the fibers of similar stations with similar ideologies and practices: They were trying to weave those threads together into a fabric of alternative radio.

In contrast to these differences, there were also similarities. Though they spoke passionately of the need to create radio for unserved ethnic and racial populations, the conferees were predominantly white. Many were college graduates, some with advanced degrees. They were young: most of the people at the NARC were in their 20s or early 30s, at the beginning of their adult lives and careers. At 41, Milam was a senior citizen. Most of all, they shared a common identity of opposition, a sense of who they were not rather than who they were. In the conference program, Milam articulated this reticence to label this form of radio they had undertaken:

We didn’t even think of the need to give it a title. I mean it was sort of “Pacifica-like,” or sort of “educational,” or more exactly “non-commercial, free-forum (even free form) radio.” Then the Carnegie Commission began to talk about “Public” radio – as opposed to “instructional” radio and television; and in the same way that the world created “broadcasting” as a contrast to “narrowcasting” – we had a bag, and we were expected to sit in it, or maybe even try to fill it.

Milam dismissed the connection of listener-supported radio to the public radio system, but then went on to reject the more positive label:

But even that won’t do – we can say “public,” but we might be put in bed with the CPB stations that do 60% net[work] feed, 25% late-romantic-and-big-band jazz, with announcers that came again out of the Ron Bailie school where you talk at, not to. And
we can say “community” and that makes us feel better – at least until the next word comes along – because that means that we belong to the town and cities from which we radiate; but still we would rather not be defined, really.

Instead, Milam relied on a laundry list of exceptional qualities to capture the commonalities of these radio stations:

Except to say that we prefer to have at least 100 volunteers, and a goodly selection of Puerto Rican, African, and Japanese music; that we usually operate out of the most dismal shabby buildings (or dumptrucks) imaginable; that we often will have equipment which should have been retired with Harding, and that the volunteers-staff-on-the-air-people have a good bit of discretion in bringing the voices of the city into the hole in the dial called frequency.

Over four days, the 75 conferees talked in groups large and small, discussing practical, political, and ideological issues, including “music programming,” “newspeople,” “dealing with the FCC,” “CPB,” “on-the-air fundraising,” and “a community communications center.” Since no textbooks or how-to guides existed to address this kind of radio, several hours each day were devoted to an effort to create a training manual that could be used by all stations: A note in the program indicated, “Terry Clifford wants us to write it here.” Representing CPB in the midst of all the activity, Clyde Robinson tried to come to grips with these non-traditional, non-institutional broadcasters, taking on the McClears and others in “a real hammering discussion about what is the definition of public radio and why community radio should be part of it.” Lansman wanted the group to “put together a document that we could all sign. This could then be presented to the agencies that deal with public radio.”

Where Lansman, Clifford, and Bill Thomas had specific goals, others came to the NARC to get a better understanding of what they were doing. After graduating from college, Bruce Theriault was hired by a youth center in the working-class town of Derby,
Connecticut, where he was given responsibility for the center’s unlicensed, fully functioning AM station: “We were operating as if we were a real station. We had people in the door. We had record service. We would have public affairs shows. We had the mayors in. We had the police in. The whole thing.” Under the right weather conditions, the station could be heard 30 miles away in Hartford – where the FCC had a field office. Theriault was nervous. An attorney associated with the center referred him to *Sex and Broadcasting* for information on the licensing process. Months later, the same attorney referred him to the upcoming gathering in Madison. For Theriault, it was the first time he’d met anyone who was trying to do the same things with radio.

With the conference drawing to a close on Saturday afternoon, discussion focused on Lansman’s position paper. The conversations moved to an array of topics – the training manual, the tape exchange, the need for legal and technical resources. How could stations gain access to CPB funding? How could stalled applications get through the FCC? How would the momentum of the conference be sustained, after everyone returned to their homes and their stations, and went back to their day-to-day tasks? The questions and concerns that hovered around the entire conference became the focus of the last conference session, listed as “a big meeting” on the conference schedule.

Bill Thomas, Tom Thomas, and Terry Clifford already knew the answers to some of these questions. Bill had been developing the infrastructure of the program exchange since January. Tom and Terry were moving to Washington D.C. to continue the work they had started in St. Louis, helping noncommercial, non-institutional organizations gain broadcast licenses and undertake their responsibilities to federal authorities. Bruce
Theriault thought it was a fine idea: “What did we know? We wanted Tom and Terry to go to Washington to represent our needs.” Tom proposed that the conference take steps to create a nonprofit agency to continue the work undertaken in Madison. He even had a name for the organization – The League of Stations. In the discussions that followed, the name did not survive, but the conferees agreed to take the steps necessary to create a formal association. The group passed the hat and collected about $60.00 so that Tom and Terry “could at least fill their tank a few times” on the way to Washington. They also passed a resolution calling for representatives of noncommercial “community/alternative broadcast” stations and groups to meet the following August for the purpose of drawing up a corporate charter and by-laws for a “national support organization.”

From Columbia to the Capital

“The Constitutional Convention” convened in Columbia, Missouri, on Friday, August 1, 1975. Like Madison, Columbia was a university town, and home to a listener-supported radio station, KOPN, base for some of the KDNA staff after the sale of the St. Louis station. 27 people, representing 18 organizations, convened in the sticky summer heat “to create a national organization that would represent their interests at a national level, provide services that could only be achieved on a cooperative basis, and facilitate an efficient use of their all-too-scarce resources.”

“The big room” at KOPN was normally used for live performances, panel discussions, laying out publications, and other tasks that required space for people to spread out. KOPN producer Dave Taylor walked “into the station, and here were all
these hippies I didn’t know - hippies from out of town. There were all these hippies looking serious and talking about bylaws.”

Taylor’s partner, program director Pat Watkins, had represented KOPN in Madison, and offered Columbia as a suitable location for the meeting. As a teenager, Watkins volunteered at KDNA, then moved to Columbia to attend the University of Missouri, where she wrote for the city’s underground newspaper. On a return visit to St. Louis, she asked Lansman what it would take to start a station in Columbia. “He asked if we wanted to start a station like theirs, and I said something snappy like, no I think we can do a better job.”

Inspired by the antiwar, civil rights, and feminist movements, Watkins intended to do “something very, very political.” Where Milam’s adherents embraced cultural programming, Watkins “had a very political agenda for community radio. I wanted it to be advancing the liberals in this country. I wanted it to be the voice of the left, pushing the liberals.”

For Watkins, radio was not about “playing sea chanties all the time. It drove me nuts.” As program director of KOPN, she intended to advance a political agenda through the choices she made for station’s program schedule, in a manner reminiscent of the Pacifica stations. Others shared in this more political strain of activism, but for the time being Watkins and those who shared her views were content to co-exist with Milam’s cultural approach to noncommercial broadcasting.

Meeting informally on Friday night, “following a reasonably high-grade gossip session,” the group agreed to dispense with Roberts Rules of Order, make decisions by consensus, and agreed on agenda. Terry Clifford was designated as chairperson, and Mike O’Connor as the official recorder. The following morning, the group identified five
areas of concern that the new organization should address. The association should provide information on federal policy issues; represent the interests of member stations on those policy issues; facilitate communication between the members; coordinate member activities; and publicize member activities. A committee took on the task of drafting these objectives into a statement of purpose. The conferees also agreed “that the overall direction and control of the organization” would be limited to noncommercial broadcasters: Though the interests of commercial broadcasters might overlap with these objectives from time to time, the association would serve the needs of noncommercial applicants and licensees, and membership would be limited to noncommercial agencies.

Saturday afternoon was given over to the process of refining and approving the association’s Articles of Incorporation. The company would incorporate in Delaware, a state without residency requirements for incorporators or corporate tax obligations for non-Delaware businesses. Similar in many respects to the documentation required for nonprofit broadcast licensees, the Articles framed the legally binding purposes of the organization, to “assist and advance” the development of noncommercial educational radio and television services and non-profit organizations “operating or planning to operate one or more” NCE stations. Affairs of the corporation would be “managed by the members empowered to vote.” Terms and conditions of voting and non-voting membership would be stated in a subsequent by-laws document, with the condition that “one-third of the members of the corporation empowered to vote may constitute a quorum.” As required of all nonprofit corporations, the Articles specified that none
of the company’s net income or assets, beyond “reasonable compensation for service rendered,” could be distributed to the members, directors, or officers, and prohibited the company from “carrying on of propaganda,” “attempting to influence legislation,” or intervening in “any political campaign.” The Articles listed 24 incorporators including Tom and Bill Thomas, Terry Clifford, Mike O’Connor, Bruce Theriault, and Pat Watkins, and Ann L. Rubin of Cincinnati.

Following “a pretty good party” and “some pretty corny late night radio on KOPN,” the tired conferees reconvened for final discussions on Sunday. They chose a name for the association - the Federation of Community Broadcasters. The descriptive “National” would be inserted when the Articles were filed in Delaware. The group took up the topic of the tape exchange, resolving that it should be a function of the new Federation. Bill Thomas agreed to be the director, with the condition “that the Federation would not get in the way.” Following up on another topic from Madison, the group was less certain in their conclusions about an organizational newsletter. At the NARC, KPFA’s Randy Thom offered to start a magazine style publication, with news and feature articles on a wide variety of topics of interest to participating stations. But Thom was not present in Columbia. Instead, he made it clear in a letter to those who were that he would move ahead with the project on his own. Others expressed the desire for a different sort of publication “which would deal only with unvarnished information on our friends in the various commissions and agencies” in Washington D.C. For the most part, the discussion ended with more questions than answers, the group resolving only to create a publication “if action seemed warranted.”
While there was no closure on the question of the newsletter, there was broad agreement on the proposal to establish an office in the nation’s capital under the direction of Terry Clifford and Tom Thomas. The initiative had been shared in a pre-conference letter from Thomas:

The purposes of the Washington Office can roughly be separated into three categories: Information out of Washington to member stations concerning regulatory, funding, and other national matters; work in Washington on behalf of stations before the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the FCC, and other groups and agencies; and ongoing liaison [sic] between affiliated stations, attorneys, agencies, etc.

The letter, accompanied by a draft of the articles of incorporation and a proposed set of by-laws, provided the conferees with the first example of Thomas and Clifford’s organizational, persuasive, and political skills, cultivated since Tom’s days at the Wilson School. In their approach to the gathering at Columbia, Thomas and Clifford identified challenges and opportunities inherent in the circumstances, assessed the needs and interests of the involved parties, and mapped the issues in a manner that directed the discussion towards outcomes framed by Tom and Terry. Thomas and Clifford would employ these skills and tactics repeatedly and successfully in the coming years. The proposal passed unanimously.

For the tape exchange and the Washington office to be viable, there would have to be a steady stream of income for both operations. Bill Thomas “hoped the exchange could be self-supporting once it got past the starting costs of $2,000.00 to $4,000.00.” The topic was referred to a broader discussion about Federation finances. A straw vote revealed what each of the organizations present might be willing to pay for services on a monthly basis. The largest and most established stations,
including WYSO, WPRT, and Pittsburgh’s WYEP, offered $30.00. Theriault’s Stand Community Radio offered $5.00. The total came to $267.50 per month, for an estimated annual income of $3210.00. Knowing that other stations and groups not present were willing to contribute, the estimate might be stretched to $4,800.00. Thomas estimated that annual expenses would run $12,000.00 to $15,000.00 for the first year, not including the tape exchange. The way seemed clear: after initial capital investment, the exchange, the newsletter, and other projects would have to be self-supporting. Impling the past generosity of Milam and others, the Federation would approach “our in-house angels, members of the communications bar, and sympathetic persons in the commercial broadcasting world” for contributions. Despite the “collective disappointment” with past approaches to foundations and more traditional philanthropic sources, the group was hopeful that their pooled resources would improve their chances of success through “the national and cooperative character of the Federation and the ‘seed money’ aspects of the grants we would be seeking.” Finally, the group suggested a range of joint projects, based on the tried-and-true techniques of their stations – “joint booking of artists for a ‘national radio benefit tour;’ a national marathon [broadcast]; a national mailing; an national bake sale.” Undeterred by the financial realities, the Federation would move ahead without a business plan. The company would rely on the collective knowledge, skills, and abilities of the participants to gather the necessary revenue and pay the bills.

With the present course of action determined, the group turned to the immediate future. Bill Thomas, Theriault, and four others composed a committee to select a site and a date for the next NARC. Bill suggested Urbana or Cincinnati as central locations.
Jerry Greene from KOTO in Telluride, Colorado, suggested the mountain resort town, to appeal to people on the west coast who had been unable to travel to Madison. Rhoda Epstein from WDNA, Miami, suggested hopefully, “if we had money to help people with transportation, the location of the conference wouldn’t make very much difference.”

The question was left to the committee.

For the mountain of work that remained to be done, the group established an interim organizing committee. Mike O’Connor would prepare a report on the Columbia meeting and distribute it to those on the Milam and Thomas mailing lists. He also agreed to maintain the company records for the time being. Terry Clifford and Tom Thomas would establish the Washington office, recruit stations and groups for membership, and develop a campaign “to publicize our activities to date and our future plans, both to the general public and to concerned organizations.” In addition, as the organization’s newly designated director, Tom would develop a budget, prepare a schedule of assessments and fees for participating organizations, and “initiate a fundraising campaign to augment these funds.” The tasks of drafting the by-laws, circulating the text for comment and revision, preparing a final document for approval of the incorporators, developing procedures to elect Federation officers, and conducting the organization’s first election, were assigned to Ann L. Rubin of Cincinnati.

Originally from Boston, Nan Rubin came to Antioch College in Yellow Springs, Ohio to pursue undergraduate studies in sociology and mass communication. Her interests led her to WYSO, one of the stations in the Grinnell tape network. Reflective of Antioch’s nontraditional approach to higher education, the staff and producers at WYSO
were adapting the Milam-Lansman model of community engagement to the institutional environment of campus-based radio. Committed to social justice and feminist causes, she valued radio as a more accessible and immediate instrument for social change and “instant gratification. Everybody had a radio. It was really cheap, and you could produce radio by yourself.”

When Milam came to Yellow Springs to promote *Sex and Broadcasting*, Rubin was convinced that “starting a radio station sounded like a fabulous idea.” She began the search for an available NCE frequency in Minneapolis, then in Cincinnati. By the time Rubin attended the KRAB Nebula Conference in 1972, she had an application on file with the FCC. WAIF Community Radio signed almost simultaneously with WORT, Rubin and O’Connor exchanging numerous phone calls to inquire “are you on yet? Are you on yet? Are you on yet?” Though she was unable to attend the NARC, she traveled with her partner Joe Bakan to Columbia for the organizational meeting. Now, she would become the architect of the new Federation’s governing structures and practices.

The group turned finally to the statement of purpose, drafted by committee and discussed over the previous days. The final document opened a forceful expression of the ideals and aspirations of the new Federation, invoked through the language of the Communications Act of 1934:

> We believe broadcast communications are a vital national resource that must serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. The overwhelming majority of existing broadcasters, both commercial and so-called public, has clearly failed to meet the obligation.
Drawing on the ideology of Hill and Milam, the statement advocated for direct citizen participation in the process of making radio, echoing the spirit of John Dewey’s philosophy of communication as the process and the instrument of democracy:

We believe access of the public to the airwaves should be an essential part of the broadcasting process. We believe it is important that the full range of opinion in our communities finds expression through our stations; and that a wide variety of cultural, racial, political, and social groups should have use of the broadcast spectrum… We get excited on the air – real people, being angry, happy, scared, or delighted… We care strongly about the people in our communities… we work for the growth of vibrant, responsive, human broadcasting.  

To achieve these aspirations, the organizers agreed “to join together in such a way as to preserve our independence yet share our resources to meet our common needs,” proposing to:

Foster the development of public policy at the legislative, regulatory and administrative levels to aid the growth of our stations… seek equitable distribution of federal funds for noncommercial broadcasting… facilitate the exchange of program materials… publicize our activities… [and] assist the organization and expansion of new and innovative broadcast stations throughout the country.

A host of issues remained on the table, including the tape exchange, the newsletter, and the training manual project, but the time had come to leave Columbia, return to their cities and towns, and carry on with the business at hand. Terry Clifford, Mike O’Connor, Nan Rubin, Bruce Theriault, Bill and Tom Thomas, Pat Watkins, and 17 others affixed their names to the Articles of Incorporation. “And then we picked up our broken bodies,” wrote O’Connor, “and went to home to bed.”

**Open for business**

The Delaware Secretary of State recorded the Articles of Incorporation for the National Federation of Community Broadcasters, Inc., on September 15, 1975. Terry
Clifford and Tom Thomas opened NFCB’s Washington office at 1716 21st Street, less than a mile from the M Street headquarters of the FCC. The masthead on the Federation’s first newsletter omitted an important detail from the address. The Washington office of the NFCB was located in Apartment 3, the home of Terry Clifford and Tom Thomas. Santa Cruz engineer Don Mussell “slept in that room for a number of days,” when he came through town to review filings at the Commission. "NFCB was literally on the second floor of their house,” recalled Mussell. “They seemed very organized. The phone was ringing.” On his first visit, Mussell found the FCC staff unable to locate the documents he had so carefully prepared:

> The FCC reference room couldn’t find them. They said, “we’re really busy. We know it’s in that area. Why don’t you look?” I went back to the reference files. Nothing was where it was supposed to be. But there was this huge pile of applications in the corner of the room, all stacked up, almost to my chin. About half way down I recognized some of the colors for some of the filings I had done. I did nice color separations on the files in there. Sure enough, there was KAZU’s file, about 3 feet down the stack. It was about 3 inches thick. I very carefully pulled it out, and said, “I found the file.” They said, “Oh good, we can file it correctly when you’re done.” And then I went back to Terry and Tom’s house, and I looked around, and they were so organized compared to the FCC. I thought, “this is great.”

Thomas and Clifford immediately put their organizational and persuasive skills to work raising startup capital from the enlisted and prospective members of the NFCB. “The principal immediate task before us,” wrote Thomas, “is raising enough funds to make this project work.” Optimistically asserting that “any outside support we may collect is still weeks away,” Thomas used his provisional authority to designate a tiered scale of membership fees, from $25.00 for those groups not on the air, to $50.00 for stations with budgets above $10,000. In addition, Thomas asked members to
consider payments of $10.00 to $30.00, leaving the final determination to individual
“dictates of conscience and checkbook.”

On these terms, 16 groups or stations joined the Federation, including KOPN, WAIF, WYEP, WORT, WYSO, and Milam’s most recent endeavor, KCHU, and the Double Helix Corporation of St. Louis, successor to KDNA.

From their education in public policy and their experience with telecommunications administration, Thomas and Clifford understood that the Federation’s success would depend on building alliances with the established noncommercial broadcasting authorities, agencies, and advocates in Washington. Michael Bader was just one of “a number of lawyers in this town who are excited about what we are doing.” Within the staid specialty of telecommunications law, NFCB and its constituents offered new challenges for Bader and the legal community, and new opportunities to press public service and spectrum issues before the FCC on behalf of unserved and underserved citizens. As attorney John Crigler observed: “In some ways, he [Bader] was the most logical defender, and in some ways it was very anomalous. Mike was by nature a very straight businessman – sort of Clark Kent-looking – he had thick glasses and a business suit. But there was this wilder, much more creative side of Bader that loved the community stations, loved Lorenzo.” For Tom and Terry, the “legal eagles” provided an informal support network, “to whom we can refer cases according to expertise and interest.”

Thomas and Clifford also worked to build alliances with key individuals and advocacy agencies engaged in efforts to shape the future of mass media, especially the
growing FM radio and cable television sectors. Within weeks of opening the doors at NFCB, Tom and Terry had the first of many meetings with representatives of the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting [NCCB]. Chaired by former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, the NCCB monitored FCC proceedings, and advocated for direct citizen engagement in broadcast and cable media in the pages of its bi-weekly publication, *Access.* Al Kramer, an attorney in his mid-30s, operated “a one-man show” called The Citizens Communications Center, filing renewal challenges on behalf of ethnic minority citizen groups, and petitions on behalf of Quakers and others who had been refused air time to run antiwar advertising. The Media Access Project, a public interest law firm, challenged the Commission to implement the Fairness Doctrine in order to open commercial broadcast outlets to antiwar and civil rights causes. These and other agencies offered natural affinities and alliances for the political aspirations of the NFCB.

One particular action before the FCC connected these organizations in common cause. On December 1, 1974, Milam and Lansman filed a Petition for Rulemaking, asking the FCC to overturn the rule exemption allowing ownership of multiple NCE stations by a single licensee in a single market; and to freeze applications by “religious, ‘bible,’ ‘Christian,’ and other sectarian schools colleges, and institutes,” and by government-controlled groups, for reserved FM and TV channels. Filed in response to repeated and ongoing conflicts over license applications between small community groups that aspired to operate single facilities in their cities and towns, and larger, better-funded religious and institutional interests that operated multiple stations in single or
multiple markets, Milam and Lansman asked the Commission to intervene and level the playing field in favor of smaller, non-institutional broadcasters. Criticizing the lack of experimentation and controversy in the programming of emerging public radio sector, they asserted, “Educational broadcasters should not draw the Ivory Towers about themselves as some sort of sacred cloak which permits them to choke off efforts for new, diverse, more broadly-based groups.” Taking aim at the expansion of “narrow, prejudiced, one-sided, blind, and stultifying” religious radio and TV, they observed, Religious broadcasters have shown a remarkable, cancer-like growth in the ‘educational’ portions of the FM and TV bands. They control endless monies from ‘free will’ contributions, thrive on mindless banal programming aimed at some spiritless, oleaginous God, and show the same spirit as McDonald’s Hamburger Co. in the efforts to dominate American radio and television. In contrast, Milam and Lansman offered an alternative conception of public service, articulating one of the strengths of community radio: Educational FM is just beginning to grow into the areas that need it the most – rural and county areas 200 or 500 miles from major population centers. How fine it would be if these areas could count on an honest community radio, personal, with full open access and diversity of voices. Although RM-2493 sought only to limit NCE authorizations to one per authority in each community, the Milam/Lansman petition precipitated a firestorm in the religious broadcasting sector, which quickly mobilized in response to what Milam would later refer to as “The Petition Against God.” “Although the number of formal filings in response to the petition” was rather small, as documented in the Commission’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of August 1, 1975, “the filing of the petition has generated a vast amount of letters to the Commission, likely in excess of 700,000.” Many were form letters “premised on the mistaken view that the petition was filed by
Madalyn Murray O’Hare,” the outspoken atheist. The vast majority of these letters urged the Commission to reject “the proposal to ban all religious programs,” though “no such proposal was advanced by the petitioners, nor was it raised by the Commission.”

Several agencies filed in support of the petition, including Johnson’s NCCB, the Pittsburg chapter of the NAACP, and the Alabama Media Project. In addition to the objections of religious broadcasters, the Commission received opposing comments from educational broadcasters, including the University of Missouri, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, citing “economies of scale.” While dual licensing might lead to more varied public service, CPB argued there was “significant diversity in the programs now being offered by various FM or television combinations and hence no basis for action.” CPB cited the ability of statewide networks to serve rural audiences, contending there was “no monopolization of frequencies.” “Taken in context,” the FCC viewed the position of Milam and Lansman “as an impermissible proposition, which would violate our neutrality just as much as if we were to favor religious applicants over secular ones… The Commission, even if it were disposed to, cannot cater to personal views.” Consequently, the petition was denied.

Though the Milam-Lansman petition overstated the case, Commissioners Glen Robinson and Benjamin Hooks found merit in many of the arguments. “While it may yet be somewhat premature to speculate about the possibility of competing public broadcast stations in a single market,” wrote Robinson, “I do not think we ought to overlook the possibility that it might come to pass.” In the years to come, the issue of concentration of control in noncommercial broadcasting would become one of the
central concerns of the NFCB. In 1975, the issue provided a common frame of reference for Thomas and Clifford and the agents of the media reform movement.

NFCB took its first formal policy position in October 1975, in reply comments to the FCC filed in response to the Commission’s proposal to extend community ascertainment requirements to noncommercial broadcasters. Historically, the FCC required commercial broadcasters to conduct surveys of “community leaders” and “the general public” to ascertain the problems, needs, and interests in their service areas. Applicants and licensees were required to offer programming in response to the concerns identified in the surveys. Reflecting the concerns of the Federation’s members, Thomas questioned “the general validity of ascertainment,” citing “a lack of evidence that existing requirements have affected commercial programming.” NFCB emphasized that “noncommercial stations should have no less of an obligation for public service than their commercial counterparts.” In addition, where the FCC proposed to exempt 10 watt Class D and small market stations from the requirement, NFCB claimed that all broadcasters “must either demonstrate full utilization of their frequency in the public interest or relinquish their place on the dial.” The comments offered the first iteration of the Federation position on spectrum efficiency: Because they occupied the public spectrum, Class D stations should receive no special consideration from the FCC. The following spring, the Commission put the ascertainment rules in place, including the exemption.

By mid-November, Nan Rubin completed the first draft of the Federation by-laws and sent them on to Washington to be circulated to the Columbia incorporators and the
other stations or groups that had contributed financially since August. The draft reflected all of the organizers’ commitments to egalitarianism, noncommercial enterprise, local control, and participatory democracy. The NFCB would be an alliance of nonprofit organizations, with membership limited to those either operating a broadcast station, organized to build one, or in the application process. Each member organization, designated as a Participant, would have a single vote in the Federation’s affairs, and be represented by two delegates. The process for selecting delegates would be left to each participant’s local procedure. New members required nomination by an existing participant, and approval by a majority of the whole. Meetings would be held at least once per year. Most significantly, the participant members would govern the affairs of the NFCB directly, “including all the powers normally associated with the board of directors, including accepting participants, setting policy, hiring staff, electing officers, and setting budgets.” All of these powers, with the exception of participant removal, would be delegated to a steering committee of at least six, consisting of a chairperson, secretary, treasurer, two or more at-large members, and the Executive Director – Tom Thomas. Only the chairperson would be required to be a participant member delegate. Rubin asked the organizers to provide comments on the draft by mail. A revised draft would be submitted for approval at a subsequent meeting.

In Urbana, Bill Thomas continued to work on the Possible Tape Exchange [PTE], receiving programs from participating stations, publishing periodic program listings, duplicating programs, and shipping over 350 tapes by the end of 1975. The PTE continued to rely on the facilities at WHA in Madison: The high-speed duplicators
Jeremy Lansman had volunteered to build had not materialized. The 1975 PTE catalog was indicative of the minimal state of operations, unevenly duplicated in the unique purple print of a Ditto machine, showing Bill’s hand-written corrections and notes, the first page revealing that he was “in such a hurry to get this off that I almost forgot some of the tapes.”

“Lack of operating capital,” wrote Tom Thomas, “has also made work difficult.” Bill donated his time to the PTE, living on his savings. Acknowledging that the exchange required a larger, more diverse market, the brothers looked optimistically to the near future, when “the supply of and demand for programs will undoubtedly increase as new stations take to the air.”

In an informal report to the members at the end of the year, Thomas summarized the activities of the new company over the past five months. Nineteen organizations had joined NFCB. The unaudited end-of-year financial statement showed an operating surplus of $1,300.00, noting “both the national office and the tape exchange were forced to operate on bare bones budgets with resources clearly not adequate for the work that needed to be done,” though “the situation was, of course, not unexpected.” The numbers imply that Thomas and Clifford relied on personal resources to make up the difference between their meager salaries and their living expenses. NFCB achieved “the most immediate results” in direct service to local members, preparing applications for facilities grants from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [HEW], assisting with frequency searches, advocating for a new TV station in St. Louis, monitoring Commission filings, and “attempting to answer all manner of questions on rules, regulations, grant programs, and an occasional query on the meaning of life.”
engagements with the FCC, however, efforts to enter the policymaking process at the legislative and agency levels had been limited. “Decisions in most of these organizations are largely an internal matter,” observed Thomas. “There is also a need to develop specific policy recommendations… based on solid research.” To gain traction in the environment of the Congress, the CPB, and HEW, NFCB’s initiatives would need to be “carefully drafted to take account of the institutional environment in which they will be considered.” Thomas called for patience and pragmatism: “Our strategies for an effect on public policy at both the legislative and administrative levels must be long-term ones.”

Looking back to Madison and Columbia at the end of 1975, Tom Thomas was “satisfied and proud” of NFCB’s initial accomplishments. Looking ahead, he was “confident that we are building a movement that will have a powerful and important effect on the way people in this country live and work and speak to one another.”

Demonstrating his ability to summarize complex issues in straightforward, persuasive prose, Thomas summed up the NFCB’s emerging position in the field of public telecommunications policy: “In a field dominated by trade associations on the one hand and public interest groups on the other, the Federation works for a synthesis that filters idealistic concerns through the practical experiences of groups actually working to implement such concerns at the local level.”

Participants, policy advocates, and public radio

The prospective members of the NFCB gathered in Cincinnati at the end of February, 1976 to review and approve the organization’s proposed structure and by-laws.
In addition, the conference agenda included the site for NARC 2, a proposed budget of $118,610 for the coming year\textsuperscript{cdlxxvi}, and a variety of special projects including “joint programming efforts…the proposed community radio training manual, information directories on a variety of topics, personnel exchanges, and joint fundraising campaigns.”\textsuperscript{cdlxxvii} Coordinated by Nan Rubin and the staff at WAIF, the meetings took place at the Bush Community Center in the Queen City’s historic Walnut Hills neighborhood.

Working from the by-laws document previously accepted by the incorporators through the mail, the conferees approved 24 stations and community broadcast organizations as charter participants in the Federation. The newly empowered delegates immediately confronted a host of issues. Though some expressed concerns about accessibility of the remote mountain location and the attendant costs for transportation, the delegates agreed to hold NARC 2 in Telluride. The group then turned to the complex and sensitive issue of representation. In a direct challenge to Pacifica’s five stations licensed to a single, national organization, Rich McClear argued successfully that participant membership should be limited to locally-controlled organizations.

Articulating their frustrations, ideals, and aspirations, Rubin and other advocates for the interests of women and ethnic minorities pressed for measures to assure representation and participation of women and minorities in all activities on the Federation and its member stations, in response to the predominant presence of white men across broadcasting generally and in community radio in particular. In response, the delegates amended the new by-laws to require the consideration of women and minorities in the
evaluation of applications for participant status. Another amendment required that one of the two delegates from each participant member be a woman or a member of an ethnic minority. The Washington office was directed to make contact with national organizations advocating for the interests of women and minorities at the national level. On the local level, each participant was directed to prepare a report on “the role of women and minorities in their own management and operations, together with a description of any steps they are taking to change the level of such involvement.”

The reports would be discussed in Telluride. Through this series of sweeping decisions, the delegates set the Federation and its members apart from every other interest in NCE broadcasting, as an advocate for women and ethnic minorities.

Noting “the serious inadequacy of support so far,” the delegates approved an “austerity budget” of $15,420.00, drawn primarily from monthly membership fees of $5.00 to $50.00, depending on the member organization’s annual budget. Estimating that the monthly fees would bring in $7,000 to $8,000, the delegates approved “a national marathon/benefit weekend” tentatively scheduled for the following April, with each member assuming responsibility for a share of the national goal. Covering only a fraction of the Executive’s proposal, the delegates acknowledged that the adopted budget represented “something of an investment in outside funding,” optimistically looking ahead to “major grants or gifts” in the Federation’s future to support the company’s long term projects. The delegates took no action towards these proposed grants and gifts, leaving any initiatives in the hands of Thomas and Clifford.
Discussions of public policy focused on “efforts that can result in more adequate funding for local stations.” Considerable attention focused on the main sources of federal funds for noncommercial radio, the HEW Educational Broadcasting Facilities Programs and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The delegates discussed proposals for special funding for rural radio and programming projects, and went on record with a declaration “that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting lower its minimum requirement for community service grants [CSGs] and include the in-kind donations of qualified volunteer time in determining station qualification.” The NFCB Steering Committee was charged to develop “more specific directions” in the policy field. The interim committee, chaired by Rubin, would serve until the conference in Telluride.

In the weeks following the Cincinnati members meeting, the Washington office took the initiative to engage the issues identified by the delegates. In March, Thomas attended the Public Radio Conference in Washington, the annual gathering of National Public Radio and its affiliate stations, represented by the Association of Public Radio Stations [APRS]. At one of the business sessions, a committee of the APRS Board of Directors advanced a proposal that any new money awarded to the public radio “system” in the future through CPB would be designated for a matching grants pool, rather than larger base grants to all qualified stations. These funds would be awarded on a matching basis, as a percentage of the individual station’s nonfederal financial support [NFFS]. The intention was clear: The largest stations, capable of generating higher nonfederal revenues, would receive larger matching grants. Base grants would remain static. The
committee asserted that the plan offered an incentive for economic growth. Representatives of smaller stations countered that growth would be difficult without additional assistance from CPB.

Sensing an opportunity to advance NFCB’s position on the issue of CPB grants, Thomas offered three proposals to modify the plan. Thomas argued that CPB should create a pool of funds to help “poorer” noncommercial station move towards CSG qualification; offer protections to allow these poorer stations to maintain qualification; and provide incentive funds available only to the poorest third of CPB stations to assist with special projects. “In a long and stormy session that focused on these proposals,” wrote Thomas, “the APRS committee rejected them all.” But the effort was effective in other respects: Thomas had demonstrated that there was opposition to the APRS plan within “the system.” APRS could not claim it had industry-wide approval on the issue. The outcome offered the chance that Thomas’ proposals might be reconsidered at a future meeting of the CPB Board of Directors, the group with the final authority to determine the structure and function of all CPB grant programs.

At the same conference, public radio took up NPR’s proposal to interconnect member stations and distribute programming through a satellite system that would be owned and operated by NPR. Though the Possible Tape Exchange was up and running, and the costs and complexity of satellite distribution seemed untenable for the new organization, one of the NFCB’s more technically knowledgeable members cautioned, “the Federation should refrain from further exploration of satellite interconnection on technical or financial grounds alone.” Any satellite system would benefit from the
interconnection of more stations, with costs spread across more affiliates. Satellites also offered the possibility of live station interconnections. For this reason, Pacifica was considering a system of its own. Speculating that some “least common denominator” might be found, Thomas looked forward to discussing the issue in Telluride.

Other issues were percolating at the FCC. In response to comments filed by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, in March 1975 the Commission issued a notice pursuant to Docket 20735, proposing a broad range of changes for the assignment and operation of NCE stations. Focusing on more efficient allocation of the spectrum, the Commission contemplated proposals to open a new channel 200 at 87.9 mHz for NCE assignments; require NCE stations to operate at least 36 hours per week, and at least 72 hours per week to claim exclusive use of their assigned channels; remove adjacent channel protections from 10 watt Class D stations; relocate Class D stations to other FM channels to allow authorization of new, more powerful stations or power increases for existing stations. The changes were needed to correct the “gross inefficiencies” that had accrued in the past, as the FCC handled noncommercial assignments on a case-by-case basis. Licensees of television stations assigned to channel 6, directly adjacent to the low end of the FM band, had a particular interest in the proceeding. Asserting “there is a substantial opportunity here for the expansion and development of community radio in cities across the country,” Thomas pledged that NFCB would take an active role in the proceedings.

While Tom was engaging the policy issues, Terry Clifford was working on some of the special projects that had been identified in the past months. In conjunction with
CPB staff, Clifford authored a manual of using non-cash gifts for matching grants, “which we hope will be only the first of many publications with specific practical information on station operations.” In addition to her service to NFCB, Terry was engaged in studies at Georgetown University, limiting her availability to some targeted initiatives, including the ongoing search for outside funding. A proposal was under consideration at the Rockefeller Family Fund. Tom looked forward to final consideration by the Fund’s board of directors in June.

More immediate gratification came from the Markle Foundation, another New York-based philanthropy with a special interest in communications and public policy. In response to NFCB’s request to underwrite costs associated with comments on the Docket 20735 proceeding, Markle granted $7,000 to the Federation to engage a panel of technical and legal experts. The grant allowed NFCB to engage the services of several attorneys at the Citizens Communications Center, and convene a meeting in Washington in late March 1976 to consider a preliminary position on the FCC proceedings. In the midst of competing propositions from larger and more powerful interests, including CPB, NPR, and channel 6 TV stations represented by the Association for Maximum Service Television, NFCB saw the rulemaking as the best chance to put forward the Federation’s vision of radio. “Our concept of radio has to be new,” wrote Lorenzo Milam, who attended the gathering in Washington. “It is no longer enough to think of ‘the public served’ or ‘listeners’ – we have to think of participants, and communities of minorities and volunteers – and constant electronic input.”

“For those of us who have searched in vain for spectrum space in major markets, seen channels nibbled away by a
hundred high school 10 watters and wasted away by uninspired instruction,” wrote Thomas, “the rulemaking loomed as a Golden Opportunity.”

Spring was in full bloom. The presidential election cycle was underway. The new NFCB was engaged in a vigorous policy agenda, and the hoped-for outside support had materialized. On the other hand, some of the other projects had seen little or no progress. The training manual was on hold. April had come and gone, without the national marathon intended to shore up the “austerity budget.” An unaudited financial statement issued by Thomas on May 31 showed assets of $10,175.24, liabilities of $9,398.79, and a positive balance of $7,881.56. Of course, the balance included the $7,000 award from Markle, and $1,155.36 in loans to the PTE “made by private individuals on a non-secured basis.” NFCB’s financial margin remained razor thin. The budget would be one of many topics taken up in Telluride.

“When last we met, NFCB was only an idea,” stated the NARC 2 program. The guide to NARC 1 opened with: The Uncommon Carrier,” a rambling, seven page essay by Lorenzo Milam. In contrast, NARC 2 dispensed with the opening pleasantries in a single-spaced half page, then moved immediately to the tasks at hand: Capital letters at the top of page 3 shouted unmistakable instructions to the conferee: “HOW TO USE THIS CONFERENCE.” “WE ALSO HAVE the business of continuing to build our organization,” exclaimed the following page. There would be time for socializing, but the second National Alternative Radio Conference was much larger and more businesslike in every respect.
Centered on the Telluride Community Center, the second NARC included nearly 60 workshops, almost three times the number that had occurred in Madison the year before. NARC 2 doubled the length of the gathering to four days. In addition to NFCB’s 24 participant members, the program listed another 37 community stations, broadcast organizations, and local groups, ranging from KRBD, Ketchikan, Alaska, in the far northwest to Green County Development of Eutaw, Alabama in the southeast. All five Pacifica stations appeared on the list, including the recently licensed WPFW in Washington, D.C., the final manifestation of the aspirations of Lew Hill and Lorenzo Milam to bring a more humane form of mass media to nation’s capital. The program reflected greater diversity in the interests and needs of those in attendance, with session titles such as “Third World Involvement in Community Radio,” “Women in Community Radio,” “Fiscal Control and Budget,” and “Access – Who Gets On?” At NARC 1, most of the attendees had been acquainted in advance. In terms of ethnicity, social class, economic status, education, and geography, NARC 2 was more diverse, and the differences would figure prominently in some of the gathering’s significant outcomes.

Though the participant members of NFCB took issue with many of the policies and practices of the public broadcasting establishment, “the system” could not ignore the Federation. The Pacifica stations were large enough to receive CPB support. The NFCB’s larger participants, such as WYEP, wanted to move towards qualification. NFCB stations in rural areas, such as KAXE (Rich and Suzi McClear’s station in the Iron Range), wanted to broadcast NPR programming to audiences that could not receive an established NPR signal. Somewhat incongruously, NPR Director of Radio Thomas
Warnock and CPB program officer Clyde Robinson came from Washington to explain the particulars of “the system” to the hippies, activists, and radicals at the conference. Adapting to the more relaxed atmosphere of the mountain resort, Robinson dressed in a safari suit. The Federation’s team of “Legal Eagles” dressed down as well. Jeans and t-shirts were standard attire.

While most of the workshops moved forward smoothly, some of the business meetings turned into contentious, and sometimes angry discussions. Susie McClear got into a shouting match with a representative of KBOO over issues of racial diversity and representation. Mike O’Connor got into an argument about quotas, as WORT program director Joan Rubel recounted the Jewish experience of the Holocaust. An argument over the use of the terms person of color and third-world person caused Pat Watkins to become so angry that she left the conference in frustration. “All the sudden in the middle of the night,” recalled neighboring camper Rich McClear, “there’s Patty Watkins putting everything into a bag and getting out of there.” O’Connor remembered “some very difficult conversations during the plenary sessions at Telluride that really divided the group. This was not light stuff – heavy duty stuff. We were not prepared as an organization to handle it.” In the aftermath, O’Connnor drove back to the Midwest with “a black guy, very articulate,” though O’Connor could not recall his name. “He was raising all kinds of uncomfortable issues about the composition of the board and the composition of the organizing group. It was all these white guys – Lorenzo, Jeremy – white bread.”
At NARC 1, the conferees shared common connections through Milam, Lansman, Thomas, and Clifford. At NARC 2, “we learned we still have much to learn about how to function as a national organization,” wrote Thomas in the NFCB Newsletter. “There is still a long path to travel toward full participation of the disenfranchised in our respective stations. Resolving the internal issues would require “more than spending a few days together.” As a first step, the delegates agreed to allow each participant member to establish a local screening committee to determine how to comply with “the Cincinnati resolution.” More immediately, the participants elected a new group of Steering Committee members and officers to full year terms. Some of the faces were familiar: Rubin was re-elected as chairperson. Theriault moved into the secretary’s position. O’Connor continued in an at-large role. But there were also several new faces, including Ellin O’Leary from Pacifica’s Washington bureau, Nje Sumchi from KPOO “Poor Peoples’ Radio” in San Francisco, and KPFA public affairs director Don Foster, who would go on to establish WBAI’s Third World department in later years. “Passionately, if haltingly,” wrote Thomas, the NFCB would become a more diverse organization as it set about “changing the way the nation speaks to itself.”

Down to business

In the months after Telluride, the ongoing efforts of Thomas and Clifford to obtain outside funding again brought results, as Rockefeller awarded $9,850 for the Washington and Urbana offices. $1,850 was earmarked for equipment purchases for the Possible Tape Exchange. The balance paid for a series of publications on “practical information for station operation,” including the NFCB Legal Handbook, a concise
guide to FCC rules, regulations, and required operating practices for NCE radio authored by Thomas and Clifford, and SourceTap, a directory of sources for nationally syndicated programming compiled and edited by Suzi McClear. By October, five new groups had come forward with intentions to join the Federation.

In spite of these positive developments, the financial status of the organization remained tenuous. For several years, the nation had been in the grip of a powerful cycle of economic inflation. The sluggishness trickled down to the NFCB’s local stations. “For a time,” wrote Thomas, “the NFCB National Office had all the atmosphere of an intensive care ward, as station after station reported alarming readings on the vital signs.” Fundraisers were coming up short, staff members laid off, and expenses trimmed. Member payments to NFCB slowed to a trickle, though members continued to ask for services. Thomas and Clifford compensated as best they could, “by focusing on several foundation grant supported activities while waiting out the drought.”

The Newsletter became a monthly publication.

A regional gathering of NFCB stations in Madison, held in mid-September, 1976 included a lively discussion of the planned national marathon, and other fundraising possibilities. Thomas reframed the issue in a more troubling context: With participant members unable to meet their local expenses, “self taxation to pay our NFCB dues has been difficult at best, and nonexistent at worst.” The efforts of the Washington office to secure outside money had broad implications for the future relationship between the organization and its affiliates, but no one could see a clear path forward. The issue was deferred to Nan Rubin and the Steering Committee, “being responsible for present
policies,” to “consider carefully this area of financial planning.” “No consensus was reached,” Rubin reflected, “we were only beginning to ask questions.”

Through all the financial pressures, NFCB continued to make progress on other fronts. The tape exchange provided regular mailings to “5 or 6 hundred addresses,” including all participant member stations and the newly authorized group of nonvoting associate stations, many licensed to colleges and universities. KPFA offered to provide a weekly half hour of less time sensitive news stories for distribution, but the material never arrived. A few stations contributed programs, but most neither contributed nor ordered tapes. The service relied “mainly on tapes from the old KDNA archives.” In conjunction with Pacifica, NFCB met with representatives of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] to discuss the possibility of using the recently launched Communications Technology Satellite [CTS] for high-speed program distribution, live coverage, and two-way communication between NFCB and Pacifica stations. Tom Thomas “ventured a ‘ball park’ figure of $200,000 to $300,000 for the installation of the earth station equipment.”

Backed by Bader and their colleagues in the legal community, Thomas and Clifford submitted comments to the Commission in support of a petition for rulemaking by a coalition of 66 citizen groups to expand and enhance the requirements for licensees to broadcast pro bono public service announcements. Asserting that “a unified classification scheme would make it easier to compare station performance between the commercial and noncommercial services,” the Federation proposed that requirements for recording and reporting program information by NCE stations be brought in line with
those of commercial broadcasters in Docket 20898. On behalf of the hundreds of volunteers in community radio who did not need or “want to learn about remote base current ammeters,” Thomas encouraged FCC to remove testing requirements for the routine duties of day-to-day broadcast operators, and endorsed a proposal that station program logs should be available for public inspection. On the other hand, NFCB argued against a proposal to licensees to make all written correspondence available, noting that “most correspondence at listener-supported noncommercial stations concerns contributions to the station, and that donors were entitled to some measure of confidentiality.”

As NFCB entered into its third calendar year of operation in 1977, the Federation submitted its most far-reaching and significant filing to date in the matter of Docket 20735, CPB’s petition to reorganize the NCE FM band. “It was clear from the scope of the issues,” wrote Thomas, “that the Commission was planning to take its first comprehensive look at noncommercial FM since the service was established.” The grant from the Markle Foundation allowed Thomas and Clifford to approach Docket 20735 as a large-scale research assignment, involving more than two dozen associates including public interest attorneys, engineers, and station managers. Finding there were “only a handful of FCC decisions concerning noncommercial radio from which to extract useful precedents,” and that the data that was available concerning NCE stations was “generally scattered and out of date,” Tom and Terry approached the filing “from scratch,” beginning in April 1976.
In Docket 20735, the NFCB argued in favor of the Commission’s proposal to open Channel 200 [89.7 mHz] for new authorizations. But the Federation’s filing significantly expanded the scope of the issues. NFCB called for the relaxation of protections on third adjacent channel interference and a reduction in channel spacing to provide greater access to the radio spectrum. In addition, Thomas and Clifford asserted, “technical changes alone would be inadequate to provide for future needs.” Making the case that any standards should “insure that existing stations are used wisely and effectively,” and “set priorities among the services provided by noncommercial stations to guide the distribution of facilities when there are not enough channels to meet the demand for them,” NFCB argued for a broad reconsideration of the Commission’s approach to NCE radio. The Federation’s case relied on four policy initiatives:

- NCE broadcasters should serve the needs of their communities of license, rather than “in house” purposes such as training students;
- NCE channel allotments should prioritize high power signals capable of reaching audiences large enough to ensure adequate community support; low power allotments typically used for student training and other limited services should receive secondary consideration.
- NCE assignments should prioritize a diversity of services, reflecting the full range of culture and opinion in the nation’s communities;
- The NCE band should include provisions for low power, secondary services, such as student training and instructional services, on a space-available basis.
In the succeeding years, Docket 20735 proved to be the “golden opportunity” foreseen by Thomas and Clifford. The proceeding was “the pivotal moment of NFCB’s creation,” for Nan Rubin. “This is why NFCB was created.” In terms of issues and proposals, Thomas and Clifford engaged many of the ideas Milam and Lansman had attempted to broach unsuccessfully in the Petition Against God, including localization, concentration of ownership, and best uses of the spectrum. However, where the appeal of Milam and Lansman relied on their ideals, passions, and discontents, Thomas and Clifford articulated positions in a manner far more appropriate to the bureaucratic and political cultures of the Commission and the Washington establishment. Milam and Lansman were outrageous and uncompromising. In contrast, Thomas and Clifford were reasonable and pragmatic, their policy positions backed up by solid research and key constituencies. Milam and Lansman lashed out at “fundamentalist religious ‘schools’ who would block off frequencies, and continue to show scorn for open access and minority employment and programming much as they have in the past.” NFCB asserted, “the pattern of station development may not reflect a community’s need for service, or the comparative needs for service among several communities.” The FCC could not dismiss these positions without ignoring some of the citizen interests the agency was mandated to consider. These upstart community radio stations didn’t necessarily provide the kind of service CPB intended, but they reached into geographic and cultural communities that were not served by other NCE radio services. Some received no service of any kind. The staff and policy makers at the FCC, CPB, and other agencies now had good reasons to consider the Federation’s positions. Beginning in 1977, Docket 20735 “put NFCB on
the map as a major policy player,” recalled Rubin. It was “a defining event in the life of NFCB."

As winter turned to spring and summer, the Federation looked forward to the next annual conference in Minneapolis. The Alternative Radio label was dropped: In 1977, the participants would gather for “serious planning and work” at the NFCB National Conference. Activities related to satellite services moved ahead slowly, while the renamed Possible Tape Exchange and Radio Program Service reached “stable-stage,” with a steady if small market of customers and growing lists of orders. The problem was, many of the customers were not NFCB stations. “Although the idea of our programs going out to noncommercial stations all over the country is appealing,” Bill Thomas felt the exchange needed to be “of value to NFCB stations. Right now, we’re not sure how much you really want or need it.” Meeting in Urbana in February, the participants formed a committee to work with Tom and Terry on the organization’s budget, revenue, and financial planning issues. Twelve new participants came on board at the Urbana meeting, including KTOO in Juneau, Alaska, under the management of Bruce Theriault. The total participant membership stood at 39. Revenues had stabilized to the point where the Washington office was moved out of Tom and Terry’s spare bedroom to modest quarters on Massachusetts Avenue.

In the broader arena of public policy and public broadcasting, CPB came forward with a plan to share the capacity of the planned multi-channel public television satellite system with public and community radio, though no solid commitments were forthcoming. The FCC issued an inquiry into the fundraising practices in NCE
broadcasters, with a particular interest in the methods used by public television, and granted two licenses to the Moody Bible Institute for new stations. Citing First Amendment concerns, the Moody decision showed a shift away from the Commission’s long-standing practice of restricting NCE licenses for religious broadcasting to schools. As promised 10 years earlier, the Carnegie Corporation committed $1 million to a new Commission on the Future of Public Broadcasting, known as Carnegie II. An “options paper” went to the staff and members of the House Communications Subcommittee, examining such issues as the relationship between CPB and Congress, the division of CPB funds between TV and radio, and the influence of licensees on the nature and variety of stations services. Thomas expected Carnegie II to take at least a year, and provide many opportunities for NFCB to contribute to the outcomes at Carnegie Commission and in Congress.

When the members gathered in Minneapolis in Mid-August, they found a bound, 24 page Annual Report from Thomas and Clifford, summarizing every aspect of the NFCB. In the past, reports to the members had exhibited a homemade look and feel. The 1977 report represented a more professional image of the NFCB. It was typeset, with a table of contents and more extensive explanations of the Federation’s mission, composition, goals, and activities. The report began with a problem statement:

American broadcasting fails to reflect the diversity of the American people…. Commercial broadcasting, driven largely by profit incentives and advertising objectives, pursues a bland uniformity… Public broadcasting is mostly concerned on the narrow concerns of academic institutions… The potential of the broadcast media – to address the issues of the day, to expose a whole world of culture, to celebrate and critique the grand and mundane variations of everyday life has been scarcely realized.
The document asserted, “The community broadcaster’s sole purpose is serving the listener,” offering “no one format,” but “a wide array of programming.” The stations of the NFCB intended to fill all the niches in their local communities, offering music, opinion, news, drama, art, and “experiments in the full range of creative broadcasting” to “provide a service that is truly ‘in the public interest.'”

The 1977 Annual Report detailed the Federation’s membership and governance, and the organization’s initiatives in program distribution, publications, consultations with member organizations, representation, policy development, and advocacy. The final pages offered a series of unaudited financial statements, revealing ongoing “serious problems” with revenues and expenses. The Rockefeller grant represented nearly one third of the company’s total income of $30,839. Activities of the Tape Exchange brought in another third. Member dues, originally intended to provide the financial backbone for the entire organization, were the smallest pool of revenue. Revenues were increasing, but not at a pace that could keep up with inflationary pressures. The fund balance deficit topped $10,000. To meet monthly expenses, the employees deferred salary payments to the unspecified future: NFCB owed almost $14,000 to Tom Thomas, Terry Clifford, Bill Thomas, and Betsy Rubenstein, Bill’s spouse and co-worker.

Short-term relief from the ongoing financial exigency arrived within a few weeks, with an infusion of $13,500 from the Rockefeller Family Fund. The grant was designated for a second round of publications, including the long dormant training manual project and a second edition of the *Legal Handbook.* More immediately, the grant solved the company’s ongoing cash flow problems. During the same time period, Thomas joined
Carnegie II chair James Killian, David Davis of the Ford Foundation, and some 50 other witnesses in three days of informal testimony and “roundtable discussions” with the House Subcommittee on Communications.\textsuperscript{dxxxvi} This first appearance before Congress represented a new focus for NFCB’s advocacy efforts. Recognizing “the substantial investment of time and resources” required for the preparation and presentation of Congressional testimony, Thomas had previously relied on more recognizable agencies, such as the NCCB and the APRS, to represent Federation positions. Now, the activities associated with Carnegie II cast a wider net around public broadcasting issues, Thomas felt there was an opportunity to realize “foreseeable returns” from more direct engagements with Congress. Looking ahead, Thomas asserted, “NFCB intends to take an active role in that process.”\textsuperscript{dxxxvii}
CHAPTER VII

THE NFCB MATURES, 1978 - 1984

As the decade of the 1970s moved to a close, the National Federation of Community broadcasters was well positioned to exert its influence on the nascent public broadcasting industry. In the Federation’s Washington office, Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford were building a center for policy analysis and development independent of more entangled institutional interests, including CPB and NPR. At the Radio Program Exchange in Champaign, Bill Thomas and Betsy Rubenstein served the desires and needs of a marginal but growing network of community and college stations for affordable, nationally syndicated programming. Building on these foundations, the Federation would play an influential role in several facets of public broadcasting policy over the next seven years. Concurrently, as the NFCB became more influential, key figures from the organization’s founding period moved on to other endeavors, leaving the remaining members to wrestle with the challenge of sustaining the NFCB’s early success under new leadership.

North to Alaska

At the Minneapolis conference, the participants elected a new steering committee. WORT program director Joan Rubel joined Mike O’Connor, who assumed the Treasurer’s duties. Nan Rubin continued as a Steering Committee member, but surrendered the Chairperson’s position to Bruce Theriault. Shortly before NARC 2, Theriault left his position as an organizer and program manager in Connecticut to help
Jerry Greene at KOTO with local arrangements for the conference. At the Telluride gathering, he found out about an opening for a radio station manager at KTOO FM in Juneau, Alaska. A native easterner, Theriault had grown to love the west as he hitchhiked across the US after college. The KTOO job provided an opportunity to expand on his western experiences, and reside closer to a brother who lived in the 49th state. From Telluride, Theriault submitted a resume by mail, and hit the road for the long drive up through British Columbia on the Alcan Highway. 

In transit, Theriault’s only contact with the KTOO hiring process came through a single call at a pay phone, at a cost of “like, a hundred quarters.” He was told the applications were under review. When he arrived in Anchorage 10 days later, he called again, and was told he had been selected, despite the lack of an interview or any knowledge of the station or the community. In retrospect, it seems likely that Theriault’s background with the NFCB, and his lack of experience with the culture and geography of Juneau, gave him an edge in the hiring process. His combination of community radio credentials and a counseling background seemed to be a good fit for KTOO’s licensee, Capital Community Broadcasting, an organization that was on the path to become one of the few non-institutional dual licensees for NCE radio and television.

In the 1970s, Alaska offered a uniquely nurturing environment for noncommercial educational broadcasting. The discovery of large oil deposits in 1968 at Prudhoe Bay led to an explosion of the state’s economy and tax revenues. In fiscal year 1975, petroleum-related revenue totaled $333.4 million, or 26% of state income. Five years later, the oil industry accounted for 90% of state revenues - over $2.5 billion. By
FY1985, income from oil was nearly 10 times what it had been just a decade earlier, topping $3.25 billion. Lawmakers were ready and willing to invest the windfall in projects that would benefit the citizens of the remote communities spread out across the state’s vast, imposing expanse. Oil money paid for roads, bridges, power generating facilities, and a host of other contributions to the state’s infrastructure.

While most of Alaska’s population was concentrated in and around the cities of Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau, residents were spread out in isolated pockets across the state, from Ketchikan on the southeastern peninsula, to Bethel in the far west, to Barrow, far above the Arctic Circle. The state encompassed a vast geographic expanse: Travel from Juneau to the native community of Kotzebue entailed a journey of more than 1650 miles, ending within 300 miles of the border of the Soviet Union. For all practical purposes, no highways existed north of Fairbanks or west of Anchorage. Transit to most points in the state involved sled dogs, snowmobiles, or bush pilots. Unless a person lived in one of the cities, encounters with the media were infrequent, if they occurred at all. Within the cities, there was almost no live television. National news and entertainment programs arrived on videotape, flown up from Seattle days or weeks after the original broadcast. Lacking breadth, coherence, and coordination, the state’s communications system posed considerable challenges to public authority, welfare, and safety.

Lawmakers viewed telecommunications “kind of like transportation,” recalled Theriault. “Telecommunications was really important. It was considered critical infrastructure.” Radio was the only medium capable of providing up-to-the-minute information.
Recognizing the opportunity afforded by increasing capital, Alaska policy makers allocated funds to encourage communities across the state to start local radio stations. Using CPB and NPR as blueprints, lawmakers established the Alaska Public Broadcasting Commission [APBC] to provide annual operating grants to the state’s NCE stations, and to the Alaska Public Broadcasting Network [APRN] for the production and dissemination of statewide news and public affairs programming to the local stations. Across the state, schools and other locally controlled nonprofit agencies could apply to the FCC for NCE licenses and construction permits, and to HEW for grants to build the facilities. Funds from the APBC provided the required local match for the HEW grants. Once a station was up and running, the state provided sufficient capital to operate at the levels of coverage, staffing, and hours of operation required to qualify for an annual CSG from CPB. The criteria for CPB support doubled as the primary conditions for affiliation with NPR. Though many of the communities of service in Alaska had populations in the hundreds or low thousands, government support assured the operation of professionally managed NPR stations throughout the state. The APBC afforded Theriault and the other managers of Alaska stations the resources required to move beyond the hand-to-mouth existence of most small NCE radio operations and take a position within the public radio “system.” But unlike the vast majority of NPR stations in the continental U.S., most of the Alaska stations were not connected to the sorts of larger institutions most commonly associated with NPR and CPB. These were small, independent, local, nonprofit organizations. For Theriault, the NFCB was a natural ally for Alaska’s public radio
stations, and as a member of the Steering Committee he was in a position to make connections between Alaska’s NCE radio stations and the Federation.

1978 was a good year for the NFCB. At the invitation of congressional staff members, Tom Thomas offered his first in-person testimony before the House Subcommittee on Communications, in the matter of the Public Broadcasting Finance Act of 1978. Thomas used the appearance to articulate the Federation’s core issues directly to Congress, asserting “that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting’s support structures, and the community service grant programs in particular, have yet to reflect the needs of community broadcasters and other stations serving special needs and interests.”

In May, the FCC issued its first rulings in Docket 20735, closely following the NFCB’s recommendations to eliminate protections for Class D stations, open channel 200, and establish minimum hours of service. Having gained the attention of lawmakers, policy analysts, attorneys, and other interested in noncommercial broadcasting, circulation of the NFCB Newsletter topped 400. Orders and submissions to the Program Service were up, and new grants from the National Endowment for the Arts [NEA] and the Cooperative Employment and Training Act [CETA] allowed the Illinois office to purchase equipment, hire staff, and improve marketing efforts. Grants totaling more than $38,000 accounted for over half of the Federation’s income. The additional revenue allowed Thomas and Clifford to hire Nan Rubin to assume the duties in the Washington office related to member services and station relations. The participant member list grew 20%, to 50 stations and organizations. Most of the participants were small, but a few were large enough to qualify for CPB support, including KAXE and WYSO. Since each
participant paid membership dues equaling 1% of annual revenues, the largest stations – the CPB supported stations – provided the NFCB with the largest share of dues income. Three of these CPB supported members were located in the state of Alaska. Under the leadership of Thomas and Theriault, more would follow.

**Down in the valley**

Far from Washington or Juneau, Hugo Morales was teaching at Fresno State University, and working on a plan to build a radio station that could serve farm workers in California’s San Joaquin Valley. Morales had first-hand experience with both the medium and the audience: An indigenous Mixteco from a small village in the state of Oaxaca, Morales and his family immigrated from Mexico to Healdsburg, California, when he was 9 years old. During his adolescent years, Morales lived in a farm labor camp, among the families of migrant farm laborers marginalized from the American mainstream by the threefold challenges of class, ethnicity, and language. In the cultural isolation and socioeconomic hardship of Healdsburg, he witnessed the efforts of Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers to unionize agricultural workers in California. He got his first experience in radio at 14, helping his older brother produce one of the few Spanish-language broadcasts available in the area north of San Francisco. Every Sunday for four years, Morales fetched coffee, sorted through stacks of Mexican popular music, and captured feeds from the Associated Press wire for his brother to translate in only a few minutes into newscasts in Spanish.

After high school, Morales experienced the greatest culture shock of his life in 1968 when he moved east to attend Harvard College. For two years, he did not meet a
single Latino undergraduate student in Cambridge, resorting at times to asking random people on Harvard Square if they spoke Spanish. He finally met his peers during his junior year in a class on the history of Mexican-American people and Chicano politics. Like other students of his time, he embraced movements for political and social change, and the free expression of cultural identity. He helped start a Latino student organization, and pressured the campus radio station to make time available for Latino programming. Morales was the first Latino producer to broadcast on Harvard’s WHRB, playing Chicano rock on Saturday nights, and salsa and merengue every Sunday. As an undergraduate, he kept an office at the Institute of Politics inside the Kennedy School of Government. Upon graduating in 1972, he enrolled immediately in the Harvard Law School. “Law is the fabric of the society’s values, economics, and culture,” he asserted. “That’s what I wanted to learn.” He earned a J.D. in 1975, intending “to go into politics, or use it as a way for organizing workers,” rather than practicing law.

Returning to California, he immediately got involved with union organizing and the Chicano movement, but found few opportunities to make a living. To make ends meet, he accepted a temporary appointment on the faculty at Fresno State. Fresno had no Spanish-language broadcast service, and only one NCE station – KFCF, licensed to the Fresno Free College Foundation and operated part time as a repeater for KPFA. Morales distributed leaflets throughout the university and around Fresno’s Mexican barrio, recruiting people to help him start a bilingual Spanish-English radio station, along the lines of the service he had created at Harvard. Eight people responded, joining Morales to form a nonprofit agency, Radio Bilingue. The new board of directors met
initially in a Fresno restaurant. For several years, Radio Bilingue was an all-volunteer concern, financed by revenues from benefit events, including dances and breakfasts featuring the traditional Mexican tripe dish, menudo. The events were popular with local campesinos, but it proved difficult to raise funds from a population that had little money to give. By Morales’ estimate, Radio Bilingue grossed $200 to $300 every 6 months. Morales performed all of the legal and administrative work on a volunteer basis, relying on his temporary assignments at Fresno State for income.

The NFCB’s 1979 conference took place in August on the campus of The Evergreen State College in Olympia, Washington. Prior to the conference, Thomas and Clifford took the opportunity to visit NFCB members in the west, stopping in Fresno to meet with staff at Pacifica affiliate KFCF. At the invitation of one of the Bilingue board members, Tom and Terry took time to meet with Morales. The meeting lasted several hours, as Thomas and Clifford familiarized themselves with every aspect of Radio Bilingue. Right away Morales recognized, “they obviously had a lot of experience facing people like myself, in the middle of nowhere doing a project, and not knowing there were hundreds of others doing the same thing. They were very polite in getting out of me what was going on – how did we get the application together, the status, the funding, the vision, all that stuff that they do so skillfully. They were very gracious. They didn’t embarrass me in any way.” Unable to rely on the income from his teaching job, Morales was living in his car, and holding the Bilingue files in the trunk at the time.
Within months of his meeting with Thomas and Clifford, Morales headed north to the NFCB conference, just a few days after Radio Bilingue received the FCC Construction Permit for NCE FM station KSJV. For Morales, “it was love at first sight. I really believed in what it stood for. I became quite involved.” Radio Bilingue’s application for participant status received the approval of the members, one of two bilingual Spanish/English stations to join the Federation in 1979. The members voted Morales onto the Steering Committee. Bruce Theriault won a third term as the organization’s chairperson, and Suzi McClear a second as secretary. Also voted to a third term, Joanie Rubel argued the NFCB “will either take a quantum leap or resign itself to having the limited effectiveness of a trade organization.”

The NFCB staff was already focused on a broad agenda to advance the organization’s ambitious goals. A second CETA grant for $15,000 allowed Bill Thomas to hire more staff. The appointment of Dennis Kita to oversee marketing for the Program Exchange allowed Bill to work more collaboratively with producers on funding and distribution strategies. Orders for programs were increasing rapidly, topping 600 between January and March of 1979.

In Washington, Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford appeared twice before the Carnegie Commission to discuss how community radio could address issues of public access, participation, and diversity in an expanded, multi-service public radio system. The Commission’s final report was before Congress, proposing a fundamental overhaul of the American public broadcasting infrastructure, and significant increases in federal spending. Though the House Subcommittee on Communications took up many of the
Carnegie recommendations in H.R. 3333, the Commission’s central proposal to replace CPB with an independent endowment did not survive. The goals of the second commission may have been too ambitious: Unlike its predecessor, Carnegie II had little net impact on noncommercial broadcasting in the U.S.

Contrary to Thomas’ observation that 1979 was “not an auspicious year for federal fiscal expansion on any front,” Congress agreed to proposals to award funds to CPB for a satellite distribution system for NPR, and assented to NFCB’s recommendation to mandate a fixed split of CPB grants, directing the agency to award 75% of funds to public television and 25% to public radio. Having made a strong impression on the staff and leadership of CPB over the course of the Docket 20735 proceedings and several Congressional hearings, Tom joined the CPB Radio Advisory Council, where the discussion focused on the new, competitive process that required new stations to qualify for a limited number of Expansion Grants as prerequisites for receiving full CSGs. Nan Rubin assisted stations with applications for grants from the newly authorized National Telecommunications and Information Administration [NTIA], the successor to the HEW Facilities program reconstituted in the Department of Commerce with specific Congressional directives to prioritize the extension of NCE services to unserved localities and populations. To accommodate the pressures on the Washington office, the staff moved the Newsletter to a bimonthly publication schedule in the spring of 1979.

With Rubin handling day-to-day services to members, Thomas and Clifford increasingly turned their attention to the development of long-term strategies for the
Federation’s future. In February 1979, The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation awarded NFCB $15,000 to conduct “a detailed assessment of station operations, projections of development patterns in community radio, and an evaluation of resources needed (and available) to provide a more effective service.” In the months leading up to the Olympia conference, Thomas and Clifford issued a series of position papers. “Planning for community radio” began with an overview of the Federation’s definition of community radio, the diversity of the membership, and the relationship of NFCB to the broader system of public broadcasting. Articulating a series of questions that might be applied to “program production, personnel development, fundraising, volunteer participation, minority involvement, promotion, management skills, audience research,” and broadcast facilities, Thomas and Clifford asked members how best to use the limited resources of the NFCB. Calling for an “an organizational framework for community broadcasting – certainly at the national level and to some degree at individual stations,” Thomas and Clifford proposed to convene a process that “should be as open and thorough as possible, eliciting full participation from our membership and involving outside views as well.” Part 2 of the planning paper offered more specific questions focusing in more detail on the issues identified in the first document, including:

- Qualifications for members of a station’s board of directors, selection, and orientation processes
- Qualifications for staff, selection and training processes.
- Recruitment, training, utilization, management and evaluation of volunteers.
- Participation and day-to-day involvement of minority groups in station affairs.
• Approaches to program production and scheduling, facility development, operations, and maintenance.

• Fiscal growth, fundraising, and money management.

• The relationship of individual NFCB members to their audiences, public authorities, and the field of public broadcasting.

The third position paper took up the issue of radio as a medium of artistic, social and political culture. In “Minorities and community radio,” Thomas and Clifford took on the issue that had troubled the Federation since its inception. Since 1975, there had been progress on several fronts: Pacifica’s WPFW, Radio Bilingue, and other minority owned and controlled stations were on the air. CETA funds allowed stations to create training programs and target recruitment efforts to ethnic minorities. CPB offered to support management positions through the Minority Training Program. The FCC mandated equal opportunity in recruitment and training for all stations. “The net results, however, have not been very impressive,” observed Thomas and Clifford. “Some stations have shown no net increase in minority staff participation over the past few years. Others have added minority staff, only to find they have engendered a not so subtle race war between competing station factions.” Minority members complained of a “white atmosphere.” Programming focuses on minority audiences was “ghettoized” “in fairly small blocks of time sandwiched in among offerings clearly directed at a white audience.” Stations lacked the social orientation and the practical skills to put idealistic commitments to “serve the unserved audience” into practice. Minority producers were offered exaggerated promises of their roles in stations where white staff held the final power to
make decisions. For more positive outcomes, Thomas and Clifford called for policies to promote minority ownership, recruitment, and training, and for more clarity and expertise in the processes of audience identification, program production, and program decision-making.

In the 1979 position papers, Thomas and Clifford effectively laid down a gauntlet for the members of the NFCB. Having worked systematically on the issues identified in the papers over a period of years, they were in the position to offer a broad, critical view of the most problematic challenges facing community radio stations in the U.S. In the months after the Olympia conference, they laid these issues before Theriault, Morales, and the other members of the Steering Committee. To assess the planning issues, Theriault and Thomas conducted a series of regional meetings supported by the Mott Foundation Grant. To approach the minority participation issues, Thomas and Clifford proposed a project to CPB for a series of conferences on minority ownership and program production. The timing was ideal. CPB was reaching the end of its 1979 fiscal year, and was under a Congressional mandate to support projects that addressed issues of access, training, and participation by women and ethnic minorities across the broader public radio system. While “Minorities and community radio” examined problems specific to the NFCB, the same issues were even more prevalent at the larger, more traditional, institutional stations affiliated with NPR. The program officer overseeing the effort, Daniel del Solar, had previously worked in community radio in New York. Consequently, CPB awarded the NFCB a grant for $60,000 to organize a conference for minority producers in public radio, and $20,000 to produce a series of workshops for
groups working to establish minority-controlled stations. While the grants themselves represent but the smallest portion of the federal investment in public radio,” wrote Thomas, “they signal an important breakthrough in national recognition of NFCB’s goals and efforts and indicate the accessibility of an important resource pool upon which NFCB might draw in the 1980s.

**The pivotal point**

“Planning, policy work, fundraising, a lot of travel, staff recruitment, and a steadily increasing load of station consultations and services” was all the NFCB staff could handle as the calendar rolled over to 1980. Leaving Rubenstein in charge of Kita and the other employees, Bill Thomas left the Program Service in the summer of 1979 to devote his full time efforts to WEFT, the station project he had spearheaded in Champaign since his arrival in 1975. Program orders and submissions continued to rise, as producers turned to the NFCB to distribute programs on tape to stations that lacked the financial or technical capacity to join the new satellite distribution system operated by NPR. The advent of the NPR satellite provided the justification for a proposal to NTIA for money to plan for the future of the tape distribution service, resulting in a $50,000 grant from the federal agency to hire additional staff, engage consultants, and conduct planning meetings.

In addition to Bill Thomas, other key people were on the move in and around the Federation. The CPB grant allowed Dennis Kita to move to the Washington office as the Director of Minority Affairs, with primary responsibility for organizing the upcoming minority workshops. Dave Taylor, a member of the Program Service Advisory
Committee, left his position as Operations Director at KOPN to join the Champaign office as Director of Program Development.\textsuperscript{dxxvii} Increasingly dissatisfied with his position at KTOO FM as the licensee moved ahead with plans to finance and operate a public television station, Bruce Theriault resigned the manager’s chair in Juneau to take a similar position at KRBD in Ketchikan.\textsuperscript{dxxviii} In Minnesota, Rich and Suzi McClear recognized, “if KAXE were ever going to be a community radio station, it had to be run by people from Northern Minnesota, not carpetbaggers that came in and built radio stations.”\textsuperscript{dxxix} Expecting their second child, they were looking for an opportunity to improve their financial position as well. When the position opened in Juneau, with the promise of a larger salary and a stable source of public funding, the McClears decided it was the right time to make a move. Though Rich took the KTOO position in good faith, almost immediately he began to experience the same frustrations that led to Theriault’s departure. Seeking a better alternative, McClear lobbied the APBC for funds to start a station in Sitka. Nine months after moving to Alaska, Rich became the founding manager of Raven Radio and KCAW FM.\textsuperscript{dxxx} KCAW and KRBD became the fourth and fifth Alaska stations to join the list of NFCB participants.\textsuperscript{dxxxi}

In the interim between Juneau and Ketchikan, Theriault joined Tom Thomas for a series of regional focus meetings in Chicago, New Orleans, Seattle, Santa Cruz, Boulder, Colorado and Worcester, Massachusetts, to discuss the organizational, financial, and programming issues outlined in the previous planning papers. The meetings attracted 90 people, mostly from stations, evenly split between programming and operational staff. “The meetings were organized into sessions covering overall NFCB finances,” including
“source of funds, dues, the constituency of NFCB and self-sufficiency,” reported Theriault in “Planning for Community Radio (3).” Attendees also discussed the activities of the Program Service, and were asked to “vote for the six activities they thought most important for the NFCB.”

If the results of the focus groups were unscientific, they did provide a clear snapshot of the members’ needs and priorities for Federation services. Hearing about the nature and complexity of the organization’s finances, the meetings provided many of the attendees with their first awareness “that the majority of NFCB funds were generated from outside sources and that our ability to generate funds internally was limited.” While those present felt the “NFCB should avoid a situation where the source of funds sets the organization’s priorities,” and that “self-sufficiency for NFCB should not necessarily be the goal,” the current approach to funding “was viewed as an acceptable financial structure for the NFCB.” Of the program-related projects, the attendees gave the highest priority to NFCB’s training activities, the Federation’s function as a resource bank and clearinghouse for system information, and services related to grant writing and consultation. Program distribution and consultation services were farther down the list. In summary, Theriault asserted, NFCB was “being called upon to take an even more active role in providing information and developing training activities,” while relying on “diverse external resources” to supply “a significant portion of its funds.”

Over the previous five years, the NFCB had helped dozens of organizations acquire licenses, build facilities, and establish broadcast services. These stations continued to rely on NFCB for a host of services, even as more stations joined the
organization. A growing membership placed more demands on the company. To respond, the company needed to grow. At the same time, the members could not pay the full cost of the services they expected or needed from the NFCB, and those with the fewest resources tended to require higher levels of service and attention. The Federation faced a paradox: Growth did not pay for itself. On the contrary, growth increased the need for external resources. At a joint meeting in St. Louis, members of the Program Service, Financial Affairs, and Steering Committees wrestled with the prospects of “a steady rise in the demand for services supporting station development, significant growth in program related work, and action to assure community radio will have access to public funds for public broadcasting.” While it was clear that the NFCB would have to “expand and improve its staff organization,” no one could articulate a resolution to the underlying paradox of the organization’s success. The planning process undertaken in the Mott Foundation project had raised many questions, and provided few answers.

The turnaround on the CPB project was particularly short, challenging NFCB to bring several factions in public broadcasting together for the first time. For project coordinator Dennis Kita, “it was all about building constituency,” and thanks to the previous experience of Thomas, Clifford, Rubin, and others inside and outside community radio member stations, “the outreach efforts were quite masterful.” Within a few months of the CPB awards, NFCB conducted workshops in June 1980 in San Antonio, Texas for two Latino-controlled community radio projects; and in Bismarck, North Dakota for five projects licensed to Native groups in July. June also brought 130 Native, Latino, Asian American, and African-American producers to
Boulder, Colorado for the Working Conference for Minority Producers in Public Radio. While some of the attendees were skeptical that anything could come of the gatherings, others were excited to exchange ideas with colleagues and mentors about new stations and new approaches to radio programming. Hugo Morales was “a major presence” at the events, recalled Kita. “It was a great time for such an event, because many of the communities had undergone coalition-building phases.”

For producer Peggy Berryhill, who brought an extensive background in production from Pacifica and NPR to her role as coordinator of the production skills workshops in Boulder, the event was a blur, as she dashed from room to room to double check equipment and direct hands-on training.

Sharon Maeda, manager of KRAB, saw reflections of other successful social movements in NFCB’s capacity to put the rhetoric of diversity into practice. The minority conferences were “like many of the things that happened in the civil rights movement,” observed Maeda. “When there’s access to funds, you move faster.”

The summer ended with the 1980 National Conference in Worcester, Massachusetts. On the occasion of NFCB’s 5th anniversary, Tom Thomas distributed the final report on the Community Radio Planning Project, and challenged the members to address the issues of growth and development at the local and national levels. In response, the members “with a resounding consensus elected to locate the Federation under one roof as soon as possible,” relocating the Program Service to Washington. The members also authorized “a special governance project” to address the developing needs of “the many sub-constituencies within NFCB: rural stations, people of color, the
associate members, independent producers, and others. The efforts were bolstered by a $29,000 award from NTIA’s Public Telecommunications Facilities Program [PTFP] to acquire new high speed duplicating machines for the new Program Service facilities in Washington, and $15,000 from the National Endowment for the Arts to support “services to producers and stations in program distribution and related activities.” The Program Service also reached agreement with NPR to offer some NFCB programs through the network’s satellite system, reaching all NPR member stations and the few NPR/NFCB affiliates, including the stations in Alaska.

The last half of 1980 brought equally promising developments in the policy arena. In response to continuing concerns from Tom Thomas and the other members of the Radio Advisory Council, CPB eliminated the rules requiring stations to obtain competitively awarded Expansion Grants, returning to the previous system where all stations satisfying the basic operational criteria qualified automatically for the CSG program. The policy change enabled qualifying NFCB stations to collect grants of over $30,000 each beginning in the fall. For “continuing support of the Federation’s analysis, planning, and representational work on public policy issues affecting public radio,” the Markle Foundation awarded a two year, $95,000 grant to NFCB, “to assure continuity in the organization’s work and make possible the pursuit of longer term goals.” Confident that the Federation would continue to see revenue growth, the Steering Committee adopted a budget of $443,000 for calendar year 1981, anticipating an additional $250,000 in external support from “various funding proposals to be developed
What the Steering Committee did not anticipate was a seismic shift in the nation’s political landscape. **There is a good deal to be concerned about**

Over the first five years of the NFCB’s existence, the political atmosphere surrounding public broadcasting was reasonably stable. While the presidency had shifted from Republican to Democratic hands, the office of the executive remained relatively weak in the aftermath of the Watergate affair and the resignation of Richard Nixon in 1974. Up the road from the White House, Democrats retained a firm control over the Congress. Many in the House and Senate remained committed to the broad social agenda advanced during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, including the investment of public resources in a national system for noncommercial broadcasting. In this atmosphere, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and National Public Radio had achieved a measure of stability in the decade between 1970 and 1980. Though the FCC had become more market-focused under the leadership of Charles Ferris, the Commission recognized “the dramatic evolution of noncommercial radio over the past decade, from a limited service functioning principally as an adjunct to higher education to a major component of U.S. radio broadcasting with substantial public service opportunities.”

Dramatic change came to Washington with the election of conservative Republican Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980. Reagan installed a policy team committed to lower taxes, limited government, and the deregulation of markets, including the broadcasting industry. Within weeks of coming to office, Reagan proposed a rescission of 25% of the funds that had already been appropriated to CPB for the coming
fiscal year. In addition, Reagan proposed to reduce or eliminate many of the agencies that provided collateral support to public broadcasting, including the NEA, NTIA, and CETA. To oversee the deregulation of the broadcasting industry, Reagan designated attorney Mark Fowler to chair the FCC. “For Fowler, the regulatory apparatus of the FCC was ‘the last of the New Deal dinosaurs,’” observed Douglas Kellner, “and television was ‘just an appliance, like a toaster’ that required no special regulatory attention.” Where previous commissions had attempted to articulate normative standards for the elusive public interest requirements of the Communications Act, Fowler championed a more practical approach favored by broadcasters. Under Fowler, the public interest would be equated with profit. Though Nicholas Johnson and others in the media reform movement asserted that the public interest must “mean more than the same profit-maximizing behavior that would be produced with no standards whatsoever,” under Fowler the maxim became “the public interest is what interests the public.”

In their efforts to represent the individual and collective interests of NFCB members, Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford had developed strong working relationships with CPB and the FCC. By comparison, the Federation’s presence before Congress was more limited. “Outside [of] a small number of Congressional staffers working specifically in the communications field,” wrote Thomas, “community broadcasters are simply part of the public broadcasting system, itself a somewhat small area of Congressional concern.” Historically, radio issues had been subordinate to television issues since the establishment of CPB in 1967. In the new reality of the Reagan era, the
interests of community broadcasting were now firmly tied to the more general interests of public radio and public television.

The first round in the budget battle went to public broadcasters. Led on the radio side by NPR President Frank Mankiewicz and Vice President for National Affairs Walda Roseman, public broadcasters convinced the members of the Senate Budget Committee to reject the proposed rescission and maintain CPB funding at $172 million through fiscal year 1983. In doing so, the Committee also reaffirmed public broadcasting’s forward funding, a mechanism put in place during the Nixon administration to insulate public broadcasting from abrupt shifts in the will of the nation’s political leaders. Occupied with more pressing battles over funding much larger programs, Reagan was content to defer the cuts to the next biennium, agreeing to reduced authorizations of $130 million per year for CPB in FY84-86. The final outcome provided public broadcasters with time to anticipate future cuts. More important, it left intact CPB’s “heat shield” function, providing a separation between current political issues and the day-to-day programming and operations of public broadcasting services, including community radio stations.

Though NFCB did not occupy a leadership role in the battles over federal funding, the organization added breadth and credibility to the case for public broadcasting. As a consequence of the minority conference projects and the other outreach efforts of the NFCB staff and committees, by 1981 the Federation was a focal point for many constituencies in public radio, especially those beyond the circle of the large, institutional licensees affiliated with NPR and the “narrow, moralistic view” of public radio criticized by FCC Chair Ferris and others. Approaching the 1981
conference in Durango, Colorado, NFCB’s Annual Report listed 57 participant members, including nearly two dozen stations still firmly aligned the counterculture values of the 1960s and 1970s. But the NFCB was now far more diverse than it had been in 1975. Nineteen licensees operated in remote and rural areas, including southwest Kansas, the Four Corners region of Arizona and New Mexico, and the mountains of West Virginia. NFCB represented 17 minority licensees, consisting of five Native, six African-American, and six Latino groups, operating in rural and urban areas. NFCB had 60 nonvoting associate members, ranging from individual producers, to college stations, to the Boston NPR station, WGBH. Eighteen NFCB member stations were broadcasting in California, and 10 in Alaska.

Unlike their counterparts to the south, the Alaska stations enjoyed a more robust financial outlook. In 1980, the APBC instituted an “Essential Service Level” formula to guarantee sufficient resources to meet all criteria for continued CPB funding. While satellite systems were rare at community stations in lower 48 states, 10 NFCB members in Alaska affiliated with NPR counted downlinks as part of their capitalized equipment. The legislature also appropriated $165,000 to construct a satellite uplink for distribution of programming from APRN – the first uplink in the public radio satellite system owned and operated by an agency other than National Public Radio. At the time, the president of the board of APRN was Bruce Theriault.

Though NFCB could depend on the Alaska members to pay their annual dues in a timely manner, financial pressures on stations elsewhere, combined with reductions or termination of CETA and other government programs and more competition for private
funding, meant financial difficulties for the NFCB. Over the years, the Federation had accumulated a rolling deficit of $28,000 in unpaid salaries owed to current and former staff members. In 1981, expenses associated with the move of the Program Service from Champaign, relocation to new offices in Washington, renovations of the new space, and the “budget assault on public broadcasting” added $18,000 to the deficit. New grants from the Benton Foundation to explore alternative financing for community radio ($15,000), the NEA for the Program Service ($20,000), and CPB for a second minority producers conference ($20,000) kept day-to-day operations in the black, as the company borrowed against the grants to meet present expenses, including interest payments on the debt.

Melt down

With all sectors of public broadcasting feeling the pressure from Congress and the Reagan administration to perform more efficiently and effectively, agencies across the system started to cooperate in new ways. For years, CPB had awarded 100% of its radio programming funds to NPR. In turn, NPR limited access to its programming to NPR members, with very few exceptions. Arguing that programs produced and distributed with the support of public funds should be available to all CPB-supported stations regardless of network affiliation, in January 1982 NFCB and CPB convinced NPR to establish new policies making all programs available to all stations, at least on some limited basis. Looking ahead to the reduced funding mandated for 1984, CPB adopted recommendations from NFCB and NPR to equalize the impact of budget cuts on local stations by splitting future CSG funds between guaranteed base grants and smaller,
graduated incentive grants. In response to a “chorus of objections from stations outside
the CPB system” and independent producers, CPB also agreed to open its training grant
programs to all public broadcasters, regardless of CPB qualification status. Over at
PTFP, NFCB members received more than $1.2 million for facilities planning and
construction for FY 82, including funds to build a 100,000 watt station at Pine Ridge,
South Dakota on the Lakota reservation to provide broadcast services to one of the most
impoverished areas of the U.S. PTFP awarded another $853,000 to NFCB stations in
FY1984.

The situation was very different from the circumstances that brought NFCB to
Washington in 1975. At its founding, most members of the Federation shared Milam’s
view that the agencies in the “public broadcasting system” were adversarial to the
interests of community broadcasting. Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford, joined more
recently by Nan Rubin and Dave Taylor, had worked steadily to change these
relationships, developing key allies inside the system, including Clyde Robinson and
Wayne Roth at CPB, Richard Harland and Mary Dinota at PTFP, and Mike Starling at
NPR Satellite Services. Bringing more than 40 years of combined experience to the
processes of advocacy and negotiation, Thomas, Clifford, Rubin, and Taylor provided
NFCB with a coordinated, effective presence before the principal agencies of public
broadcasting. In spite of the progress, however, some of the major issues that prompted
the founding of the NFCB remained unresolved. CPB’s qualifying criteria (5 full time
staff and an annual budget of $130,000 in nonfederal revenues for FY84) still put the
CSG program out of reach of many NFCB members. The CSG criteria were a
particular hardship for the rural and minority controlled stations that served smaller, less affluent, and geographically and socially isolated audiences. NPR continued to receive nearly 100% of CPB funds for public radio programming. NPR managed the satellite distribution system for the benefit of the network’s CPB-supported member stations. NPR’s new program access policy still gave NPR members territorial exclusivity for NPR programs – unless the nonmember seeking access was also supported by the CSG program. While the new policy addressed the issue of “double payment” from public stations and CPB for NPR programming, it was “not an adequate solution,” according to Thomas. “NPR is clearly exploiting its role as the major program producer for public radio to protect its role as a membership organization.” Thomas saw no reason that nonmember stations, “who already bear the cost of program distribution through satellite use fees, should be treated in a different fashion.”

Under President Frank Mankiewicz, NPR undertook a series of entrepreneurial initiatives designed to end the company’s dependence on the federally-appropriated funds that had come under fire from the Reagan administration. Under the banner “Project Independence,” Mankiewicz established a variety of fundraising ventures, including a plan to sell “shares” in NPR programs for $250,000 to companies and corporations, in return for regular on-air acknowledgements. On the programming side, Mankiewicz established NPR Plus, a second service consisting of classical music, jazz, and hourly newscasts planned for 150 to 200 members. Concurrently, the company proposed a for-profit subsidiary, NPR Ventures, to exploit the unused channel capacity of the satellite system for services such as paging, high-speed data transmission, and commercial
program services such as Muzak. Confident in the success of these ventures, Mankiewicz boldly asked CPB to reduce its annual support of NPR and make the money available to stations. Though Mankiewicz and NPR Executive Vice President Tom Warnock were bullish on Project Independence, some members of the NPR board remained skeptical and urged caution in the current climate of reduced federal support. According to McCauley, “Mankiewicz generally brushed these comments aside.”

But it was clear to the staff at NPR that the company was spending money faster than it could be raised. New equipment was billed to NPR Plus. The network issued credit cards to reporters and producers, even as it had trouble getting payroll checks to overseas correspondents.

The wheels came off in the spring of 1983. Initially, Mankiewicz told the NPR board the company would fall $2.8 million short of the budget for the current fiscal year. Less than two months later, the deficit ballooned to $6 million, more than 20% of the total operating budget. Mankiewicz and Warnock resigned. Member stations refused a request from the Board to contribute $1.5 million to a fund to bail out the network and at least one of its two flagship programs, Morning Edition and All Things Considered. Instead, the station representatives voted unanimously to tell NPR “that the two news magazines were to be placed ahead of all other programs.” CPB President Edward Pfister expressed concern, but withheld judgement on the best course of action until more information was forthcoming from NPR. The board turned to Ron Bornstein, chief executive of WHA, to guide the company back to stability.
On the surface, it was easy for the members of NFCB to dismiss the NPR debt crisis as the ultimate consequence for the network’s culture of arrogance. “Behind the scenes, we were all kind of, yuck yuck, har har, you have $20 million and go under. They’re wasting money on this, that, and the other thing,” recalled Dave Taylor. “But in reality, we all recognized that and discussed that NPR actually going under would be a terrible thing for all of us, even though we were the poor sister competitor, in some ways. We didn’t want NPR to go away. That would have been a disaster.”

The crisis was particularly obvious to the employees of the NFCB staff, who had developed some good relationships with people at NPR. NPR also represented the single biggest investment in the public radio system: CPB and PTFP had invested millions of dollars in the nationwide satellite system that was less than three years old, consisting of the control center in Washington, D.C., nearly a dozen uplinks scattered across the country, and scores of downlinks at the participating stations. Taylor observed, “Distribution was recognized to be a benefit to the entire system, NPR members and nonmembers alike. They needed more than just the NPR membership to make a go of it and to justify getting continued funding for it.”

If NPR went under, some other agency would have to manage the system.

The debt crisis had a direct impact on all of the NFCB members affiliated with NPR. All of the Alaska stations belonged to NPR, operated downlinks, and paid substantial dues to the NFCB. All of the Pacifica stations were interconnected through the satellite. Tiny stations like KVNF in Paonia, Colorado, and other remote corners of the country relied on the satellite to provide NPR programming under the network’s
revised distribution policy. Even stations that weren’t part of the public radio “system” were beginning to turn to interconnected NPR stations for handoffs of programs not broadcast on NPR, including those distributed on the satellite by the NFCB Program Service.

In the debt crisis, Thomas saw the opportunity to reconstruct the national program service in a manner to benefit the members of the NFCB. Within days of the issue’s emergence, Thomas proposed the “creation of a program marketplace,” placing the stations at the front line of the public radio system. Thomas proposed to balance the “three-sided equation” among “NPR, Station and independent producers, and stations as consumers of programs – all competing for limited federal dollars.” In such a marketplace, Thomas foresaw the end of NPR’s near monopoly on CPB program production funds, leading to more opportunities for producers and more diversity in the programming available to the system. Finally, Thomas urged NPR to focus on the needs and interests of its member stations, rather than “the corporate requirements of the largest single entity in public radio.” Thomas’ insights offered a pathway to Rich McClear, Bruce Theriault, and the other NFCB/NPR members as they worked through the resolution of the network’s problems.

Closer to home, NFCB was undergoing its own financial crisis. In background papers to the Steering Committee distributed in January 1983, Thomas revealed the scope of the Federation’s rolling deficit. Another document outlined continuing issues at the Program Service, which had simultaneously become much larger, thanks to the continuing support of the NEA, but continued to struggle to find a sustaining market.
The Sound Choice program series, intended to be “the lead marketing vehicle” for the Program Service, had been “a bust. Sales have been generally dismal.”\( ^{\text{dcxxvi}} \) Thomas proposed either a pullback to a modest core service, an expansion financed by not-yet-identified resources, or the elimination of the tape service and efforts to undertake “the fastest route to interconnection for NFCB members without satellite access.”\( ^{\text{dcxxvii}} \) In the midst of these and other revenue-related concerns, Thomas warned the Steering Committee of signs that current salary levels for NFCB staff were inadequate. “At least half of the staff is now ‘moonlighting’ to make ends meet,” reported Thomas, though he provided no additional information in writing about these outside activities.\( ^{\text{dcxxviii}} \)

In response, the Steering Committee directed Thomas to undertake measures intended to improve the Federation’s financial position. One of the three positions in the Program Service was eliminated.\( ^{\text{dcxxix}} \) Committee members recommended reducing Clifford’s position as Vice President to 40%, and limiting her duties to finance and fundraising. But the Committee recommended other actions in spite of NFCB’s financial condition, to upgrade the Newsletter, gain outside funding for a new edition of the Legal Handbook, to continue current representation and advocacy activities and identify outside funding for a new Director of National Affairs. Other recommendations were equally optimistic, to increase attendance at the NFCB conference by 50% (with a collateral increase in revenue from the event), provide salary increases for Thomas, Clifford, and Taylor, add a full-time Development/Promotion Director and a half-time administrative assistant, and by the way, “target reduction of the deficit by at least $10,000.”\( ^{\text{dcxxx}} \) The
following pages included budget projections of $232,050 in expenses against $222,856 in estimated revenues.  

Once again, an outside funder provided the infusion of cash necessary to see NFCB through its immediate problems. In June, the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation awarded $50,000 to the Federation to develop long term financial strategies for community radio stations, focusing on listener contributions, earned revenues, and cooperative projects. More immediately, the grant allowed NFCB to book additional revenue and erase the pending deficit for the current fiscal year. Thomas shared the information with the members at the annual business meeting during the 1983 NFCB conference in Santa Cruz. Members of new Steering Committee, including Diane Kaplan, Executive Director of the Alaska Public Radio Network, and Hugo Morales, who assumed the Chairperson position, were especially pleased to receive the news. As the year came to a close, the Federation received another grant of $75,000 from the Markle Foundation to continue its policy work.

For NPR, the road to financial recovery would be much more complicated. In the months after Mankiewicz’ resignation, the operating deficit grew to $9.1 million. NPR was faced with strong opposition to any strategy to shift the bulk of the burden to its member stations. NPR undertook negotiations with CPB, initially seeking to accelerate the schedule of CPB funds to the network, but CPB was unwilling to entertain options that did not include a significant restructuring of the company. In the end, CPB agreed to supply NPR with an $8.5 million “line of credit,” to be guaranteed by portions of the members’ CSG payments for the next three years, should NPR prove unable to repay the
loan on schedule. In addition, to protect some $2.3 million in facilities and equipment against any possible future default, NPR agreed to transfer title of its satellite assets to an independent trust controlled by majority vote of all CPB supported licensees. The new Satellite Trust would still engage NPR to manage the Public Radio Satellite System [PRSS], but there would be more voices at the table setting policy on program funding and distribution issues. It was the first step towards Tom Thomas’ marketplace for public radio programming.

**Distinguished service**

“We have been with NFCB far longer than we ever envisioned when we started,” wrote Tom Thomas in the lead article of the *NFCB Newsletter* for March, 1984. “The time has come for us to move on to other challenges and opportunities." In fact, neither Tom nor Terry Clifford had a very clear idea of what would come next. For the present, the couple was expecting their second child, and the prospect of continued employment with the NFCB offered few encouraging indicators for their personal financial future. “We simply can’t afford to live on what NFCB can afford to pay me,” wrote Thomas in a memo to the Steering Committee a month earlier. Given the centrality of their contributions to the establishment, growth, and development of the NFCB over the previous decade, few could imagine an NFCB without Tom and Terry. But from their perspective, the time was ripe for a move. The Babcock and Markle grants provided the Federation with a higher degree of financial stability than the organization had known for some time. Though Nan Rubin had chosen to leave the company after the Santa Cruz gathering, former Steering Committee chair Carol
Daugherty soon replaced her as the Director of Station Development. Early in the year, Pat Watkins, former station manager of KOPN and more recently the executive director of the National Federation of Local Cable Programmers in Washington D.C., came on board as Director of Training and Outreach, joining her husband, Dave Taylor, in the NFCB office. With Betsy Rubenstein overseeing publications, Jim Gleeson assisting Taylor with the Program Service, and a new business manager, the company was fully staffed. Taylor, Watkins, and Rubenstein provided solid connections to the organization’s past. The time had come “to hang out our shingle as Thomas and Clifford and see what happens.” Tom and Terry would step down September 1, following the 1984 conference.

In the months leading up to the conference, Thomas and Clifford and the rest of the staff kept up with business as usual. Continuing to monitor the NPR reorganization, Thomas and Clifford “meticulously researched the various agreements and prepared background papers for all our members.” NFCB sponsored a teleconference over the satellite system, in which CPB Vice President David Brugger, new NPR President Doug Bennet, and Thomas presented the positions of their organizations. Debt retirement was the dominant topic at NPR’s Public Radio Conference in April, attended by many on the NFCB staff and representatives from the Federation’s NPR affiliates. In April, NFCB joined other public broadcasters in support of a bill offered by Republican Barry Goldwater to increase funding authorizations for CPB between FY87 and FY89 to $270 million. Sponsors of the bill from both parties agreed “the Reagan Administration’s budget of $100 million for CPB is inadequate.” In June, Fowler’s
FCC swept away requirements for radio stations to conduct formal ascertainment surveys and maintain chronological logs of all broadcast programming, while in the Senate Oregon Republican Bob Packwood continued to push his Freedom of Expression Act S.1917 to repeal the Fairness Doctrine. In the House, Republican Tom Tauke and Democrat Billy Tauzin pushed a bill to eliminate the FCC’s comparative renewal process. The bill was broadly supported by the commercial broadcasting industry.

Looking forward to their departure, Thomas and Clifford prepared a series of memos to the Steering Committee, covering everything from a new statement of organization’s mission and objectives, to management recommendations in the areas of national affairs, station services, publications, the annual conference, and the Program Service. In addition, he offered the final financial report for FY 83, a preliminary report for the first quarter of FY84, and a summary of all current positions and personnel. The report emphasized the importance of NFCB’s work “which produces immediate, tangible results for our members and which is clearly beyond the capacity of individual stations to take on themselves,” including influencing national policy, assistance with national funding, and consultations in areas where local personnel lacked expertise, especially in areas of regulation and compliance. Thanks to the recent awards from Babcock and Markle, Thomas reported progress on reducing the working deficit, and projected a balanced budget for the coming year. With regard to the approaching management transition, Thomas urged the Committee to prepare for “a brief period of overlap to get the new person going, and later as the organization pays out my accrued benefits.” For
In another memo, Thomas outlined recommendations for the process of selecting a new president. Following the recommendations closely, the Steering Committee agreed to a five member search committee, including two members of the Steering Committee: Hugo Morales, as chair of the Steering Committee would chair the search, joined by Diane Kaplan. Committee members nominated more than a dozen people for the final three positions, including Nan Rubin, Bill Thomas, Rich McClear, and Joan Rubel. The final choices were left to Morales.

The 1984 NFCB conference in Washington, D.C. was the largest event staged to date by the Federation, featuring pre-conference sessions focusing on women in community radio programming and management, and 75 workshops covering a wide range of topics in financial management, production, engineering, volunteer training, and legal issues. At the annual members meeting, the members passed nine resolutions reaffirming the Federation’s commitment to women and minorities, including one urging CPB to adopt supplemental grants for minority-controlled stations. “Finally, the membership overwhelmingly passed a resolution of gratitude to Terry Clifford, outgoing Vice President, and Tom Thomas, outgoing President,” noted the minutes of August 18, 1984.

In a special ceremony, David Brugger awarded the first CPB Distinguished Service Award to Thomas and Clifford, whom he described as “the best that public broadcasting has.” Then, on behalf of the Steering Committee and the Presidential Search Committee, Diane Kaplan announced the selection of Carol Schatz, former
manager of Bethel Broadcasting in Bethel, Alaska, as the new President of the National Federation of Community Broadcasters.
CHAPTER VIII
TRANSITION, CRISIS, AND ACCOMPLISHMENT, 1984 - 1990

With the departure of Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford, NFCB was heading into unknown territory. Since the inception of the organization, the Steering Committee had been able to rely on the leadership of Thomas and Clifford to guide its deliberations and decisions. New leadership in the Washington office required a more collaborative approach to managing the affairs and initiatives of the Federation. As the remaining founders departed the staff to pursue other opportunities, the NFCB faced financial and leadership crises that threatened to implode the organization. At this crossroads, key individuals from the founding period worked with new leaders to resuscitate the organization, ultimately achieving some of the NFCB’s most important and long-standing policy objectives.

Once again, Alaska

By the age of 27, Diane Kaplan had already accumulated an impressive resume in the field of public broadcasting. She gained her first experience as a producer and program director at the University of Pennsylvania’s student managed and operated NCE station, WXPN. After she graduated from Penn, the University elected to turn out the students in the aftermath of a controversy over indecent program content. Hired to coordinate the station’s marketing efforts, Kaplan became acquainted with the NFCB when Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford visited WXPN during the transition from student
to professional management. In the spring of 1979, she was hired by the University of California Berkeley as the professional manager of student station KALX, which became an associate member of NFCB during her tenure. After staying in Berkeley for a little more than two years, she moved to a position as a program officer for the California Public Broadcasting Commission [CPBC]. The state equivalent of CPB, the agency provided grants to California’s CPB-supported public radio stations, and supported statewide efforts to develop the state’s public broadcasting capabilities.

Under the administration of the state’s progressive Democratic governor, Jerry Brown, the CPBC provided funds for a minority fellowship program and a minority telecommunications conference. As one of the people overseeing these efforts, Kaplan had contact with all of the public television and radio managers in the state, including Hugo Morales at Radio Bilingue. At the same time, some of the commissioners came under fire for their connections to California’s emerging cable TV industry. The commission was “much in the news” and “under attack by the legislature,” recalled Kaplan. “There was a lot of money” associated with the development of the cable industry, and “the commission got in the middle of it – almost a scandal around commissioners who had cable interests trying to influence a report that the commission did. Things got pretty tense at the commission between the staff, the commissioners, and the legislature, and the governor’s office.”

For Kaplan and others on the staff, “it was a pretty unpleasant place to be.” In November of 1982, conservative Republican George Deukmejian succeeded Brown, and almost immediately proposed to eliminate funding for the CPBC.
Eager for an adventure in another part of the world, Kaplan applied for jobs in Australia and Alaska in the winter of 1983. In April, she was hired as the new Executive Director of the APRN, with a mandate from the APRN board of directors to attract more private funding in the Reagan era of smaller government budgets. Within a week, she attended her first Public Radio Conference and heard about the NPR budget crisis. At APRN, Kaplan faced a very different situation than the one at NPR: Where NPR’s governance structure tended to isolate its board of directors from the member stations, at APRN the board consisted entirely of Alaska station managers, including Rich McClear and Bruce Theriault. Unlike the relationship of NPR and CPB, none of the funding for APRN came directly from the Alaska Public Broadcasting Commission. Instead, the Commission gave programming grants to the stations, “with the understanding that they would pass it through to the network,” Kaplan explained. As a result, the station managers on the APRN board controlled all of the network’s funding at the source. To Kaplan, the conflict of interest was obvious: “It became clear to me that in order to raise a lot of private money, which is what they hired me to do in terms of building the system, I needed more juice on my board than station managers could provide. I needed public citizens who were just into the mission, and were connected.”

Moving strategically, Kaplan convinced the board to hire a consultant to conduct an assessment of the APRN operation. Turning to the largest and most successful state network in public radio, Kaplan brought in William Kling, CEO of Minnesota Public Radio, to conduct the assessment. Since the passage of the Public Broadcasting Act, Kling had amassed a powerful reputation as an instigator of innovation and controversy,
having established American Public Radio as a direct competitor to NPR. Kling’s report to Kaplan recommended the addition of public members on the board. “Otherwise,” remarked Kaplan, ”we could forget about raising private money.” The board accepted the recommendation, opening the way for Kaplan to recruit “public citizens who were just into the mission, and were connected” to three new seats on the board.

Kaplan moved quickly to establish ties within the spheres of private industry and government. In her view, “there were some very obvious corporations to approach for underwriting, because they had statewide image needs.” Oil industry interests were especially eager to position themselves as public benefactors to the citizens of the state’s rugged and pristine environment. Concurrently, she cultivated relationships with the state’s political leaders, particularly U.S. Senator Ted Stevens, who became an outspoken advocate for Alaska’s public radio system. “At the 10th anniversary of APRN, he was the speaker,” recalled Kaplan. “He always would bring an FCC commissioner up with him to Alaska every summer, and we would host something for them. We had a close relationship.”

With the support of Hugo Morales and other delegates, Kaplan was elected to the NFCB Steering Committee in July of 1983. Other members elected during the Santa Cruz conference included Barbara Day from WBAI/Pacifica Radio in New York; Quentin Hope, who had worked closely with Thomas and Clifford to start a 100,000 watt, CPB-supported, rural service to southwestern Kansas; and Bill Thomas, now station manager and program director of WEFT in Champaign, Illinois. The delegates re-elected Morales to a second term as chairperson. To this group came the responsibility to guide
NFCB as it transitioned from the founding leadership of Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford to new leadership and new challenges. One of those challenges was attracting qualified candidates for Executive Director position. Morales, Kaplan, and the other members of the search committee knew “it was very difficult work for very little pay.”

Through APRN, Kaplan had contact with all of the station managers in the Alaska system. In the village of Bethel, radio station KYUK served a community of 3500, consisting primarily of Native Yup’ik Eskimos. Located 600 miles west of Anchorage and accessible only by air, Bethel was the hub for the Native population spread out across the remote stretches of the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta. Owned and operated by Bethel Broadcasting, a local, Native-controlled nonprofit agency, KYUK AM and KYUK TV provided the only local news services for the region. KYUK TV offered instructional programming from the local community college and news in English, while KYUK programmed classical music, local public affairs programs on public health and fisheries issues, interviews with tribal elders, and news in Yu’pik. Volunteers from the college read the news on television, and hosted the music programs on radio. One of the college employees who began volunteering at KYUK in 1976 was a transplanted New Yorker, Carol Schatz.

Schatz was an educator and administrator by profession, not a broadcaster. Nevertheless, when the general manager position opened at KYUK in 1978, she applied and won the job on the strength of her management experience. Over the next seven years, she oversaw a series of significant developments at KYUK TV and radio. In the first year, she ended a three year operating deficit. With the operation back on a firm
financial footing, she oversaw interconnection to the public radio satellite, affiliation with NPR and APRN, and increases of 150% in the operating and capital budgets over her five-year term. During her final two years, she served on the long-range planning committee of the APBC. During her stay in Bethel, she had contact with Kaplan, McClear, and Theriault through the APRN, but was generally unaware of the NFCB and the organization’s efforts to reach out to Native stations. “There was a real difference between the stations in communities like Sitka and Ketchikan, that were largely white,” she recalled, “and some of the stations like Bethel and Kotzebue that were serving largely Native Alaskan populations.” She left Alaska in 1983 to travel, thinking she might eventually look for employment in an area closer to her family in New York.

In the summer of 1984, Schatz received a phone call from Kaplan, asking if she might be interested in the Executive Director position with NFCB. Schatz’ reputation as someone who could turn an organization around financially seemed like a good match for an organization that needed to address its ongoing deficit issues and continue to attract major donors. Invited to Washington for an interview, the Steering Committee was impressed by her service as the manager of a minority-controlled public broadcasting agency, and her track record as “a skillful diplomat, and outstanding administrator, and a terrific organizer.” The Committee recommended that she become the second President of the NFCB, and the selection was confirmed by acclamation of the membership at the annual business meeting on August 15, 1984. For her part, Schatz was pleased to find employment closer to her family on the East Coast, and was impressed with the organization’s strong commitment to the current member stations. “I
had the sense that it was a close knit group of people who knew each other, and weren’t necessarily reaching out to the community as a whole,” she observed.

**Under (not so) new management**

“We have a dedicated staff with experience and expertise and a Steering Committee which also provides some continuity from the former administration,” wrote Schatz in her first *Newsletter* editorial. Sensitive to the significance of the biggest transition in the organization’s history, she pledged to focus on internal review and planning processes, and meeting the current needs of members. Though he was no longer an employee, Tom Thomas continued to appear in the office. “At my first staff meeting, Tom was there and he opened it. I thought, ‘this is interesting. Is he still the president, or am I?’ He just came. He was so connected to it.”

Though he and Clifford were no longer physically present most of the time, Schatz could sense the staff’s continuing loyalty to Thomas. “I knew the transition would be difficult for everybody,” she reflected. “This was a new organization where I didn’t know anybody. Some of the people had worked for [Tom], and admired him tremendously, and were not necessarily ready to let go. We were looking at things differently.”

In her first month on the job, Schatz and the NFCB got good news from Capitol Hill, when Congress passed and President Reagan signed an omnibus emergency appropriations bill primarily intended to finance national defense initiatives. Tacked on to the bill were supplementary appropriations to CPB for FY84 and FY85, restoring a portion of the funds previously cut by the administration. The CPB Board allocated all of the FY84 funds to the CSG program. On average, CPB-supported stations saw an
increase of $6,407, or 9%, in their CSG payments in October. About $750,000 of these funds went to NFCB stations. With regard to the FY85 funds, NFCB joined a coalition of 15 NPR stations in a recommendation to allocate the full amount of $4.6 million to stations, but NPR management asked CPB provide $958,000 directly to NPR to cover increased costs in news and administration. In a departure from past history, the CPB Board elected not to fund the NPR request, choosing instead to create an independent $1.3 million radio program fund, to be managed directly by CPB. For the first time, funds for national programming initiatives would not pass through NPR, but would be available directly to producers.

CPB’s decision to create the Program Fund was indicative of a larger shift in the balance of power in the public radio system, from NPR to the stations. In the aftermath of the debt crisis, member stations demanded more accountability from NPR for the millions of dollars paid in station dues and program fees. With more seats on the reorganized NPR Board, station managers called on the network to develop a new business plan that would give stations more flexibility to acquire, program, and pay for NPR programs. Concurrently, CPB wanted more accountability for the millions of dollars the agency paid out to support national programming. With the assets of the satellite system transferred to a trust under the direction of people inside and outside NPR, CPB’s next logical step was to redirect funding away from the network, and toward stations and independent producers. The Radio Program Fund represented the first gesture in this new direction for the public radio system.
On other fronts, the news for NFCB was not so good. In October, President Reagan for the second time vetoed the Goldwater bill to increase the CPB funding authorization for FY1987-89. Though Reagan later signed the Labor, Health, and Human Services Appropriations Act, providing a $200 million appropriation to CPB for FY87, the impasse over the authorization cast a shadow over the long-term funding for the agency. Without the forward funding provided in the authorization, CPB continued to be exposed to the volatility of the appropriations process, where political disagreements over fairness and balance in public broadcasting carried over frequently in the debate over annual funding. For now, public broadcasters could only be satisfied that funding was scheduled to return to a level not seen since 1982.

Closer to home, NFCB was experiencing significant financial problems. Schatz was surprised when she had to struggle to meet the payroll. In her first weeks, she quickly realized, “Here was an organization that was trying to do so many different things – the training, the membership services, consultation with people, the extensive newsletter, publishing books, and then the representation. But they had hardly any money.” Member stations were behind on their dues, or didn’t pay at all, but still received services. Though some members of the Steering Committee were astute about budgets, the leadership had relied on Thomas and Clifford for financial information for years. Lacking their guidance, the ambiguities, rules, restrictions, and intricacies associated with NFCB’s many funding sources were troublesome for Schatz. The company regularly “borrowed” from grant funds to cover routine expenses not associated with the specific projects. As they prepared to leave NFCB, Thomas and Clifford drew
thousands of dollars in back salary and benefit payments owed to them from the previous nine years, converting a portion of the organization’s long-term paper deficit into an immediate cash shortage. A second year of funding from the Babcock Foundation provided $40,000 to shore up the finances, but the situation remained precarious.

**Channel 6, and a new plan for public radio**

In the closing days of 1984, the FCC imposed a freeze on all applications for new NCE stations, modifications, and construction permits. Two months earlier, the commission released new rules designed to address the interference caused by some NCE FM stations, operating between 88.1 and 89.1 mHz, on the reception of TV stations in the same vicinity operating on channel 6, between 82 and 88 mHz. Public radio interests, represented by CPB, NPR, and NFCB, filed a joint petition for reconsideration, arguing that the new rules restricted the “growth and expansion of public radio by precluding some public stations from making changes in operation necessary to provide effective service and others from obtaining sufficient coverage areas to make operations viable.”

The television interests, represented by the National Association of Broadcasters, the Association for Maximum Service Television, and several licensee groups, filed their own joint petition, arguing the recommended FM power levels “allow far more interference to TV-6 reception than the Commission assumed and take no account of the number of TV-6 viewers who would be affected.”

Caught between the opposing parties, the commission chose to freeze all NCE FM and TV-6 applications until the situation could be sorted out.
While the freeze presented a setback to all NCE interests seeking to establish or improve their service, the commission’s action put some community radio stations in double jeopardy. Ordinarily, PTFP required applicants to file necessary applications with the FCC before the agency would consider any projects to build or improve transmission facilities. Now, with commission staff estimating the freeze could be in place for up to six months, it would not be possible to file applications with the FCC in time to meet the PTFP deadline. For the undercapitalized stations in the NFCB, any interruptions in the PTFP program could devastate plans to reach new audiences, or replace aging and obsolete equipment.

Taking the lead on discussions with the FCC, CPB, and NPR, Pat Watkins was surprised that the other agencies were not aware of the potential impact of the proposed regulations. “Frankly, I don’t think any of the people at NPR or CPB realized what it meant when the first draft of what the FCC came out with was going to mean to radio,” recalled Watkins. “As soon as I got it, I started playing with the numbers, and I knew enough engineering to throw a major fit. When NPR and CPB realized that we were going to fight it – we dragged them into it.” Working with consulting engineer Doug Vernier, Watkins estimated that 96% of current NFCB members would be affected by the new rules, and 35% would be forced off the air unless the FCC agreed to provide those stations with “grandfathered” status, creating exceptions for existing transmission systems. Twenty-three percent of the Federation’s minority controlled stations would have to reduce power by half. Forty-seven percent would be forced off the air. Citing
these and other statistics and adverse consequences of the new rules, NFCB filed a petition for reconsideration with the FCC.\textsuperscript{dclxxx}

Even as Watkins worked on the FCC petition, NPR unveiled the first draft of the new business plan, recommending that “all money which Congress appropriates available for public radio in FY 1987 and thereafter under the Public Broadcasting Act should go to licensees and permittees of public radio stations as defined by the Act.”\textsuperscript{dclxxxii} In the past, CPB allocated funds directly to NPR for the production and distribution of national programming. Under the new proposal, those funds would go to stations, to spend among any of the vendors in the marketplace of public radio programming, including NPR, NFCB, Pacifica, and American Public Radio. Alternatively, stations would be free to pool their resources to create new regional services, leading to “a dramatically altered program marketplace.”\textsuperscript{dclxxxiii} In addition, the business plan proposed to separate NPR program fees from NPR membership fees. For the first time, an NPR member would pay one fee to cover NPR programming, representation, development, legal, and corporate costs. A separate NPR membership fee would be calculated as a percentage of its annual revenue, just as the NFCB calculated its membership fee. The plan had many implications for the NFCB: The federal money passing through the hands of the Federation’s NPR member stations could be used to support new programming ventures, including the sorts of collaborations between NFCB stations and independent producers that could be facilitated by the NFCB. With budgets increased by the infusion of federal funds, dues income from the NFCB/NPR stations would rise. On the other hand, NPR’s intention to focus on member representation might supplant the need for NFCB to
advocate on behalf of its largest stations. Whatever the outcome, the business plan promised to materially alter the landscape of “the system.” From Dave Taylor’s perspective, the proposal assured that “it will certainly make this an interesting year in public radio.”

At the CPB Board meeting in April, Schatz voiced the concern of NFCB members that the business plan would not satisfactorily address the needs for minority and other specialized audience programming and independent production met by the radio program fund. In response, CPB added an exception to its general support of the business plan: Along the lines of the model established by the program fund, CPB intended to continue to withhold some funds from the public radio system to support the development of specific programs and initiatives. Schatz also questioned NPR’s practice of “bundling” its membership and programming fees, which forced NPR members to purchase the entire schedule of NPR programs, rather than choosing from a menu of individual programs or program packages. At a meeting in May, the NPR Board agreed to modify the business plan to charge a membership fee for representation and other non-programming services, and a separate programming fee to cover the costs of programming services. Without making any commitments, the board also promised to “keep ‘an open mind’ on unbundling the various program services.” The final business plan, approved by NPR members at the 1985 Public Radio Conference, included amendments proposed by the Station Resource Group [SRG], a new agency representing some of the largest stations in the public radio system. The coalition formed in the aftermath of the FY84 supplemental appropriation, when this select group of stations and
licensees, including KUOW Seattle, WHA Madison, and Minnesota Public Radio, hired two consultants to assist them with planning for the future of public radio funding. Those consultants were Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford, now President and Vice President of the SRG.\footnote{dclxxxvii}

As the NFCB prepared to return to Madison on the 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of NARK 1, the FCC agreed to accept proposed rule changes on potential FM interference with TV-6 reception offered by NFCB with the support of CPB and NPR, and worked out in negotiations with the representative of channel 6 interests. While the changes still offered protection for channel 6, the NFCB proposal based the rules on the actual population under the conflicting signals, rather than a flat mileage allowance, benefiting “a number of rural stations for which a geographical limit to interference would be more stringent than a population limit.”\footnote{dclxxxviii} In addition, existing stations would be grandfathered in unless their proposed changes would increase predicted interference. The commission agreed to lift the freeze on NCE applications as soon as the new rules were issued. At the urging of NFCB, PTFP urged the FCC to expedite the rules so the facilities program could move ahead on grant proposals.\footnote{dclxxix} For Schatz, the decision was “a big deal, not just for the organization, but for many public radio stations around the country. For a small organization like NFCB to have aligned ourselves with NPR – I think we really pushed NPR. It was significant to get the FCC to make policy based on something that was negotiated in part by NFCB and these other organizations.”\footnote{dcxc}

The outcome of the channel 6 issue provided a demonstration of the NFCB’s role as a significant player in noncommercial broadcasting policy. A combination of
expertise, independence, and agility had allowed the staff in the Washington office to
craft a solution that served the interests of noncommercial broadcasters, and also
provided the FCC with a rationale to assert its authority over the increasingly audacious
commercial sector. Concurrently, developments at NPR demonstrated that some the
Federation’s approaches to governance and finance were beginning to take root in the
larger public radio system, as the talents and ideas of the organization’s founders were
suffused across more stations and agencies. At its tenth anniversary, the NFCB was
making a difference.

**Part of the system**

When NFCB gathered in Madison for its tenth conference, it was a vastly
different organization that the one born at the 1st National Alternative Radio Conference.
The Federation now had 65 participant members in 32 states. The membership included
all 5 Pacifica licensees. Eleven NFCB stations were located in California, 8 in Alaska,
and 7 in Colorado. Six were licensed to Latino organizations, and 6 to Native agencies.
More than 25 qualified for Community Service Grants and other support from CPB.
More than a dozen, including all the Alaska stations, were members of NPR. Over the
past decade, the NFCB had made substantial progress on its goals to grow and diversify
the membership, and develop additional resources for community radio. Welcoming
attendees to the 1985 NFCB National Conference, Schatz urged the attendees to come
together to “celebrate our victories and to figure out how to overcome our setbacks.”

The biggest setback remained the state of the company finances. To address the
ongoing cash shortage, Schatz adopted a “bare-bones budget,” looking for any
opportunity to cut expenses or raise revenue. When employees chose to leave, Schatz eliminated the positions of Director of Station Development (Carol Daugherty) and Director of Publications (Betsy Rubenstein), reducing the staff to 6. The Steering Committee increased the minimum annual dues payment, adopted penalties for late dues payments, and empowered Schatz to suspend services to those members more than one year behind in their payments. Past due salaries owed to previous employees were transferred from operating expenses to a long-term debt repayment note. The size of the Steering Committee was reduced from 9 to 7, in part to reduce costs associated with meetings. Contrary to the concerns of Committee members, Schatz elected to forego a proposed Development Director position. When asked how fundraising projects would be accomplished, Schatz responded that some activities would be spread among the remaining staff, “and that she was considering trying to plug into groups like the Development Exchange (a spin-off of CPB) for some station services and hiring on a project-by-project basis for things like grantwriting.” Schatz urged the Steering Committee to consider moving some NFCB services to a fee-based model.

As Schatz approached her first anniversary as the President of the NFCB, the culture of the organization was changing. The organization had grown up around Thomas and Clifford, and shaped to their manner of doing business. Schatz took a more traditional approach to management. “She didn’t have that gritty rootiness” that characterized the counterculture elements of community radio, according to Dave Taylor. “She cut all us gritty, rooty people a lot of slack. But that’s not how she came to it. I think Tom and Terry, in urging her hire, they wanted somebody with a more stable,
institutional background.” Policy and planning became a focus for the entire staff. The affairs of the NFCB became increasingly intertwined with those of the larger public radio system. Taylor served on the advisory panel for the satellite system, and developed strong contacts within NPR. Pat Watkins focused on the legal, regulatory and technical matters relevant to the FCC and PTP. The Program Service continued, but the market for programs on tape was slowly disappearing. Taylor “always wanted [the Program Service] it to pay its own way, and earn its keep. It came close a couple of years, but it never really did. Our greatest hits would sell 50 copies. It was a dying medium for distribution.” By March of 1986, Taylor left to become the Director of Policy and Planning at NPR.

Through the winter and spring of 1986, CPB took the formal steps necessary to shift its programming funds away from NPR and toward individual stations and independent producers. In creating the National Program Production and Acquisition Grant [NPPAG] in January, CPB provided each qualified station with funds to purchase programs in the emerging public radio marketplace, from NPR, APR, or any other program provider. The following May, the CPB Board approved a plan to close down its Satellite Program Development Fund [SPDF], administered since the program’s inception in 1980 by NPR, and replace it with the $3.15 million Radio Program Fund, to be administered directly by CPB. The decisions were based, in part, on the information contained in a study of the radio program marketplace conducted in the fall of 1985 by Thomas and Clifford, under contract to CPB. Schatz attempted to capitalize on the dynamic atmosphere to reiterate one of the NFCB’s establishing goals,
urging CPB to broaden the eligibility criteria for CSG grants to “encompass those stations which provide the only public radio service to an area,” and to “those stations controlled or operated by minorities and women.” Schatz’ recommendations were not considered.

With Taylor gone to NPR, the regular NFCB staff was reduced to five. While the open position freed up additional cash to cover operating expenses, Taylor’s responsibilities for program and member services could not be absorbed by Schatz, Watkins, Publications Director Kathy Anderson, and the remaining clerical staff. Casting about for likely candidates, Watkins and others contacted Bill Thomas about the possibility of relocating to Washington and returning to NFCB. As it happened, Thomas was interested in making a professional change from WEFT, and a personal interest in moving from Champaign to a larger city, to accommodate the professional ambitions of his partner. As NFCB prepared for its 1986 conference in Bellingham, Washington, Thomas accepted the position of Director of Member Services.

At Bellingham, Schatz tried to reposition the NFCB conference to have a broader appeal to the public radio system. NPR’s Public Radio Conference [“the PRC”] tended to focus on the needs of the managers and policymakers in the NPR network. In response, Schatz recast the NFCB event as “NFCB’s Public Radio Training Conference,” offering “complete tracks in programming, production, management, fundraising, and engineering.” The event included the Federation’s first RF [Radio Frequency] Training Seminar, funded by a training grant from CPB. Dave Taylor came in his new capacity from NPR, as did Marcia Alvar, program director for Seattle NPR affiliate
KUOW, and an outspoken advocate of the use of Arbitron ratings and other forms of audience research in public radio. As part of a panel provocatively titled “Increasing the audience: Selling your soul?” Alvar discussed the objective of NPR’s Audience Building Task Force to double the size of the public radio audience in the coming 5 years, and chastised community stations for prioritizing the values of and desires of their managers, producers, and volunteers over the needs and interests of their listeners and communities. At the annual members meeting, the delegates scheduled a future vote on the recommendation of Schatz and the Steering Committee to transform the committee into a Board of Directors, and transfer oversight responsibilities from the body of delegates as a whole to the new board. Asserting that the Federation had become too large to be governed directly by the members, the Steering Committee argued successfully that the new structure would provide a smaller governing body to act in a more timely manner on issues of Federation policy and finance. The members re-elected Hugo Morales and Diane Kaplan to the Steering Committee, along with Rich McClear and a relative newcomer to the NFCB, WORT manager David LePage.

Meeting in San Francisco in October, the committee set down to the serious business of prioritizing NFCB’s activities and services. In spite of Schatz’ efforts, the company continued to hemorrhage money. Members owed tens of thousands of dollars in back dues. Though NEA pledged $20,000 to support the Program Service, CPB turned down Schatz’ proposal to hire NFCB to do station advisory work. With competition for private funding intensified after years of Reagan administration cuts in arts and cultural programs, grants of the sort Tom Thomas had gathered from private foundations had
dried up. A survey of the members showed that most stations depended on the NFCB for representation, information, and technical assistance. The board doubted that there was enough money in the budget to provide other services. Bill Thomas suggested the Program Service might be merged with the Pacifica Program Service, located at the Pacifica Archive in Los Angeles. Rich McClear concurred, though it was very hard to let go of one of the founding purposes of the NFCB. The Program Service “had been part of our signature, he reflected, but “we simply didn’t have the resources to have two program services in community radio.”

One event overshadowed all others in San Francisco: Carol Schatz tendered her resignation, effective November 20, 1986. Unlike the departure of Thomas and Clifford, Schatz’ exit was quick and understated. “Thanks to all of you for your support and encouragement,” she wrote. “The Steering Committee is taking a realistic look at the organization and is demonstrating that it will take the actions necessary for NFCB’s continued development.” “I never totally felt a real part of it, even though I was there two years,” recalled Schatz. “To some extent, I felt like I wasn’t a real part of this.” Schatz returned to Alaska to begin work on a new television project with her new partner – Jeremy Lansman, whom she met at a barbecue at the home of Dave Taylor and Pat Watkins.

With the future of the organization very much in doubt, Kaplan and McClear urged the committee to identify an interim leader while the search went forward for a new president. They turned to Bill Thomas, who accepted the position as acting
Executive Director of the NFCB. In later years, Thomas reflected that Schatz intended for him to replace her from the moment he arrived in Washington.

The new team

When David LePage traveled from his native Wisconsin to his first NFCB conference in Washington, D.C., in the summer of 1984, he was not impressed. Coming from a background in finance and community development, LePage thought the NFCB was too “hippie-dippie.” It was unbearably hot in most of the conference facilities at Mt. Vernon College, which functioned without air conditioning. “What kind of professional organization would put their members in these kind of conditions? Everything was unorganized.”

Succeeding Joan Rubel as the station manager at WORT, LePage was newly employed at one of the largest, most mature, and most conflicted stations in the NFCB. On one side, the volunteers at WORT expected LePage to undertake a catechism in the Milam-Lansman-*Sex and Broadcasting* approach to community radio. “It was supposed to be this huge philosophical lesson on community access,” he recalled. In contrast, LePage’s colleagues and employees in the office expressed a much more traditional and practical approach to running the station. “The staff probably didn’t want me to read *Sex and Broadcasting*. They preferred that I read the Arbitron ratings. There was a very strong conflict between the direction that some of the core staff took, between the audience-driven model, versus what many of the volunteers wanted – the mission.”

As a candidate for his position, LePage offered no background in mass media, journalism, or broadcasting. Responding to an inquiry into his knowledge of radio, he
told the interview committee, “I know how to turn it on.” This lack of experience did not concern the board of directors for Back Porch Radio, licensee of WORT. On the contrary, LePage’s professional background in community and economic development for nonprofit enterprises seemed to be a much better match for the needs of the station. “WORT had great programming content, and great community support,” according to LePage. “What they didn’t have was strength within their organizational structure, or their long-term financing.” The circumstances hit home the first time LePage “met with the bankers after being hired.” The organization had purchased and renovated a building in Madison to house the station. “By the time they were done, the value of the building was less than the loan amount.” When LePage asked the bank for an extension, and interest-only payments, he was turned down. WORT had missed the previous payment altogether. “A lot of the work that had to be done was organizational development stuff, personnel stuff, and getting the finances in place.” LePage was hired because he had the skills necessary to bring order to the financial situation at WORT.

In conjunction with WORT development director Kay Burns, LePage worked to bring the NFCB conference to Madison in 1985, where he occupied a prominent role as the representative of the host station, welcoming attendees and hosting many of the gathering’s social functions. More generally, over the course of the conference WORT served as a showcase for some of the best practices in community radio, demonstrating innovative programming, successful underwriting, and strong ties to local groups, organizations, and civic institutions. At the time, the station was also going through the
contentious processes of selecting a program director and a news director. For LePage, “it was a questioning of which direction the station would go, as well as where the decision-making was going to lie.” As the manager, he consistently asserted “two things: One, being audience driven; and that the staff and the manager were the decision-making leads. That didn’t necessarily sit very well with a lot of people.”

While many managers and organizations in the NFCB experimented with consensus approaches to management, LePage relied on a more traditional approach to decision-making that focused less on process and more on results. He looked on WORT as “a mission-driven business.” The station existed to serve the local community, especially those not served by other media. At the same time, “There were huge financial realities that had to be met. There was a building mortgage. We had to refinance the entire station.” To continue to qualify for the CSG program, WORT maintained a 24/7 broadcast schedule, a full time staff of at least 5, and a budget of more than $150,000. The station was also undergoing a generational change, from Rubel, Mike O’Connor and the founders, to new leadership. Over two years, LePage filled the staff with new employees, normalized the finances, and gradually brought the situation under control. By the summer of 1986, “things at WORT were actually quite stable. We’d gotten through our refinancing, so the finances were a bit more secure.”

Confident that WORT was on a solid footing, and encouraged by the recruitment efforts of the NFCB staff, LePage submitted his name for consideration for the Steering Committee at the Bellingham conference, and was subsequently elected. Soon after, Schatz told him she was leaving the NFCB.
Within days of Schatz’ departure, NFCB issued a packet of memos to its members, summarizing a series of decisions made by the Steering Committee. Kaplan announced that Bill Thomas would act as executive director through April 1, 1987. LePage agreed to assume the duties of Chief Executive Officer through the same date. Former WORT business manager and CPB financial consultant Mark Fuerst agreed to assist as needed with the Federation’s financial systems. Morales, McClear, and committee member Maria de los Angeles Villaverde formed the core of a search committee to identify the new president. Adding emphasis to the circumstances, the Steering Committee took the unusual step of scheduling the next meeting of the membership apart from the NFCB Conference. Instead, the annual meeting was called for Tuesday, April 28 in Washington D.C., one day prior to the PRC. “If you are planning just one out-of-town trip this year,” wrote Kaplan, “make it to Washington in April. We will be enacting new by-laws, implementing a new organizational structure, and adopting a long-range plan for NFCB.”

In the same packet, Watkins announced that the “somewhat scaled-down” 1987 Public Radio Training Conference would take place in Boulder, Colorado in July. A memo from Kathy Andersen asked members to consider the NPR Audience Building Task Force Report, including recommendations that CPB funding be tied to audience growth, and that stations “adopt the practice of audience-based budgeting: Each expenditure should be examined in terms of dollars per listener.”

While many of the task force recommendations seemed antithetical to the community radio tradition of serving the unserved, the report also contained language
that afforded opportunities for NFCB stations. Recommendations that CPB “study the costs and benefits of a providing a formatted program service designed to serve minority groups,” and “target $500,000 of its available funds for creation of a program to assist local stations in audience development,” spoke directly to the needs of stations serving rural and minority communities. The report called for more funds to support training “to improve the skills of local stations program directors and managers, as well as producers and personnel.” To the degree the it provided a basis for policy initiatives aimed at developing and distributing more resources to all public and community radio stations, the members of the Steering Committee and the staff interpreted the report was a positive development for the NFCB.

As the members prepared to meet in the spring, a string of events in Washington indicated a shift in the political climate for public broadcasting generally and the NFCB in particular. Following the 1986 midterm elections, Democrats took control of both houses of Congress, and designated new chairs for the subcommittees responsible for the funding authorizations of the FCC, CPB, PTFP, and all other telecommunications legislation. In the House of Representatives, Edward Markey of Massachusetts assumed the chair of the Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications. On the Senate side, Daniel Inouye of Hawaii became the chair of the Subcommittee on Communications. Both men had established records as supporters of public broadcasting legislation. Though President Reagan’s budget sought once again to reduce funding for CPB and eliminate PTFP altogether, the makeup of the two subcommittees promised to offer a strong challenge to the plans of the executive branch. Having overseen the broad
deregulation of the broadcasting industry over the previous six years, Mark Fowler resigned as chair of the FCC. At CPB, the board approved management’s proposed budget of $220.7 million for FY88, including $500,000 targeted at radio audience growth (as recommended by the Audience Building Task Force), $150,000 to begin the design phase of a new satellite system for public radio, and $600,000 to develop a series of “minority production centers” to “help public radio stations develop better minority programming,” Having taken the lead in the public radio system to establish Latino, Native, and African-American licensees, and support minority stations and producers through the minority production and ownership conferences, NFCB was “in a strong position to be a central resource” to CPB for developing any new minority service strategies.

NFCB emerged from the business meeting of April 27 and 28, 1987 as a reinvigorated organization. Hugo Morales and Diane Kaplan stepped down after four years on the Steering Committee, receiving thanks from the members for negotiating the Federation through two management transitions. The members approved the change in the governance structure, transforming the Steering Committee into a Board of Directors. Having completed his appointment as the Federation’s acting Executive Director, Bill Thomas returned to the board in his capacity as the new director of the recently merged NFCB/Pacifica Program Service in Los Angeles. The board also included Rich McCleary, David LePage, who was re-elected to the chair, and Marita Rivero, station manager of Pacifica station WPFW in Washington, D.C.. The delegates established working committees to study the issues of membership, programming, minority concerns, CPB
relations, NPR relations, and long range planning, and passed resolutions to increase dues, reevaluate the relationship of dues and services, assist stations to interconnect to the satellite system, and “actively seek the role of facilitator in the establishment of” the CPB Minority Production Centers. A final resolution addressed the organization’s historic objective to “push for the broadening of [the CSG] criteria in such a way that it allows for more NFCB members to participate. Strategies could include: Separation of NPPAGs from CSGs; a different CSG program, possibly for smaller grants that would be open to stations not now eligible; and consideration of how the involvement of more stations will expand public radio’s audience.” Finally, the members unanimously elected a new president, Lynn Chadwick, to pursue these ambitious goals.

“An outlier in community radio”

Lynn Chadwick knew how to fight uphill. Chadwick came to the American feminist movement in her early 20s, soon after she was admitted to the University of Virginia in 1970 as a member of the first coeducational class in the College of Arts and Sciences. “There were 12,000 men, and 100 women,” she recalled. She remembered professors who refused to discuss certain topics in class, saying “Gentlemen we would normally have this conversation, but since there’s a woman in the class…” The very presence of women threatened the University’s honor code, argued some faculty, who expressed concern that “we’re going to lose the honor code because of them.” Chadwick became a feminist because she “found out what it meant right in my face. I had to go [to college] under a court order.”
Outspoken, energetic, and gregarious, she graduated from college with the intent to become a writer of some sort, and ended up composing highway safety information for the federal government, which “was not totally fulfilling.” In her personal time, she lived in a collective house with other young people and “joined the poetry scene in Washington, D.C.” When her boyfriend came back from the local cooperative grocery with a 3-by-5 card advertising for “Women in radio – no experience required,” she called the number. Of some 50 women who responded to the initial call to join the Feminist Radio Network, Chadwick was one of four invited to join the production collective. Years later, she asked the organizers how she had come to be chosen “out of all those people, and I remember a woman looking at me and saying, ‘We threw the I Ching.'”

Chadwick began her career in radio by producing interviews with poets. In addition to producing programs, the Network operated a specialized distribution network for taped programs produced by women around the U.S. One of Chadwick’s primary duties as a volunteer for the Network involved making copies of submitted programs. Lacking high-speed duplicators, the programs had to be copied one at a time in real time, forcing Chadwick to listen to the same program over and over until all the copies were complete. Dull and repetitive as it might seem, she “learned a lot from that experience. It was learning by doing.” The experience also taught her to appreciate the value of the audio medium and the listening experience: “Because I was listening to these women’s voices from all over the country, I got to know all these women in an audio way. I just started really appreciating the value of audio. I met
people by audio, which is different than a photograph. You get their pacing, and the rhythm, and the voice. It was so interesting to me.

In 1979, the Feminist Radio Network received a grant from the NEA to produce the National Conference of Women in Radio at the facilities of the 4H in Chevy Chase, Maryland. The gathering brought together dozens of prominent women in community radio, including Nan Rubin, Pat Watkins, and Adi Gevins from KPFA, and a handful of men, including Bill Thomas. For three days, Chadwick recalled, the participants "stayed in these little bunk rooms. We had no money. It was $10/night, 4 bunks to a barracks, where the 4H kids come to town - hardcore feminists in line in the Kellogg dining hall with the kids. That was the first time I understood what a vegan was. It was very exotic.

Over the next two years, while she earned a living doing everything from copywriting to public information to typing dissertations, Chadwick became the central administrator in the office of the Feminist Radio Network. Though she continued to work for the Network on a voluntary basis, the position afforded her the opportunity to connect with producers at NPR and the National Radio Theater, and with agencies interested in promoting noncommercial radio for social causes, including the Markle Foundation and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]. After attending a UNESCO conference in Puerto Rico in 1980 associated with the United Nations Decade of Women, Chadwick decided she had to choose between working in print or electronic media. At the time, she was working steadily for United Features Syndicate on a variety of projects, and serving on the board of the newly
formed Audio Independents, an organization formed to represent the interests of independent public radio producers. At an AI board meeting in San Francisco, she met Leo Lee, former west coast bureau chief for NPR and founder of Western Public Radio [WPR], a nonprofit production and training institute in San Francisco. In October 1981, Lee hired Chadwick as the managing director of WPR, with a $1 million grant from Markle to develop a series of events under the banner of the National Radio Training Project. As the managing director, Chadwick served as the project’s administrator and fiscal agent, “in charge of making sure the equipment was working right, collecting the receipts from all the things. [Leo] knew who the talent was. I was the one who had to lay down the law, [and] design the workshops.”

For the next four years, Chadwick worked for Lee, managing the WPR facilities and programs and conducting workshops and other production training events. With Lee in his 70s, she figured that he would soon retire, and she would assume his leadership position, but Lee had no such plans. Over time, she realized that she could best put her talents and skills to use “on the other side of the microphone,” in management and teaching. Her income from WPR was not really sufficient to pay her living expenses in San Francisco, as well. In the spring of 1984, she submitted an application to replace Tom Thomas as the President of the NFCB, but was passed over in favor of Carol Schatz. She decided instead to pursue a master’s degree, and began researching graduate programs in California. At the University of California at Berkeley she discovered a program in public policy that seemed to fit her background in public media and nonprofit management. Though she had been out of school for 12 years, Chadwick applied,
submitting some of her radio documentaries as part of her portfolio. To her surprise, she was admitted to the School of Public Policy in the fall of 1985.

Ironically, Chadwick’s career in graduate school paralleled Schatz’ time at the NFCB. As Schatz prepared to resign from the President’s position, Chadwick was undertaking an internship at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment [OTA] in Washington, D.C., where she remained “blissfully ignorant of what was happening in community radio.” She left Washington to complete her degree in Berkeley, and returned to search for a job in the winter of 1987. On a visit to the NFCB, Pat Watkins and Bill Thomas recruited her to apply for position of President. She continued to look for other jobs in the Bay Area and Washington, including a position at OTA, when Bill Thomas called to offer her the NFCB post. Both Leo Lee and her former supervisor at OTA urged her to accept. Though she had misgivings about the salary, Chadwick accepted the offer from the Federation, just prior to the Boulder conference.

Under new management

In her first official communication to the members, included in the program for the 1987 conference, Chadwick expressed confidence in the organization and the importance of its place in the field of public policy, as an advisor to NPR and PTFP, and CPB. As a case in point, Chadwick announced that CPB had engaged the NFCB as a primary contractor for the Minority Production Centers initiative. Like her predecessor, she acknowledged that the organization could not “do all the activities we would like to do,” but saw potential for growth in recruiting new participant members from the ranks of current associates. By the time of the conference, Chadwick had already traveled to
San Francisco, Denver, New York, and Jackson, Mississippi, to attend meetings with CPB program officers Augustine Dempsey and Lourdes Santiago and representatives of minority stations. Unlike Schatz, Chadwick seemed to thrive on opportunities to go out in the field and meet with managers and others in the NFCB and the broader public radio system.

Chadwick was equally quick to advocate with the key public broadcasting agencies, drafting budget recommendations to the CPB calling for increased money for training, programming, audience research, and “new tiers of CSGs” appropriate for our stations. At NPR, she participated in negotiations that brought a reduction in the satellite distribution/interconnection [DI] fee for small stations, and a 50% discount in the first year’s fee for newly connected stations. At PTFP, she lobbied for more grants to connect NFCB stations to the satellite. When Congress returned from the summer recess, Chadwick began lobbying for a provision in the FY1988 Budget Reconciliation Bill to create an ongoing and dedicated source of federal funding for public broadcasting derived from revenue from a proposed fee of 2% to 5% on the sale of commercial broadcast licenses. To broaden the appeal of the bill, sponsoring Senators Inouye and Ernest Hollings of South Carolina proposed in the first two years to divert a portion of the revenue from the transfer fee to offset the legacy of federal deficits that had developed during the Reagan years. The bill also contained a proposal to restore the FCC’s abandoned Fairness Doctrine into law. Chadwick pushed hard to get NFCB members directly involved in the advocacy effort, urging them to contact legislators directly to discuss the importance of the bill for the future of community radio.
Chadwick also took steps to cut expenses and raise revenues. The typeset NFCB Newsletter was replaced by the smaller, simpler NFCB News and a series of memo packets, all typed in the office on an IBM Selectric typewriter. By the end of 1987, Publications Director Anderson left the organization. Chadwick eliminated the position. She offered a 10% discount to members who paid their 1988 dues in advance, and imposed a $100 penalty on stations that did not return the annual dues survey. The NEA continued its support of NFCB production training services with a grant of $25,000. When the new board of directors, still operating under the title of the Steering Committee, met in Washington, D.C., at the end of October to consider the long-range plan for the NFCB, Chadwick was determined to bring the financial situation under control.

Looking back, David LePage would recall “the infamous Halloween board meeting” of 1987 as a watershed event when “the board did some very, very strategic decision-making” about the future of the organization. “Where are we going? Here’s what we want to do. Here are the priorities. Here’s how much money we have. Start sticking to the priorities.” By the time they finished with items 1 and 2 on the list, “we had spent all the money.” Everyone agreed that advocacy and representation before the agencies in Washington were the most important activities. There was no money to fund anything else – conferences, new publications, on-site consultations with members. “There was the decision,” recalled LePage. “Staff had to be laid off. Programs had to be cut. We would focus on the priorities.” Though the immediate situation appeared bleak, Rich McClear “had a feeling that we finally had some direction.
I had a feeling that Lynn had some idea of where to take the organization. She had more of a hardheaded approach. I felt good about her being there.”

In November, Chadwick delivered testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Communications in support of the license transfer fee to recast public broadcasting as “a national information system.” “Public broadcasting is charged with creating, distributing and delivering the programming that commercial broadcasters ignore because it is not marketable to advertisers,” Chadwick asserted. “Public broadcasting is in the business of delivering entertainment, education, and news to its audience. Commercial broadcasters are in the business of delivering their audience to advertisers.” Nevertheless, on December 10, the full Senate voted to strip out the trust fund from the deficit reduction bill. The vote also killed the attempt to restore the Fairness Doctrine. Operating on the leanest of budgets, NFCB would have to find other strategies to accomplish its public policy objectives.

**Party of two**

Since his election to the board, David LePage had been enjoying his work with the NFCB more than his position at WORT. By the fall of 1987, he was ready to move on from Madison. His strong leadership style clashed with the collectivist tendencies of the station’s volunteers, and he was tired of the simmering conflict. The process of separation was “not good,” he recalled. “It was a really difficult time at WORT, a difficult time for me.” He resigned without knowing exactly what he would do. Having entered into an extremely low-profile personal relationship with Chadwick, he decided to move to Washington, D.C., in January 1988 to get a new perspective and a
Within a month, Chadwick hired him to recruit new members, collect delinquent dues, and coordinate the 1988 conference, nudging aside Pat Watkins, who could see “things were changing.” She announced her intention to resign following the conference in April, and work with Taylor on an application for a commercial FM license in Missouri. To minimize costs for the Federation, the staff chose to locate the conference in Washington. The location also provided the opportunity for members to meet with members of Congress and representatives of CPB and PTFP.

The circumstances in Washington were dynamic. Ironically, the Reagan administration that had swept into power with a foreign policy triumph in Iran was hamstrung in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scheme to sell weapons to the same hostile government, and direct the proceeds to anti-Communist insurgents in Latin America. On March 17, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and Navy Rear Admiral John Poindexter were indicted on charges of conspiracy to “defraud the United States by illegally providing the Nicaraguan rebels with profits from the sale of American weapons to Iran.” With a lame duck administration fighting charges of corruption, and a presidential election approaching in the fall, Democrats in both houses of Congress felt more confident to flex their muscles on a host of issues, including the reauthorization of public broadcasting. In the House, Representative Markey introduced House Resolution 4118, the Public Telecommunications Act of 1988, to authorize CPB funding through 1993. Under the same title, Senator Inouye introduced a similar measure in the upper chamber as Senate Bill 2114. Key provisions of both bills funded replacement of the aging satellite system, allocation of funds to support the work of independent
television producers, and new financial management procedures at CPB to redirect funds from internal administration to grant programs.\textsuperscript{deccxxv} Hearings on the House bill were scheduled for April 19, just a day after the NFCB conference. PTFP grant applications were scheduled for review on the same day.\textsuperscript{deccxxvi}

Chadwick and LePage believed it was critical to strengthen alliances with the other public broadcasting agencies before the hearings moved forward in Congress. In addition, they believed that NFCB’s ability to serve the broader interests of its members depended on outside funding. “We realized we had to stop the hemorrhaging money,” said LePage, “and to start to focus on the members.”\textsuperscript{deccxxvii} One obvious source of funding was CPB. In January 1988, the Corporation announced Audience 88, a series of studies to be undertaken by Thomas and Clifford and two other consultants to measure and describe the public radio audience, and develop recommendations for programming, membership, resource development and allocation, and policy planning strategies.\textsuperscript{deccxxviii} If the NFCB could serve in a similar consulting capacity, Federation members could receive additional services, and the company would receive additional revenue.

An initiative from Elaine Salazar, a former NFCB station manager who was hired by Dave Taylor as Director of Training for NPR, offered the first opportunity for NFCB to pursue such a consulting project. Under the title Building the Winning Team, NPR and NFCB proposed a series of intermediate and advanced management seminars to be held around the country. With the goal “to translate the system-wide goal of audience service into an individualized station plan of action,” teams comprised of the general manager, development, program, and promotion directors from each participating station
went through a series of exercises over two days to develop marketing and other audience development strategies. Though the project primarily served NPR’s interests and goals, it allowed Chadwick and LePage to involve NFCB stations in a broader system initiative, and allowed them to consult with member stations locally as they traveled the country to facilitate the seminars. “In fact, it didn’t end up serving that great a number of members,” recalled LePage. “It really was NPR’s model. They led it. They said where the workshops would be. But, it was a necessary opportunity. It gave NFCB some credibility across public radio, because we were doing this training with NPR.”

Chadwick put that credibility on the line when she testified before the Senate Subcommitee on Communications in support of the Inouye bill. In expressing support for continued funding for CPB, Chadwick informed the committee, “two thirds of our members do not share in the Federal dollars distributed to public radio because these stations fall short of the current established criteria in terms of their income and staffing.” Then, Chadwick expressed some of the founding principles and objectives of the NFCB: “Their poverty should not be a barrier to participation in the Community Service Grant program. Stations serving rural and minority audiences face extremely difficult financial circumstances….NFCB recommends re-evaluation of the CPB criteria for distribution of Federal dollars in order to serve more people in their communities.”

Chadwick accompanied her testimony with a written statement, describing the efforts of rural, Native American, and Latino stations to serve remote communities, and asserting that “prudent use of federal funding must include service to as many citizens as is possible given available resources.” Inouye questioned
Chadwick: “How should the CPB criteria for radio stations be revised to expand the number of qualified stations without undermining the CPB’s fiduciary duties?”

Chadwick responded, “You have put your finger on the crux of the issue in question. It is difficult to answer because much of the needed data has never been made available. We believe that CPB has gathered many of the information elements needed to redesign the criteria. NFCB has submitted a proposal to CPB to develop the answer.”

In closing, she added, “I base this request on the assumption that public broadcasting should make every effort to fulfill its original mission: to serve those audiences unrecognized by the general media.”

The majority of the testimony of March 15, 1988 centered on issues specific to public television. In addition to Chadwick, the subcommittee heard testimony from NPR President Doug Bennet, and representatives of the Public Broadcasting Service [PBS], the National Association of Public Television Stations [NAPTS], and the Chief Operating Officer of the Children’s Television Workshop, producers of Sesame Street. CPB President Donald Ledwig extolled the “quality and importance” of programming on PBS and NPR, specifically mentioning Sesame Street and the classical music television series Great Performances. Ledwig asked the committee to fund a replacement for the public radio satellite system, and to help the system expand beyond the “300 public radio stations that reach 82% of Americans.”

Ledwig asked for increased funding to help public radio “reach new and underserved audiences by expanding the number of noncommercial stations qualified for CPB support.” In response to a series of pointed questions from Inouye regarding CPB’s eligibility criteria, Ledwig contradicted
Chadwick, asserting that the NFCB “has been an active participant in the development of the current CSG eligibility criteria.” But Ledwig could only assert that NFCB was regularly consulted: He did not mention that NFCB’s recommendations to broaden the CSG program had been ignored for years. In contrast, Chadwick offered the committee a letter from Gibbs Kinderman, station manager at tiny WVMR, the only broadcast service of any kind for West Virginia’s Pocahontas Valley. “We do not qualify for a Corporation for Public Broadcasting Community Service Grant,” wrote Kinderman, “because we are too small....Even $10,000 per year would make a great difference to the WVMR’s of the non-commercial radio world,” operating on annual budgets of $50,000 per year.

In the weeks following the hearing, as NFCB members converged on Washington for the 1988 NFCB Annual Conference, station managers and representatives of dozens of NFCB stations had the opportunity to meet with their Congressional representatives. Kinderman met with Senate committee member Jay Rockefeller, while Rich McClear engaged subcommittee member Ted Stevens, both of whom were already familiar with and supportive of their rural stations. In preparation for meetings with Congress, Chadwick’s testimony was distributed to members through the NFCB News. At the conference, members participated in a series of plenary sessions focused on the Federation’s policy agenda, including “Meshing audience development with community radio’s mission,” and meetings with representatives of CPB, NTIA, NPR, APR, the NEA, and the Public Radio Satellite System [PRSS]. The centerpiece was a Saturday afternoon session moderated by Chadwick, featuring CPB President Ledwig; Antoinette (Toni) Cook, Counsel for the Senate Subcommittee; Jack Mitchell, Chair of
NPR; and Tom Thomas. The topic, “Public dollars and the expansion of public radio,” took up the issues delineated in the authorization hearings, and posed the question, “Is there a potential for expanding the systems and the stations sharing in CPB funds?"

Expansion

At the Public Radio Conference in May 1988, Chadwick and LePage took their case for expansion to the stations of National Public Radio. More stations receiving CSGs and NPPAGs would bring more participants to the satellite system, more money to the emerging marketplace for national programming, and more affiliates for NPR and APR. More affiliates would mean more money for NPR’s representation efforts and training services. Thomas and Clifford agreed: Money available for rural and minority services would give stations an incentive to reach more distant audiences in outlying communities through expanded transmission networks. New revenues from additional listeners and new stations could offset any losses incurred as CSG reductions by individual stations. Expansion of the public radio system made good political and financial sense.

Just one week after the PRC, at a press conference on May 26, CPB created “a major upheaval in the public broadcasting industry,” asserting, “the breach of faith by the public broadcasting community with the Corporation for Public Broadcasting on presenting a unified approach during this key legislative period could jeopardize Congressional authorization for public broadcasting’s funding.” The statement demonstrated the efficacy of NFCB’s advocacy strategies. After hearing from their constituents, Congress was following up with CPB on the questions originally raised by
Inouye. Senator Stevens wanted to know why more CSG money wasn’t flowing to the rural stations that served Native populations in Alaska. Representative Bill Richardson of New Mexico wanted to know about grants to rural, Native, and Latino stations in New Mexico. CPB’s responses were unsatisfactory. By July, the bills were moving through both committees toward a final vote, including an amendment directing CPB to form an outside board “to report to Congress on the initiatives and programmatic efforts of all public broadcasting entities with respect to serving the television and radio needs of minority and diverse audiences.” If CPB was not prepared to address the issues of equity and diversity itself, Congress was ready to force the hand of the agency by overseeing the issue directly, a prospect that must have made Ledwig very uncomfortable.

Realizing that the agency needed to work proactively to avoid the unwanted Congressional mandate, CPB convened a meeting on system expansion on August 3, bringing together representatives of NPR, NTIA, NFCB, and several CPB departments. In preparation for the meeting, Thomas and Clifford, acting as the Station Resource Group, prepared a document titled “Expansion and diversification of Public Radio – Discussion Draft.” Framing the basic opportunity as “creatively managing normal growth and continuing toward the goal of full national coverage,” the report advocated for system expansion and diversification to “foster greater diversity in public radio programming, improved minority service, more opportunities for station specialization, a critical mass of outlets for new national programming, and a broader base to carry system-wide fixed costs.” Thomas and Clifford identified three...
options to encourage expansion: Lower CSG criteria for all stations; a “step-up” path to full qualification; and lower criteria in special circumstances, for stations serving target audiences or providing the only available public radio service to an area.

Chadwick prepared for the meeting by writing and distributing a cover story in the NFCB News that raised provocative points about the system’s perception of public radio and its obligations to the audience as represented in the Audience 88 study. The report documented an enormous opportunity to extend services to the 88% of the general public who did not listen to public radio. Chadwick, however, found fault with the study’s method: Though NFCB member stations operated throughout the U.S., including stations in New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Washington D.C., and Atlanta, “not one NFCB participant member station is in the study.” In fact, the study gathered information “from people who told Arbitron in 1986 that they listened to one of the National Public Radio members stations.” Consequently, “minority audiences, the middle class, the less educated class, the working and unemployed classes, – the 88% of the population open for expansion initiatives – were not part of the study.” Chadwick called these groups “an audience we ought to care about, legally if not morally [emphasis Chadwick].” Noting that the largest stations in the system received the overwhelming share of CPB support, while the smallest stations served this underserved audience, she evoked the foundations of radio broadcasting as public service, asking, “Doesn’t everyone throughout the system share a common belief in the power of mass media to make our world a better place?”
Chadwick credited Rich McClear for the strategy. At a meeting of the NFCB board, McClear observed, “we don’t have any money, so we should seize the moral high ground.” Going back to the years long before CPB and NPR, NCE broadcasting had been dominated by institutional interests associated with colleges and universities. Though these institutions were noncommercial and often public agencies, their classical music, news, and educational programming catered to the elite elements of society. The tendency became even more pronounced as these stations assumed the mantle of Public Broadcasting and sought financial support from well-heeled listeners, businesses, and corporations. As the enabling agency with control over federal funds, CPB policies perpetuated and enhanced this system. From a public policy perspective, Chadwick knew, the system was “totally upside down.” In contrast, the NFCB represented an opposing set of social forces, advocating consistently for the interests of those stations outside the system, particularly those serving rural and minority audiences. Now, those disenfranchised interests were a political asset, as “the system” tried to find a way to meet the expectations of the authorities in Congress.

The Public Radio Expansion Task Force

At the NPR board meeting on October 18, Wayne Roth was elected chair by a unanimous vote. Before becoming the station manager and representative for KUOW Seattle, Roth had been engaged as the manager of NFCB participant member station KVNF in Paonia, Colorado, and a program officer for CPB. In his opening chair’s report he commented, “I view this time and this year as the beginning of a new era.” Roth
called on the board to develop a new strategic plan focusing on system expansion and audience growth.

On November 7, 1988, six days after the election that marked the beginning of the end of the Reagan administration, the President signed Public Law 101-626, authorizing funding of up to $285 million for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting through FY 1993. Though the authorization provided more money for CPB, President Ledwig was dissatisfied with the outcome. He maintained that the bill’s reporting requirements “would restrict CPB by reducing its program funds and the amounts it uses to address the many needs of underserved audiences, such as minorities and children.” Congress was unconvinced. The law directed CPB “to assist radio stations in maintaining and improving service where public radio is the only broadcast service available.” Further, CPB was required “prior to July 1, 1989, and triennially thereafter, to assess and report to the Congress on: (1) the needs of minority and diverse audiences, including racial and ethnic minorities, new immigrants, persons for whom English is a second language, and illiterate individuals; (2) plans of public broadcasting entities to address these needs; [and] (3) ways these broadcasting entities can be used to help the targeted groups.” Further, the law required “annual reports to Congress on public broadcasting services to these groups, minority employment, and CPB efforts to increase the number of minority public stations eligible for financial support.” The bill included $200 million for replacement of the public radio and television satellite interconnection system, and up to $42 million for PTP through FY91.
Thomas credited the efforts of Chadwick and the members of the NFCB for the directives to CPB called for in the report language.\textsuperscript{dccxviii}

One month after the signing of P.L 101-626, the NPR board gathered at the network’s M Street headquarters in Washington D.C.\textsuperscript{dccxix} In addition to Roth and the board members, representatives of the other public broadcasting agencies were in attendance, including Chadwick, Thomas, and Richard Madden, director of CPB’s Radio Program Fund.\textsuperscript{deccxx} After considering several items on the agenda, Roth came around to the language of the new authorization and task of system expansion. Thomas recalled that someone on the board suggested that NPR should form a committee to look into the matter. Thomas cautioned the group, “You’re missing the point. This can’t come from NPR only. We need a different approach, not owned by anybody – NPR, NFCB, CPB.”\textsuperscript{deccxxi} Board member Joan Rubel agreed with Thomas, as did Roth, and eventually the full group. Breaking with NPR’s tradition of looking to itself for answers, the board moved to create an independent panel to investigate and recommend the next steps in the future of public radio. “The Public Radio Expansion Task Force [PRETF] was born in about 30 minutes,” recalled Thomas.\textsuperscript{deccxii}

Over the winter months, Chadwick kept up the pressure on the CPB board. In a letter, she reminded the board, “The CSG program should not be an entitlement solely to the wealthier public stations… To respond to Congress, we should agree to share the CSG dollars among an expanded and diversified public radio system. Further, we should work together as a system, including stations currently unqualified for CPB support, to design the future of public radio.”\textsuperscript{deccxiii} Concurrently, Thomas worked with NPR to
secure funding from one of the historic benefactors of American public broadcasting, Carnegie, to fund the costs of the Task Force. Additional funding came from SRG, NFCB, and the other national organizations. The National Telecommunications Information Administration [NTIA], parent agency of PTFP, agreed to supply research, as did CPB.

The PRETF formed at the invitation of the NPR membership committee on March 2, 1989. The members included Roth, Chadwick, Tom Thomas, Joan Rubel, Hugo Morales, and Bruce Theriault, Senior Vice President and Director of Network Operations for American Public Radio after he left Alaska to complete a master’s degree in public policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Midge Ramsey, NPR Vice President for Representation; Augustine Dempsey, CPB Director of Broadcast Services; and Dennis Connors, Director of PTFP, represented the other national agencies. Tom Livingston, general manager of NPR station WETA in Washington D.C.; and Michael Morgan, director of radio for Mississippi Public Radio, represented NPR member stations. Doug Sweet, general manager of NFCB member station KMUN in Astoria, Oregon, was the sole member of the Task Force affiliated with a station not supported by CPB. As general manager of WOSU AM/FM/TV at The Ohio State University, PRETF chair Dale Ouzts characterized the established system of large, institutional public radio services.

Though Chadwick recognized from the outset that the task force “was not a slam dunk,” she was encouraged that the collective experience of the majority of the members flowed directly from their work for, with, or on behalf of the NFCB. This came as
no surprise to Thomas, because the group was intended to be “representative of something that public radio was - and could be. Quite naturally, that included a lot of the elements that had come through NFCB. People had a lot of shared history. It wasn’t like people were meeting each other for the first time. These issues had been fundamental dimensions of task force members’ careers from the earliest days of their work in radio.”

At their March meeting, the CPB board took the first steps towards fulfilling the Congressional mandate to assist sole service stations by authorizing “an unrestricted initial grant of $4,000 to each station that qualifies under criteria developed by CPB.” Only WVMR qualified for the grant. In a letter to West Virginia Senator and Communications Committee member Jay Rockefeller, Gibbs Kinderman questioned if the grant really qualified as assistance at all, “considering that the base Community Service Grant for the smallest CPB-qualified station is in excess of $20,000 per year,” or was simply intended to fulfill the letter of the law. Chadwick took the matter up directly with CPB Vice President Fred DeMarco, telling him that NFCB members were unwilling to be “the poster children” for public radio, and called the award “insulting.” In reference to CPB support, Chadwick reminded the board, “The stations that will never qualify or have difficulty qualifying should not be viewed as failures. In terms of audience service, they are fulfilling the mission of public broadcasting.”

The task force met for the first time on April 18, 1989 in Washington, D.C., establishing a schedule of four future meetings through November. In addition, the task
force agreed to hold open discussion sessions meeting at the upcoming NFCB conference and NPR’s PRC, scheduled back-to-back in May in the Bay Area. For those unable to attend the meetings, or wishing to submit comments in writing, Ouzts asked for response to a series of questions focusing on effective ways to extend program services to more Americans; improvements to existing stations and development of new ones; the advantages to be realized from a more extensive public radio system; and concerns about and constraints on expansion efforts. Chadwick and Sweet offered to meet informally with NFCB members concerned about expansion during the upcoming conference.

The 15th NFCB Conference and annual business meeting took place in Berkeley, California, May 14 through 17, 1989, in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of Pacifica Radio station KPFA. Expansion was the prominent theme of the conference, taken up in workshops, plenary sessions, and the annual business meeting. Chadwick informed members that the task force was examining ways to accommodate smaller stations in the CSG program, and provide NPPAGs to all interconnected stations, regardless of size, budget, or service. Representing CPB, Dempsey met individually with representatives of stations that intended to qualify for any new expansion programs. B. Morse and Jim McEachern from NPR Satellite Distribution explained the project to replace the satellite system in the coming years, while Thomas Hardy from PTFP advised stations intent on applying for grants to acquire the equipment necessary for satellite interconnection. NFCB participants in Alaska, down the west coast, across the southwest, and along the northern tier from Montana to Wisconsin stood to benefit directly from the expansion initiatives.
The discussions continued over the following week at the Public Radio Conference in San Francisco, attended by Chadwick and representatives of NFCB stations. For many of the NPR affiliates, it was their first contact with the world of NCE radio beyond the borders of the national network. “Most of them didn’t know that every public radio station was not already equipped with a satellite dish,” recalled Chadwick. “Most of them didn’t know how community radio stations actually survived without an institution behind them. They didn’t even know these stations existed.” At subsequent meetings of the taskforce, Gibbs Kinderman came in to discuss the circumstances at WVMR. Representatives of the Native stations in Arizona, New Mexico, Wisconsin and the Dakotas spoke about the conditions of Native radio and life in Indian Country. Rich McClear testified on behalf of APRN and the Alaska stations. For some members of the task force, the conversations brought a new awareness of the diversity of public radio. “They thought public radio was all white bread,” said Chadwick. “It was a real education project. It was back to the moral high ground, and they knew it. Even Dale [Ouzts] got it”

The PRETF published its final report in November 1989. Taking a global view, the committee characterized the options for expansion as a series of initiatives in every aspect of public radio, including programming, interconnection, extension of signal, research, training, and outreach. With regard to the distribution of federal funds, the report contained several recommendations:

- New CPB grants for stations “that use the public radio satellite system, but that do not have the staff, budget, or facilities to qualify for regular grant support.”
• A step-up program “through which stations may initially qualify for limited
support from the Corporation for Public broadcasting under a reduced version of
the criteria employed for Community Service Grants.”

• New CPB funding “to provide financial support to minority controlled stations …
that do not have the staff, budget, or facilities to qualify for regular grant
support.”

• “Funding of additional downlinks through NTIA’s Public Telecommunications
Facilities program. The target for this effort is some 100 college and community
stations that have a commitment to public service programming.”

Ouzts delivered the recommendations to the CPB board on January 22, 1990, calling on
the system “to change its own self perception. We envision a public radio system that is
no longer defined solely in terms of those who garner a specific grant from CPB, or that
affiliate with a particular organization; that is instead shaped as much or more by a shared
mission of public service and participation in the rich and expanding marketplace of
quality programming.”

Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford drafted the report language, the denouement of 15 years of work begun in the months before NARK 1.

Following the final report of the PRETF, it took CPB another year to implement
the recommendations of the Task Force. By November 1990, 27 new stations were
receiving either a Program Acquisition and Assistance Grant (the expanded program that
replaced the NPPAG); or a Step-Up Grant, providing limited support from CPB under a
reduced version of the qualification criteria for the Community Service Grant program.
Fourteen stations, including WVMR, qualified for a recast and more generous Sole
Service Assistance Grant program. In addition, aided in part by new incentives for minority licensees, 7 new stations qualified for full CSGs, including NFCB associate member WDCU. As a consequence of 15 years’ effort by the NFCB, the public radio industry, as recognized by CPB, expanded by more than 15% in 1990: In a single year, the number of stations receiving annual assistance from CPB for station operations, production, and programming jumped from 312 to 360. Over the succeeding years, as the expansion initiatives envisioned by the Task Force took effect, the public radio system nearly doubled: In 2007, CPB provides annual support for more than 700 NCE radio stations.

The expansion initiatives marked a paradigm shift in public radio. As it was conceived in 1971, the public radio system relied on the support of public funds flowing through CPB to established institutions, including NPR, public and private universities, and statewide educational broadcasting authorities. In the struggles over the public treasury that characterized the Reagan years, those institutions came to understand that their continued prosperity depended on their ability to derive support directly from listeners and other private sources. Tom Thomas, Terry Clifford, Hugo Morales, Lynn Chadwick, and those who had operated within the listener-supported paradigm for years were well positioned to bring their knowledge, skills, and experience to the system at a time when the system needed new ideas.

Many of the old guard in public broadcasting adapted to the new paradigm. Others did not. One of the casualties was CPB President Donald Ledwig. During a 1991 hearing on CPB reauthorization before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance, Morales testified to CPB’s continuing inflexibility. In a response to
Congressman Bill Richardson, Morales stated, “Consultation with the system means
essentially a resumption of the status quo.” Noting that only 20% of CPB funds
went to base grants, Morales complained, “Those of us that serve rural people are
punished for that. We get less money. The rich get richer, the poor get poorer.”

Sitting beside Morales, Ledwig endured a withering statement by Richardson regarding
CPB’s poor progress on the issues of minority services and employment. “You haven’t
made much progress,” said Richardson, “and I’m at the point where I think you need
more than reports and jawboning, and as I said, I am currently drafting legislation.”

Unwilling to engage in another fight over Congressional mandates, Ledwig announced
his departure from CPB effective January 1, 1992.

For Chadwick, the successful closure of the PRETF was a turning point for NFCB
and the public radio system, “when we gave these folks a new opportunity to decide what
to do.” In 1970, the public radio system established by CPB encompassed an
exclusive set of institutional licensees, offering limited services that appealed most to the
elite elements of American society. Over the next 20 years, as the diversity and
complexity of American society challenged the institutions of civic and cultural life,
these original public broadcasters demonstrated a limited capacity to comprehend and
respond to the changes going on about them. Community broadcasters provided the
talents, knowledge, skills, and abilities to push public radio in new directions, to become
more open to change and more responsive to listeners. In the process, the National
Federation of Community Broadcasters moved from the margins to the mainstream of
public radio policymaking in the United States. The ambitious goals outlined in Madison at the National Alternative Radio Convention were achieved: The expansion of public radio provided American citizens with a broader and richer system of noncommercial broadcasting to serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”
CHAPTER IX
THE PROMISE AND THE PRICE OF POWER

As a summative historical examination covering a period of 20 years, this study necessarily offers a fairly broad view of the issues and events under investigation. Many of the people, issues, and events included in the study could have been examined in more depth and detail. This study relied primarily on sources originating from or directly connected with the NFCB, it primarily portrays the viewpoint of the founders and those who supported their efforts. This characteristic of the study manifests a conscious decision by the researcher to work with those elements of the historical record that were fairly available, continuous, and complete.

The mechanisms of power

All of the outcomes identified in this study are explained by the theories of political economy. As described by Murdock and Golding, growth is a fundamental characteristic of a system of mass communication. Between 1970 and 1990, the public radio system grew, and NFCB grew along with the system, becoming increasingly intertwined with the other agencies of public broadcasting over the period of fifteen years. Murdock and Golding also cite the influence of state intervention and control in the establishment and development of mass communication systems. Beginning with the reservation of the NCE FM spectrum, the educational broadcasting system that evolved into public radio was the creation of agencies of the state, beginning with the FCC, public schools, colleges, and universities in the late 1940s. Congress intervened directly in the
1960s, providing funding first through HEW, followed in 1967 by the Public Broadcasting Act and the establishment of CPB. Through a network of agencies, the state circumscribed the forms and structures that directed the development of a system of noncommercial broadcasting within a set of narrow confines that would not threaten the interests of private capital in the prevailing market driven system of mass communication.

Spatialization, as described by Mosco, is a process of building alliances to diversify and extend the influence of a mass communication enterprise. In the private sector, spatialization describes a pattern of strategic alliances, mergers, and acquisitions that allows a single company to exert influence across many sectors of the communication economy. A similar pattern of strategic alliances can be found in the development of the public radio sector between 1975 and 1990, as NFCB worked with NPR, APR, Radio Bilingue, Native American Public Telecommunications [NAPT] and independent producers to extend their influence on CPB, PTFP, and Congress. As an outcome of the PRETF, the public radio system became more diverse, reaching more audiences with a wider range of programs.

Structuration, as described by Mosco, is a systematic process that reproduces power relationships through the agencies of the state and the mass media, perpetuating power and privilege for particular groups, especially along the lines of social class. Mosco observes that the erosion of government funding during the Reagan years forced public broadcasting to pay greater attention to the class constituencies, including the corporate and chartable funders who shouldered the funding responsibility. The NFCB
directly represented the interests of a range of minority constituencies, including rural, Latino, and Native stations, and by extension, their audiences. The process of structuration compelled the NFCB to accommodate the goals and objectives of the elites who created and controlled the greater public radio system, including the largest stations, the leadership of NPR, and members of Congress. Without these engagements, the outcomes of the PRETF would not have been realized.

Smythe’s concept of commodification, cited by Murdock, Golding, and Mosco, describes a process where programs are bought and sold in a market, and in turn the audiences for the programs become negotiable commodities in the market for advertising, or in the case of public broadcasting, program underwriting and other forms of private financing. Prior to 1981, the American model of public broadcasting insulated noncommercial broadcasters from the market through the agency of CPB. As market based economic policies gained dominance over the mechanisms of federal authorization and appropriation, public broadcasters turned to private funders to close the gap opened by the severe cuts imposed by the Reagan administration. In the aftermath of the NPR debt crisis of 1983, NPR station managers were no longer content to accept the opinions of NPR management without question, and were ready to consider another model for program development, production, and distribution. Tom Thomas and Terry Clifford saw the opportunity to establish a broader market for public radio programming. Inexorably, and perhaps inevitably, the market model came to dominate the relationship between public broadcasters and their audiences, just as it always has in commercial broadcasting.
For years, the collective will to achieve the outcomes of the PRETF exerted a powerful binding influence on the members of the NFCB. Once those goals were accomplished, the Federation splintered into factions over questions of mission and market. Some, like Marty Durlin of KGNU, maintained that the mission to serve the unserved and give voice to the voiceless was essential to community radio, and that questions of the size and loyalty of the audience should remain subordinate, or even immaterial, to the success of the enterprise. For others like Bill Wax, program director of KBOO and later Director of National Programming for Pacifica, it was “all about the programming.” Without programs that attracted measurable and sustainable audiences, the mission could not survive, regardless of its moral efficacy. The issue dominated the NFCB for most of the next decade, as a coalition of “grassroots radio” stations joined activists from the Pacifica stations to assert the mission-centered paradigm. The controversy was another iteration of the fundamental contradiction confronted by Lew Hill in 1949: How can a radio station offer programming that addresses the margins of social and political culture, and simultaneously gain access to an audience large and/or affluent enough to sustain the station within a market-driven broadcasting system? This fundamental tension between mission and market has never been resolved, and probably never will be.

“I always knew money was not the issue,” said Lynn Chadwick. “In all the workshops, on all the surveys, the members all said we don’t have enough money. The members wanted more money.” From the beginning in the summer of 1975, the leaders of the NFCB attended to this objective. But then something happened the
members did not anticipate. “Once the issue was taken away, they had to face other shortcomings – inconsistent programming, poor governance, staffing issues,” according to Chadwick. ‘Money didn’t fix the problems. And then, some people decided ‘that’s not who we want to be.’ I don’t mind that, but I don’t think they should pretend to be other than they are.’ Subsequent events demonstrate that the outcome of the PRETF was not the panacea envisioned by the founders when they sent Thomas and Clifford off to Washington. But their decisions set in motion a series of actions and events that eventually accomplished the most complex and difficult objective of the NFCB. “We won the war,” said Chadwick. Almost immediately, the war over funding was replaced by a new war, not over matters of public policy, but over the culture and mission of the NFCB.

The view from history

Writing 25 years after NARC 1, Walker asserted, “A great community radio station eschews bureaucracy, gives its volunteers wide latitude, and relies on listeners for most of its funds.” In Walker’s view, a community radio station should be “as diverse, messy, and alive as the community it reflects,” “neither standardized into a predictable sound nor rigidly balkanized.” This is the Milam-Lansman version of community radio, where, at least theoretically, “the listeners feel like family.”

The ideal of Sex & Broadcasting, the Milam-Lansman model where intelligent, engaged, enthusiastic listeners embrace the full range of culture and opinion from the mainstream to the margins of the community, inspired a generation of alternative broadcasters. The problem is, according to Bruce Theriault, “It’s the wrong model.”
Applied to the realm of experience, Lew Hill’s theory of listener-sponsored radio has never worked in the manner he envisioned. Milam’s enthusiasm for the intrepid listener voluntarily supporting the intrepid, independent radio station has never been manifested in a service that could sustain itself financially. Most of the Milam stations licensed in the 1960s and 1970s did not survive. Milam and Landsman sold KDNA, which operated on a commercial frequency, to commercial interests to finance other projects. In the end, the signal proved to be more valuable than the service. Once Milam withdrew the financial safety net from KRAB, KTAO, and KCHU, the stations succumbed to debt. KUSP, the creation of Milam and David Freedman, transformed from a hippie alternative enclave into a professionally managed and operated NPR affiliate. WORT, KBOO, and other stations patterned after Sex & Broadcasting have regularly struggled to keep up with the costs associated with providing power to the transmitter, equipment for the studios, and wages for the few (if any) people who labor 40 or more hours each week to facilitate the efforts of scores of volunteers who produce programs targeted at marginal and niche audiences.

Ideally, as Walker suggests, most of the funds should come from listeners. But Walker’s ideal bumps up against a number of obstacles. Some audiences, such as those living on the reservations of the northern tier or the desert southwest, or in the migrant camps of central and southern California, have little to give. Founders, coordinators, and facilitators cannot sustain their voluntary efforts indefinitely. Costs associated with operating a transmission facility sufficient to broadcast an adequate signal to a major market such as New York and Los Angeles are very high. Equipment fails, technologies
become obsolete, and the next generation of gear is rarely less costly, as evidenced by the conversion from analog to digital transmission systems in the present day. Buildings require maintenance, and eventual replacement. Local services programmed by community volunteers cannot benefit from the economies of consolidation and technology that have driven profitability in the commercial radio industry since the early days of network radio. The question is, once the listeners have given all they are willing to give, who will pay the additional costs and close the gap between sustainability and collapse?

Bill Thomas, Mike O’Connor, Rich and Suzi McClear, Hugo Morales and the other founders of community radio initiatives in the 1970s recognized early on that they had to acquire resources beyond those available from their audiences to sustain their stations and the collective mission of community radio to serve the unserved. This was one of the primary motivations behind the establishment of the NFCB. From the outset, the founding members of the Federation were explicit about their intention to gain access to the federal funds that were not available to small community licensees in the early years of public broadcasting. Undoubtedly, in 1975 some if not most of the participants envisioned a redistribution of CPB resources, drawing dollars away from what they perceived as comparatively affluent institutional stations and redirecting them to unquestionably more needy community stations. A redistribution of the collective assets of public radio would have required a complete restructuring of the political economy of public broadcasting. Invoking similar logic and rhetoric, Lansman and Milam undertook
such a strategy in RM-2493 without success. The problem called for other tactics and solutions.

Schooled at the Wilson Center in the methods and traditions of policy analysis and coalition building, Tom Thomas took a more traditional and gradual approach to political change, beginning with the agency he knew best, the FCC. Success on ascertainment, production training, and similar issues of limited scope allowed Thomas and Clifford to cultivate key relationships with the public broadcasting agencies in Washington D.C. Similarly, they developed productive working relationships with established figures in Washington, such as Nicholas Johnson and Michael Bader, and relied on alliances with other advocacy agencies such as Johnson’s NCCB to advance the formative policy agenda of the newly-established Federation. These tactics brought NFCB to the attention of the dominant interests in public broadcasting, and allowed Thomas and Clifford, and later the similarly schooled Chadwick, to build momentum behind the objectives of the Federation. At the same time, as these strategies moved forward, they allowed the dominant interests in public radio to exert their influence on the Federation agenda. In their efforts to craft workable strategies for the Federation, Thomas and Chadwick invoked their backgrounds in public policy, and may have relied on the thoughts of Edmund Burke: “Every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter.”

In Docket 20735, Thomas and Clifford addressed the needs of NFCB stations to gain access to spectrum, and exert the priority of full-time over part-time broadcasting services. Concurrently, NPR and CPB shared these goals, and in developing an alliance
with NFCB, the agencies quickly understood the advantages that could be gained from a strategic partnership with the dynamic and effective policy team of Thomas and Clifford. Subsequently, when Thomas joined the CPB Radio Advisory Panel, the opportunity allowed him to have ongoing contact inside CPB and advance the NFCB agenda. At the same time, the relationship allowed CPB to acculturate Thomas in the agency’s way of doing business. Over time, Thomas and Clifford gained access to all of the key players in public broadcasting, but during that time they also came to appreciate the needs, interests, and limits of all of the agencies of public broadcasting. Eventually, they made the most of those relationships in their efforts with the Station Resource Group, and for the PRETF.

Throughout the first 15 years of the NFCB, the Federation and the larger public broadcasting industry benefited from growth in the industry and in federal spending. The Federation grew from 24 charter members to 165 participants and associates, while and the number of CPB-supported stations grew to more than 300 before implementation of the PRETF initiatives. Cuts imposed on CPB during the early years of the Reagan administration were restored between FY83 and FY87, while nonfederal revenues from listeners, business, and philanthropies doubled in the decade of the 1980s. As NFCB found in its early years, growth did not pay for growth, but growth provided public radio broadcasters, including the members of the NFCB, with the rationale to leverage public and private resources to benefit their enterprises.

** Significant findings of the study **
The present research illuminates the political economy of public broadcasting within the larger, market-driven system of U.S. commercial mass media through a detailed historical case study of one particular public broadcasting agency. The founders of the NFCB began their collective enterprises to establish and operate noncommercial, listener supported community radio stations through the designated public agency for all broadcasting services in the United States, the Federal Communications Commission. The responsibilities and obligations they assumed under the terms of their FCC licenses led them to engage the other dominant agencies of the public broadcasting system, especially HEW (later PTFP), CPB, and NPR. In the early 1970s, the outcomes of these engagements were often unsatisfactory, leading the founders to establish the NFCB to advocate for the individual and collective needs and interests of participating community radio stations. Over time, the NFCB established functional working relationships with these and other agencies, and engaged directly in lobbying members of Congress for directives in legislation related to public broadcasting to establish initiatives for the benefit of community radio stations and the broader public radio system. The advocacy efforts of the NFCB culminated in the establishment of the Public Radio Expansion Task Force, and subsequent changes in the definition, structure, and implementation of public radio services in the United States.

The study demonstrates that decisive power and control over the political economy of public broadcasting in the United States rests with the U.S. Congress, exercised through its ability to authorize, appropriate, supplement, and rescind programmatic and financial support for the American system of broadcasting generally
and the public broadcasting system in particular. While many of the founders of community radio, including those involved with the NFCB, intended to establish independent, locally controlled, noncommercial radio stations funded entirely by contributions from listeners, efforts to establish such stations proved to be unsustainable. Consequently, the NFCB and its member stations turned to federally funded agencies for opportunities to develop new systematic and financial resources for community radio stations, including the establishment and enhancement of public radio signals, redefinition of restrictions on noncommercial content, and the development of new assistance programs to fund public radio services and activities. The historical record clearly demonstrates the centrality of the U.S. Congress, in its role as the representative and sponsor of geographic and political constituencies, in the emergence, evolution, and continuation of the American system of public broadcasting.

The study addresses one of the significant historical controversies in American community radio. Beginning in the mid-1990s, as pirate broadcasters asserted their shadowy presence on the FM band and began a movement that eventually led to the creation of new class of Low Power FM [LPFM] services in 2000, critics including Bekken, Walker, and Fairchild chastised the NFCB for its role in the Docket 20735 rulemaking and the subsequent dismantling of protections for 10-watt stations. These critics maintain that the NFCB undercut the regulatory safety net that allowed for the establishment of community radio stations at minimal cost. Further, these critics contend that the NFCB neglected the mission of community radio to provide access to and program services for underserved and the unserved constituencies on the public spectrum,
and instead focused its time, energy, and resources on the effort to secure “Money from Washington.” This view oversimplifies and ignores a number of important historical facts.

At the time of Docket 20735, the 4 mHz bandwidth allotted for NCE FM had become clogged by the FCC’s haphazard allocation of the NCE spectrum and the unintended consequences of the FCC’s table of allotments. Applicants for FM licenses found their applications blocked by channels reserved for or occupied by small instructional stations, radio clubs, or larger religious or institutional stations that had received their authorizations in the early years of NCE FM, when spectrum was more easily available. Community stations already on the air found it impossible to extend their signals to underserved and unserved communities, because the existing FCC rules prohibited growth even where the spectrum was unoccupied in some cases. Like their counterparts at NPR stations, the founders of the NFCB quickly realized that a licensee’s greatest asset is its signal: More coverage reaches more listeners. In Docket 20735, the NFCB persuaded the FCC to clear away the increasingly problematic traffic jam on the NCE band that had been developing since 1946. The FCC responded by giving 10-watt stations the opportunity to upgrade their services before the protections on their spectrum were removed. While it is true that the rulemaking removed the possibility of establishing new, low-cost 10-watt services, it also allowed many new, community radio stations of 100 watts or more (with exponentially greater coverage) to come to the air, and other, established stations to extend their services to new audiences. These advances
in community radio would not have taken place without the rules established in Docket 20735.

The study also demonstrates the efficacy of the open marketplace for public radio programming envisioned by Thomas and Clifford. Prior to the financial collapse of NPR in 1983, the network maintained a virtual monopoly over the production and distribution of public radio programs. As the sole recipient of CPB program dollars, and the de facto owner and manager of technology and traffic for the public radio satellite system, NPR had no incentive to engage producers outside the network. The shift of CPB program dollars from NPR to CPB-supported stations put the decision-making power in the hands of program directors, allowing them to buy programming from NPR, acquire programs from other producers, or produce their own programs for the national market. The system was further enhanced when CPB replaced the NPPAG program with the PAAG, which made program funding available for more stations, and the NFCB collaborated with stations to acquire new downlinks through the PTFP, bringing more stations into the market. All of the stations, producers, and content distributors in public radio have benefited from the dynamism and diversity engendered by this approach.

**Limitations of the study**

In the earliest stages of this project, the researcher contacted Lorenzo Milam to solicit his participation as a source for the study. Milam politely but firmly declined, and referred the researcher to the expansive reflections on his career in community radio available in the Walker study. As this effort progressed, the researcher became satisfied
that Milam’s extensive published record, in combination of the recollections of those who worked with him, provided ample evidence to inform the present project.

Because the study relied heavily on the written record available in the various iterations of the *NFCB Newsletter*, the constructed narrative depends extensively on contemporaneous accounts of Tom Thomas, Terry Clifford, Lynn Chadwick, and others who were engaged directly by the organization and had a vested interest in the positive representation of NFCB’s positions, activities, and accomplishments. The researcher made every effort to access other sources, including meeting minutes, correspondence, and individuals outside the NFCB, to verify the assertions and interpret the representations made in the NFCB publication. Without exception, these sources confirmed the general accuracy of the documentary record. Given additional time, more critical sources may have provided additional insights, but such critical sources did not emerge with any significance over the course of nearly four years of research.

One reason that more critical sources may not have been available is the general inadequacy of the documentary record of community radio beyond the sources available through the NFCB. Because it was established as a membership organization, those inside the NFCB who were critical of the efforts and methods of Thomas and Clifford, Schatz, Chadwick and LePage were most often associated with individual member stations, and those records are scattered around the country in station files or collections of personal papers. Earlier collateral studies of individual community stations conducted by the researcher demonstrate that attention to the preservation of historical records varies widely from person to person and station to station. Records reaching back more
than 10 years, let alone those reaching back into the 1970s, are often incomplete or lost entirely. In addition, the available record confirms that those who were involved as participant members and delegates to the organization between 1975 and 1990 were supportive, or at least tolerant, of NFCB’s approach to the public radio system and the objective to secure CPB funding for more community radio stations. As documented by Walker, Lasar, and others, the harshest criticism of NFCB emerged after implementation of the PRETF recommendations. This more recent history lies outside the frame of this project.

As with any study that relies on the recollections of historical actors gathered through in-depth interviews, this project operates within the limitations of human memory. In some cases, the order of historical events and the dates of those occurrences required considerable probing and verification by multiple sources. The date of the KRAB Nebula conference proved to be especially slippery: Five participants recalled the conference in 1972, but contemporaneous documentary sources placed the event in June 1973. Recollections were more easily verified for those events that took place between 1975 and 1990. A more detailed reconstruction of the events and circumstances that took place prior to 1975 would require additional interviews with the sources included in the study, interviews of additional sources not available at the time of the study, or the discovery and acquisition of additional documentary evidence, subject to the limitations and challenges mentioned previously.

The present study tells the story of the NFCB from the viewpoint of the founders. Almost certainly, some will disagree with the findings presented here. An alternate
narrative may be available from other documentary sources and participants not consulted in this project for the reasons mentioned above. Those discoveries, if they are to be made, remain as a project for future historians of community radio.

**Implications**

The emergence of LPFM as a licensed class of noncommercial radio service breathed new life into the NFCB in the first years of the 21st century. The movement to create low power and microradio stations exhibits some striking parallels to events and circumstances that led to the creation of the NFCB. Radio scholar Michael Keith compares Dunifer and Sakolsky’s *Seizing the airwaves*, the 1997 how-to book for setting up unlicensed micro stations, to Milam’s *Sex and broadcasting*. The radical, antiestablishment traditions of community radio can be found in the rhetoric and activities of the Prometheus Radio Project, a Philadelphia-based advocacy organization that works with local organizations to license and construct new LPFM stations across the country. Following the FCC’s authorization of LPFM channels, the NFCB added a staff position to help low power projects apply for licenses, build facilities, and maintain services once they are on the air. In 2006, the NFCB membership roster included 9 LPFM participants and 38 LPFM associates.

LPFM stations face many of the same challenges that confronted the stations of the NFCB in the 1970s. They require capital to replace their aging equipment and continue their operations. Station founders are burning out and leaving their projects in the hands of others. LPFM activists are looking for opportunities to improve their signals and reach more listeners. Some in the LPFM movement wonder out loud if they should
advocate for support from CPB and PTFP. Others remain outspoken in their opposition to any association with public funding agencies or corporate support.

The significant difference between the LPFM stations of today and the stations represented by the NFCB in 1975 can be found in the licenses issued by the FCC. Full power FM stations may operate at a maximum output power of up to 100,000 watts. The founders of NFCB, in competition with much larger NPR and commercial stations, quickly realized the value of a robust signal and extensive geographic coverage, and worked consistently to expand their signals to reach new localities and new audiences through power increases, tower relocations, and networks of boosters and translators. For NFCB, the primary objective of the Docket 20735 filing was to create more opportunities to build new full power community radio stations and expand existing community radio signals. In contrast, LPFM services are restricted to power levels between 10 and 100 watts, and cannot grow beyond these FCC-imposed limits. Constrained by these limited signals, LPFM stations have been permanently consigned to marginal channels. Without changes in the enabling rules and regulations, it is unlikely LPFM will produce the sort of engagement with American audiences that has characterized the public radio system over the past 35 years.

The circumstances of the broadcast radio industry have changed substantially since the early years of the NFCB. The stations of the Federation shared a common interest in providing access to the airwaves for individuals and populations who were absent from the mainstream of commercial radio. In the present, citizens have access to many more channels of communication, and the technologies associated with mass
communication have moved beyond a very limited number of professional facilities into schools, libraries, churches, and most significantly, homes. The convergence of audio production, computing, and network technologies has removed the requirement for studios, transmitters, towers, and antennas. The audio production tasks that used to require a professional production facility can now be accomplished with a personal computer, a low cost microphone, and one of several free audio production applications. If the computer is portable, it serves as a remote studio, capable of production at any location. Audio content can be distributed worldwide over the Internet for free through publicly accessible networks, or through any Internet service provider for the cost of a monthly subscription. Listeners are no longer limited to a few geographically defined program services offering fixed schedules on an appointment basis. Listeners can acquire audio content from all over the world over the Internet on any personal computer, and thanks to the Apple iPod and similar personal, portable listening devices, they can engage content when and where they choose. In 1975, producers, distributors, and listeners turned to the NFCB to overcome the scarcity of content and constraints on delivery. Today, producers, distributors, and listeners must come to terms with the overwhelming number of options available for production, delivery, and reception of audio programming in a globalized mass media system.

For community broadcasters like David Freedman, general manager of NFCB participant member station WWOZ New Orleans since 1992, radio has become just one of many channels capable of delivering content to listeners. “My job on that radio program now is to get you to that web site,” says Freedman. “That’s what broadcasting is
for. It’s casting a broad net. I’m trolling. Then, if I catch enough people, I send them over to the web site. That’s the correct application. It’s the highest and best use of that technology. The one thing that does not change is that now, our desire to make available all the stuff that’s not mainstream, it can actually work now.”

Retired from the broadcasting business for several years, Dave Taylor points to blogs such as Daily Kos as the newest iteration of democratic media. “The new community radio for politics is all on the Internet,” says Taylor. “It will be like Madison or Telluride was for community radio. It’s huge. Anybody can write a diary.” Comparing the blogosphere of today with the counterculture of his youth, Taylor asks, “Is this the movement? Is this one place it can coalesce, like it did around community radio in the 70s?”

Taylor finds that the political and cultural community of the Internet lacks the sense of unity he felt in community radio: “I don’t think it has the kind of national consensus of different groups in different parts of the country coming together like it did back in the 70s.”

Only time will tell if any of the political and cultural movements on the Internet will serve the same purposes and provide the same services that characterized community radio in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Only recently have centers of power on the Internet started to emerge and coalesce around issues of access, control, content, delivery, reception, and representation. As they have since the days of the first broadsheets, content producers will continue to play a major role in the relationship between service providers and users. Legacy media producers and distributors, including NPR, are competing directly with on-line services for the attention of citizens and consumers. The stunning profitability of Google demonstrates that search engines and portals such as
Digg.com serve an important function in an environment saturated by information. With the notable exception of regulations intended to limit sexual content, political leaders have stayed the hand of regulation, content to allow the “invisible hand” of the market drive the growth and development of the Internet. Scholars and activists worry that the unregulated marketplace has already become an oligopoly that primarily serves the needs and interests of major media conglomerates. The issue of network neutrality, now pending before Congress, provides a significant test, pitting the regulatory powers of government against the market powers of private capital. The outcome will dictate how the Internet will serve the needs and interests of American citizens for years to come.

Suggestions for further research

Though he has been widely recognized in community radio and the alternative press, the story of the life and influence of Lorenzo Milam should be shared with a broader audience. As an intellectual, author, broadcaster, and social activist, Milam has been a significant figure in social and cultural movements including the beginning of community radio in the 1950s, the recognition of rights for the disabled in the 1980s, and the emergence of online publishing at the turn of the 21st century. While he continues to reside in Mexico and publishes online in the Review of Arts, Literature, Philosophy, and the Humanities (RALPH), Milam’s lifelong battle with polio and his advancing age have made his interactions with the wider world less frequent. Milam’s autobiographical works provide a rich and detailed first person account of his views and experiences. In contrast, the accounts of the individuals consulted in this project who knew and worked
with him often varied from the Milam version. These circumstances suggest that a Milam biography would prove to be a fascinating and rewarding undertaking.

Many community radio stations have rich histories, and founders such as Jeremy Lansman, Mike O’Connor, Rich and Suzi McClear, Pat Watkins, and others provide excellent resources for those interested in exploring the evolution of particular community radio stations and the audiences they serve. Lasar has studied Pacifica from the network perspective, and a few individuals have written about their experiences at KPFA and WBAI. Building on these efforts, any one of the five Pacifica stations provides an opportunity for scholarly investigation. Beyond Pacifica, many community radio stations offer rich cultural histories, characterized by interesting and often inspired individuals producing unique local programs, and the audiences and communities they serve. Though it has now been off the air for more than 30 years, Lansman’s KDNA deserves special attention. WORT Madison has broadcast continuously for the past 35 years, offering an unbroken record of service to a receptive audience in a dynamic community. Across the U.S., dozens of community stations deserve the attention of media historians as sites of political and cultural expression, activism, and resistance.

When the research for this project was first undertaken in the spring of 2003, it was envisioned as a grand cultural narrative of the places, people, and agencies that shaped community radio in the United States. Over time, it became clear to the researcher that scope of such an effort would far exceed the available time, resources, and expertise. The history of the NFCB has yet to be woven together with other equally important histories of the visionaries, activists, and broadcasters, and the technologies,
agencies, and political, social, and cultural movements that enabled the evolution of American community radio after World War II. The history of the NFCB forms just a small piece of a larger story that is waiting to be told.

Notes


6. Ibid. 33-34.


9. Ibid. 5.

10. Ibid.


13. Witherspoon, Kovitz, Avery, and Stavitsky, 82.


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xxi. Ibid.


xxiii. Ibid. 223.

xxiv. Ibid. 231.


xxvii. Ibid. 31.
xxviii. Ibid. 30.


xxxi. Ibid. 368.

xxxii. Ibid. 371.


xxxiv. Ibid. 212.


xxxvi. Ibid. 563.

xxxvii. Ibid. 566.


xl. Ibid. 4.


xlii. James Tracy, Direct action: Radical pacifism from the Union Eight to the Chicago Eight, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996, xv.


xliv. Ibid. 42.


xlvi. Ibid.


xlviii. Ibid. 99.
lix. Fairchild, 166.
liv. Ibid. 167.
lvi. Ibid. 145.
lvii. Ibid. 146.
lx. Ibid. 134.
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lxxiii. Ibid.

lxxiv. Ibid.


lxxvi. Ibid.


lxxviii. Ibid. 85-92.

lxxix. Smythe, 1960, 563.

lxxx. Ibid. 564.

lxxxi. Ibid. 569.


lxxxv. Ibid.


xc. Ibid. 183.

xci. Ibid. 196.
xcii. Ibid. 204.

xciii. Ibid. 212.

xciv. Ibid. 219.

xcv. Garnham, 250.


xcviii. Ibid. 134.

xcix. Ibid. 132.

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ci. Ibid.

cii. Ibid.


civ. Ibid. 218-219.

cv. Ibid.


cviii. Ibid. 24.

cix. Ibid. 56.

cx. Ibid. 195.


cxii. Ibid. 33.


cxiii. Ibid. 37.

cxv. Williams, 1975, 28.

cxvi. Ibid. 30.

cxvii. Ibid. 31.


cxxi. Ibid. 363.


cxxiii. Ibid. 5.

cxxiv. Ibid. 6.

cxxv. Ibid.

cxxvi. Ibid.

cxxvii. Ibid.

cxxviii. Ibid. 7.


cxxx. Milam, 1975, 43.

cxxxi. Barlow, 81.

cxxxii. Ibid. 83.


cxxxiv. Barlow, 100.

cxxxv. Fairchild, 92.

cxxxvi. Lewis and Booth, 1990, 9.

cxxxvii. Ibid. 8.

cxxxviii. Ibid. 120-121.

cxxxix. Mosco, 89.
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cxl. Mosco, 27-29.

cxlii. Ibid. 64.
cxlvi. Ibid. 34.
cxlvii. Ibid.
cxlviii. Ibid.
cxlx. Startt and Sloan, 182.
clix. Ibid.
cliv. R.M. Entman, “Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm,” quoted in McQuail, 343.
clv. Ibid. 344.
clviii. Lindlof and Taylor, 17.
lx. Ibid.
lxi. Peter Johansen, “For better, higher and nobler things,” *Journalism history*, v.27 n.3, 2001, 94.
lxii. Startt and Sloan, 158.
Startt and Sloan, 179.

Marshall and Rossman, 150.

Lindlof and Taylor, 218.


Lindlof and Taylor, 215.


Ibid. 17.

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Walker, 15.


Ibid.


Ibid. 5.


Ibid. 30-32. See also Barnouw, 1966, 42.

Lewis, 69.


Walker reports that “the number of active stations grew rapidly, from about 150 in 1905 to around 600 in 1910 to more than 10,000 in 1914,” 16.

See Barnouw, 1966, 28-32.

Sterling and Kitross, 40.

Ibid. 42.
clxxxii. Ibid. 43


clxxxiv. Sterling and Kitross, 95. 360 meters is the equivalent of 833 kilohertz frequency on the AM band.


clxxxix. Ibid.

cxc. Sterling and Kitross, 57.

cxci. Ibid. 58.


cxiii. Sterling and Kitross, 63.

cxiv. Walker, 29.

cxv. Barnouw, 1966, 61

cxvi. Sterling and Kitross, 45. See also Barnouw, 34-35.

cxvii. Barnouw, 1966, 64.


cxix. Ibid. 28.


cxxi. Barnouw, 1966, 94.

ccii. Sterling and Kitross, 94.

cciii. Many of the original Class A AM stations survive to this day, including WABC (originally WJZ) New York, KOA Denver, and KGO San Francisco. Under the right nighttime weather conditions, the signals from these stations can still be heard over vast areas of the U.S. An explanation of the FCC’s AM station classes is available on the Commission’s web site at <http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/amclasses.html>.


cxv. Sterling and Kitross, 119.
McChesney, 1994, 14


Sterling and Kitross, 92.


Ibid. 301-302.

Craig, 67.

McChesney, 1994, 21-22.

Barnouw, 1966, 301.

FRC 1929, quoted in McChesney, 1994, 27.

Ibid.

Walker, 40.

Witherspoon, Kovitz, Avery, and Stavitsky, 6.

S.E. Frost Jr., *Education's own stations: the history of broadcast licenses issued to educational institutions,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1937.


Lewis, 248.

Ibid. 269.

Among the Americans prominent in the interwar pacifist movement was a young Edward R. Murrow, president of the National Student Federation of America in 1930-31. The NSFA provided Murrow with the introduction to the people, politics, and culture of western Europe.


Lasar, 14.


Lasar, 25.


Issel, 437.

Ibid. 44.

Lasar, 46.

Ibid. 56-64.

Ibid. 68.

Ibid. 69.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Lasar, 164.

Walker, 55.

Walker, 62-63.


Walker, 64.

Milam, 1984, 104.


Ibid.

Milam, quoted in Walker, 64.


Ibid.

Ibid. Though Milam’s efforts were unsuccessful, Pacifica would eventually license WPFW FM in Washington D.C. in 1977.

Ibid.

Milam, 1984, 127-134.

Milam, 2004, 12.

Milam, 1984, 135

Ibid.


Ibid. 12

Walker, 80.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, attributed to John Bevelan.

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cclxxii. Ibid. Also Walker, 81.
cclxxiii. Walker, 82.
cclxxv. Ibid. pp 3-5.
cclxxvi. Lorenzo Milam, Sex and broadcasting,“ Los Gatos, Dildo Press, 1975, 43.
cclxxviii. Walker, 82.
cclxxxvi. Walker, 87.
cclxxxix. Ibid. 38-39.
cclx. Ibid.
cclxi. Ibid.
cclxii. Ibid. 40.
cclxiii. Federal Communications Commission, Form 340 Application for authority to construct or make changes in a noncommercial educational TV, FM or standard broadcast station,” submitted by the Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 22 December 1965, s.V-B 1 and exhibit 1 1-5.
cclxiv. Walker, 89.
cclxv. Walker, 89-90; Christiansen, 5.

. Ibid.


. Witherspoon, Kovitz, Avery, and Stavitsky, 10.


. William Harley, interview by Burton Harrison, interview transcript, *The public radio oral history project*, National Public Broadcasting Archive, College Park, University of Maryland, 29 October 1978, 9

. Ibid.

. Ibid.


. Avery and Pepper, 23.

Avery and Pepper, 23; Witherspoon et al, 13-14.


Ibid. 183-5.

Sandler, interview with Harrison, 20.


Lasar, 221.

Ibid. 185.


Milam, 1975, 229.

Gitlin, 211.

Sterling and Kitross, 433.


Walker, 106.

The Woodstock Music and Art Fair, billed as “3 days of peace and music” drew more than 300,000 to the rural area around Bethel, New York in August, 1969.


Donham, 30-31.

Ibid.

Ibid. 31.

Milam, 1975, 351.


Milam, 1975, 154-155.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. 158.

Rubin interview.

Haertig interview.


Freedman interview.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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ccclxiv. Lorenzo Milam, in a letter to radio stations, 9 March 1975. Correspondence file, National Federation of Community Broadcasters, Oakland, California.

ccclxv. Ibid.


ccclxviii. Ibid.


ccclxx. Ibid.

ccclxxi. Ibid.


ccclxxiii. Ibid.

ccclxxiv. Ibid.

ccclxxv. Ibid.

ccclxxvi. Bill Thomas, in a letter to radio stations, 28 April 1975, National Federation of Community Broadcasters, Oakland, California.

ccclxxvii. Ibid.

ccclxxviii. Ibid.

ccclxxix. Bill Thomas, in a letter to radio stations dated between 9 March and 28 April 1975, National Federation of Community Broadcasters, Oakland, California.
Several underground newspapers joined together in the late 1960s to form the Liberation News Service, but the operation fell apart as the participants succumbed to organizational friction and financial hardship, described by Peck, 1985.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Lasar, 168.

Rich McClear interview.

Ibid.

Ibid.

The historical record offers conflicting spellings of the conference title and the acronym. Some documents, including the front cover of the event program, use a capital K to spell Konvention. Other documents use conventional spelling, including the rear of the event program. With the exception of direct references to the title printed on the convention program cover, the C spelling is used here to demonstrate consistency between the acronym and the associated colloquialism.


Rich McClear interview.


Lorenzo Milam, *NARC* program, 3-4.

*NARC* program, 9.

Ibid. 8.

cdii. NARC program, p.11.

cdiii. Theriault interview.

cdiv. Ibid.

cdv. Ibid.

cdvi. Ibid.


cdixi. Ibid. 1.


cdixiv. Ibid.

cdixv. Ibid.

cdixvi. Ibid.


cdixviii. Ibid.

cdixix. Ibid. 13-14.

cdixx. Ibid.

cdixxi. Ibid. 16.

cdixxii. Ibid.

cdixxiii. Ibid. 3.

cdixxiv. Ibid. 7.

cdixxv. Ibid. 8.

cdixxvi. Ibid.

cdixxvii. Ibid. 6.

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cdixxix. Ibid. 11-12.
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Ibid. 9.
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Rubin interview.
Ibid.
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Ibid. 4-5.
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Ibid.
National Federation of Community Broadcasters [NFCB], untitled newsletter, v.1 n.2, 1 October 1975, 3.
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NFCB, untitled newsletter, v.1 n.2, 1 October 1975, 2.


dv. Ibid.

dvi. Ibid.

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dviii. Ibid.

di. Federal Communications Commission, 75-946: In the matter of RM-2943 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Washington D.C., 1 August 1975, 941-942. In The petition against God, Milam claimed the FCC received 1.5 million letters.

dii. Ibid.

diii. Ibid. 945.

div. Ibid. 950.

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dvi. NFCB, untitled newsletter, v.1 n.3, 15 October 1975, 1.

dvii. Ibid.

dviii. Ibid.

NFCB, NFCB Newsletter, v.1 n.5, 15 November 1975, 1,3.

dix. Ibid.

dxi. NFCB/ Possible Tape Exchange, untitled catalog, 1975, 1.

dxii. NFCB Newsletter, v.2 n.1, 26 January 1976, 5-6.
Ibid.

Ibid. 1, 3-4.

Ibid. 7.

*NFCB Newsletter*, v.1 n.6, 1 December 1975, 2.

*NFCB Newsletter*, v.2 n.1, 26 January 1976, 8.


*NFCB Newsletter*, v.2 n.4, 8 March 1976, 1.

Ibid. 3-4.

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*NFCB Newsletter*, v.2 n.7, 3 May 1976, 1,4.

Ibid. 1.

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*NFCB Newsletter*, v.2 n.6, 5 April 1976, 1,4.

*NFCB Newsletter*, v.2 n.7, 19 April 1976, 3.


*NFCB Newsletter*, v.2 n.10, 31 May 1976, 2.

*NFCB Newsletter*, v.2 n.11, 14 June 1976, 3.


Ibid. 2, 33-38, 12-18.

Ibid, 17.

Rich McClear interview.

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O’Connor interview.

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*NFCB Newsletter*, v.2 n.12, 12 July 1976, 2-3.

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*NFCB Newsletter*, v.3 n.1, January 1977, 1.
. Ibid.

dxx. Rubin interview.

dxxi. Milam (as Allworthy), 1975, 21.

dxxii. Tom Thomas, “Tuning up the band,” NFCB Newsletter, v.3 n.4, April 1977, 4.

dxxiii. Rubin interview.


dxxv. NFCB Newsletter, v.3 n.6, June 1977, 3.

dxxvi. NFCB Newsletter, v.3 n.3, March 1977, 1.

dxxvii. NFCB Newsletter, v.3 n.7, July 1977, 4.

dxxviii. Ibid. 1.

dxxix. Ibid. 4.

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dxxxiv. Ibid. 19-21.

dxxxv. NFCB Newsletter, v.3 n.9, October 1977, 1.

dxxxvi. NFCB Newsletter, v.3 n.8, September 1977, 1.


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dxxxix. Theriault interview.

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“We were very fond of the *NFCB Newsletter,*” recalled attorney John Crigler in a 2006 interview with the author. “Mike Bader – he used to get the *Newsletter* and he would read it, because he read everything, and then he would drop it in my office and he would say, ‘this is the best newsletter in the broadcast business. It’s got more information, more succinctly summarized than anything else out there.’”


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