

2023

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Recommended Citation

Jones, Dhivan Thomas (2023) "From Nothing to No-thing-ness to Emptiness: the Buddhist Recycling of an Old Jain Saying," *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies*: Vol. 22, Article 3.

Available at: <https://digitalcommons.linfield.edu/iijbs/vol22/iss1/3>

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From Nothing to No-thing-ness to Emptiness: the Buddhist Recycling of an Old Jain Saying

Dhivan Thomas Jones*

Introduction

What we call ‘Buddhism’ has had a distinctive self-identity as a religious tradition since the lifetime of the Buddha, and it is therefore easy to overlook the fact that the Buddha’s own teaching emerged from a particular context and began life by distinguishing itself from that context. The Buddha’s cultural context, in ancient north India, would have included Brahmanical culture based on Vedic literature, but his more direct context was the religious and cultural milieu of the *śramaṇa* movement of ‘Greater Magadha’.¹ While we may doubt the precise historical authenticity of much of early Buddhist literature, which is our only witness for the life of the Buddha, one feature of the Buddha’s life seems indubitable: that he was a *śramaṇa*, an ‘ascetic’.² Like other *śramaṇas*, he left home as a young person and took up a wandering, homeless life, living on alms given by supporters, and practising meditation in order to reach the goal of *mokṣa*, or ‘liberation’ from *samsāra*, the round of rebirth. And, after his Awakening, he engaged in discussion and debate with other *śramaṇas*, to test their understanding and potentially to convert them to his own teaching.

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¹ The phrase ‘Greater Magadha’ is from Bronkhorst (2007), while the same distinction of Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical (*śramaṇa*) cultures is made in Samuel (2008).

² This is nicely evoked by Carrithers (1983: 20–21).

In the *Aṭṭhakavagga* ('Chapter of the Eights') of the *Sutta Nipāta*, the Buddha speaks against engaging in fruitless debate about speculative views.³ But in other discourses from early Buddhist literature, the Buddha engages in highly critical debates with groups of fellow ascetics whom he calls *nigaṇṭhas*, and whom we would call Jains, followers of Mahāvīra, whom the Buddha called 'Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta'.⁴ It would appear that the Buddha felt a particular need to distinguish his teaching from that of the Jains, presumably because they were similar enough to risk being confused, while in fact differing enough for any confusion of the two to be misleading about the Buddha's own teaching. The Jain teaching on *karma* and its results is the main example, since the Buddha also taught *karma*, but denied the deterministic Jain view that "Whatever an individual person experiences, whether pleasant or painful or neither pleasant nor painful, it is entirely caused by what was done in the past" (A 3: 63 PTS I 173).⁵ However, the Buddha also made a practical point of distinguishing his way of life from that of the Jains. He denied that it is necessary or desirable to endure painful self-torture in order to wear out past *karma*, and instead he taught the benefits of meditative happiness.⁶

Early Buddhist discourses also show the Buddha taking ideas current in the *śramaṇa* context and re-interpreting them in a way consonant with his own teaching.⁷ In this article I take up what appears to be an old Jain saying given in Pāli texts as:

*n'āhaṃ kvacani kassaci kiñcanatasmim, na ca mama kvacani
kismiñci kiñcanat' atthi*⁸

There is no I anywhere in anyone's property, and neither is there anywhere in anything property which is mine.

³ Especially Sn 4: 3–5, 8, 9.

⁴ See Balbir (2000: 2–4) for details.

⁵ The deterministic Jain view, as represented by the early Buddhists, contrasts with the fatalistic views of the Ājīvikas, who did not believe one could change one's karmic destiny.

⁶ The contrast of the Buddha's teaching with that of the Jains is nicely demonstrated by the *Devadaha Sutta*, M 101 PTS II 214–228.

⁷ Another example is an annihilationist view, re-purposed by the Buddha as an aid to insight reflection; I will return to this parallel case below.

⁸ There are in fact many textual variants of this formula, and what is presented here is the regularised commentarial version, as discussed below.

This enigmatic saying, of which there are many textual variations in the Pāli tradition, is attributed to the Jains at A 3: 70, where the Buddha accuses them of false speech, because their teachers declare this saying on the *uposatha* ('observance') day, while they know perfectly well that they have a social identity as a person, since they use the words 'I' and 'mine' as family members. But at A 4: 185 the Buddha cites the same saying as a *brāhmaṇasacca* ('brahman truth'), which a true brahman can declare truthfully, as a means to practice the way to the state of having nothing (*ākiñcañña*). And in the *Āneñjasappaya Sutta* at M 106, the Buddha presents the same saying as a way in which a practitioner may enter the experiential dimension of no-thing-ness (*ākiñcaññāyatanam*), a refined meditative state, conducive to insight and liberation. In the commentarial tradition, especially in the *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa (Vism PTS 654), this same saying is referred to in relation to the meditative practice of 'four-cornered emptiness' (*catukoṭikā suññatā*), belonging to the final insight stages of meditative cultivation. The old saying has been borrowed out of the Jain context, and re-purposed by the Buddha and the Buddhists as an invocation of a meditative state.

However, the exact significance of this old saying, and even its Pāli form, is hard to determine. As Ñāṇamoli writes, in regard to the citation of the saying in the *Visuddhimagga*, 'The passage is a difficult one'.⁹ Both Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi have discussed the meaning of the old saying, and Bhikkhu Anālayo has also indicated parallels to the saying in other sources. In addition to the testimony of early Buddhist texts preserved in Pāli, there is a version of this old saying preserved in the *Āyāraṅga Sutta*, an early Jain scripture, which gives us a better sense of its meaning in context. Another version of the saying is preserved in Sanskrit in a parallel to A 4: 185. Furthermore, a version of the same old saying in an early Buddhist commentarial text preserved in a Gāndhārī fragment allows us another perspective on the Pāli version.¹⁰ These non-Pāli witnesses allow me to put forward a

⁹ Vism trans. Ñāṇamoli (1956) Ch.XXI §53 n.19.

¹⁰ This article is more or less footnotes to the scholarship of Bhikkhu Anālayo, through which I have found most of the important sources discussed, as well as footnotes to the translations and notes of Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi.

conjecture about the original form of the old saying, and the subtle but important change made by the Buddha in order to re-deploy it in his own teaching. My conjecture is that the Buddha changed a Jain saying concerning soteriological isolation, into one concerned with practical non-possessiveness, and then into a saying that promoted a meditative state. This in turn became part of a Theravādin tradition of evoking the meditative experience of emptiness (*suññatā*). Hence, with the help of the testimony from the Jain scriptures, a Sanskrit version, and the testimony of the Gāndhārī Buddhist fragments, it becomes possible to trace one small part of the process by which the Buddha's teaching emerging out of the shared *śramaṇa* context and became a distinct tradition.

Textual variation in the Pāli version

What Nāṇamoli describes as a 'difficult' passage occurs in three places in Pāli discourses as well as in several further places in commentarial literature, with variations. I summarise these variations in the table below, in order to demonstrate that they are minor, although questions remain.

A 3: 70 B^c <i>B^c variants</i>	n'āhaṃ	kvacani kassaci	kiñcanatasmim <i>kiñcanattasmim</i> <i>kiñcanatasmī</i>	na ca mama	kvacani katthaci <i>kismiñci</i> <i>kassaci</i>	kiñcanatatti <i>kiñcana</i> <i>nāthi</i> <i>kiñcanatthi</i>
A 3: 70 PTS <i>PTS variants</i>	n'āhaṃ	kvaci kassaci <i>kvañcāni,</i> <i>kvacani</i>	kiñcaṇaṃ tasmim <i>kiñcana,</i> <i>kiñcanatasmim</i>	na ca mama	kvaci kassaci <i>kvañcāni,</i> <i>kvacani</i>	kiñcaṇaṃ n'atthi <i>kiñcana</i>
A 4: 185 B^c <i>B^c variants</i>	n'āhaṃ	kvacani kassaci <i>kvacana,</i> <i>kvacini,</i> <i>kvaci</i>	kiñcanatasmim	na ca mama	kvacani katthaci	kiñcanatatti
A 4: 185 PTS <i>(no variants)</i>	n'āhaṃ	kvaci kassaci	kiñcaṇaṃ tasmim	na ca mama	kvaci katthaci	kiñcaṇaṃ n'atthi
M 106 B^c <i>B^c variants</i>	n'āhaṃ	kvacani kassaci <i>kvacini</i>	kiñcanatasmim <i>kiñcanattasmim</i> <i>kiñcanatasmī</i>	na ca mama	kvacani kismiñci	kiñcaṇaṃ n'atthi
M 106 PTS <i>PTS variants</i>	n'āhaṃ	kvacani kassaci <i>kvacini</i> <i>kucana</i> <i>kassaci</i>	kiñcanatasmim	na ca mama	kvacani kismiñci <i>kucani</i> <i>kismici</i>	kiñcaṇaṃ n'atthi
Atthakathās	n'āhaṃ	kvacani kassaci	kiñcanatasmim	na ca mama	kvacani kismiñci	kiñcanatatti

The variations on the spelling of *kvacani* seem insignificant, but the alteration of *katthaci* ('anywhere'), *kassaci* ('of anyone') and *kismiñci* ('in anything') effects the sense. More significant, however, is the question of what *kiñcanatasmim* represents grammatically.¹¹ The commentary regularly glosses it as *kiñcanabhāve*, 'in reference to being something', but nevertheless it may also represent *kiñcanaṃ tasmim* or *kiñcanat' asmim*, with significant changes in meaning.¹² Likewise, some scribes or reciters in the Pāli tradition seem to have wanted to sort out the ambiguous closing words, *kiñcanat' atthi*, by rendering them *kiñcanaṃ n'atthi*. In short, the textual variants noted above appear to represent uncertainties about what the old saying means as well as what it says. Through the following discussion I will attempt to re-construct the old saying in a way which is clearer as to both form and meaning. Meanwhile, I will take the Pāli commentarial reading as standard, if only because it preserved the saying in a form which the commentators have analysed enough to remove ambiguity.

An old Jain saying

In the *Uposatha Sutta* (A 3: 70 PTS II 205–15), the Buddha gives a discourse to his female lay-follower, Visākhā, after she tells him that she is observing the *uposatha*, or observance day.¹³ The Buddha describes three kinds of *uposatha*: (i) that of cowherds, (ii)

¹¹ Cone (2001: 685) reads *kiñcanatasmim* as locative singular of *kiñcanatā*, an abstract noun from *kiñcana*, and meaning '(the state of being) a possession, a property', the translation I follow here. However, she also guesses that *kiñcanatasmim* represents *kiñcanat' asmi* (i.e. *kiñcanatā asmi*), which I will suggest below preserves some truth. The citations that Cone gives for the peculiar word *kiñcanatā* are only from the old saying and from later commentaries on it. I will conclude below that this is evidence for what may turn out to be an artefact of a mistaken tradition of transmission.

¹² See, for instance, what Woodward makes of A 4: 185 in his translation (1933: 183–4): he reads the Pāli as *kiñcana; tasmim*, and renders the saying as, 'I have no part in anything anywhere, and herein for me there is no attachment to anything.'

¹³ At A 1: 259 (PTS I 26), the Buddha describes Visākhā Migaramātā as 'foremost among those who give (*dāyikā*)'. At Ud 8: 8 PTS 91–2, she also approaches the Buddha in the middle of the day.

that of Nigaṇṭhas, and (iii) that of Noble Ones. Someone who observes the cowherds' *uposatha* only thinks about the food they have eaten today and will eat tomorrow, like a cowherd thinking about where the cows have grazed today and will graze tomorrow. This, of course, is not a very effective way to observe the *uposatha*, and the Buddha does not recommend it. The second type of observance is called the Nigaṇṭha's *uposatha*, after the ascetics called Nigaṇṭhas, whom we would call Jains, the teachers among whom rouse their disciples to practice the *uposatha* in two ways. They firstly incite them not to harm living beings (*pāṇā*, 'beings that breathe') who live more than 100 *yojana*s (700 miles) away. In this way, claims the Buddha, the Nigaṇṭhas enjoin sympathy and compassion for some living beings but not for others. However, as Bhikkhu Bodhi observes concerning the Buddha's words here: 'This, it seems, is contrary to the Jain teaching, which enjoins strict nonviolence (*ahiṃsā*) in regard to all beings under all conditions'.¹⁴ The Buddha goes on to say that the Nigaṇṭhas secondly incite their disciples as follows, citing the saying which is our theme:

'They [nigaṇṭhas] rouse the disciple on the *uposatha* day in this way: "Heh, you there, man, take off your clothes and speak in this way: "There is no I anywhere in anyone's property, and neither is there anywhere in anything property which is mine."'
[*n' āhaṃ kvacani kassaci kiñcanatasmim, na ca mama kvacani kismiñci kiñcanat' atthī ti*]¹⁵

However, the Buddha also ridicules this whole enterprise. He goes on to say, presumably of the disciple who follows the Nigaṇṭha teacher's instruction:

'But his mother and father know him, thinking "this is our son," and he knows them, thinking "these are my mother and father". His wife and children know him, thinking "he is our provider",

¹⁴ In Bodhi (2012: 1657 n.475). The great vow (*mahāvratā*) of non-harming (*ahiṃsā*) is the first of the vows undertaken by Jain ascetics (*Ācārāṅga Sūtra* II.15, trans. Jacobi (1884: 202f)); the Buddha implies that Jain ascetics recommend their lay-followers to practise an inconsistent form of non-harming on their *uposatha*.

¹⁵ I have given the old saying here in its regularised form, although see the table of textual variants above to see the actual range of words included in this version of the saying.

and he knows them, thinking “these are my wife and children”. His servants, workers and men know him, thinking “this is our master”, and he knows them, thinking “these are my servants, workers and men.” Thus on the very occasion that one should be roused to truth they [the Nigaṇṭhas] arouse false speech.’¹⁶

The Nigaṇṭhas, that is to say, encourage people to believe that they have no social identity when really they do. The Buddha tells Visākhā that this, too, is not a very effective way to observe the *uposatha*, and he goes on to describe (in some detail, with comparisons and verses) the Noble Ones’ *uposatha* (*ariyuposatha*), consisting in five of the six recollections (of the Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, virtuous conduct and of the deities), and in practising the eight precepts.

A version of this same discourse at MĀ 202, preserved in Chinese translation, also presents the Buddha as caricaturing the Jain teaching. However, it does not include the old Jain saying, but instead has the Buddha tell Visākhā that Jain teachers incite their lay followers to reflect in the following way: ‘I am without parents, I have no parents, I am without wife and children, I have no wife and children, I am without male or female slaves, I have no ownership over male or female slaves’.¹⁷ This sheds helpful light on the Buddha’s argument, as given above in the Pāli version; the parallel at MĀ 202 makes it clear that the Jain lay-followers know perfectly well that they do have parents, wives, children and servants, and hence the Jain teachers incite their followers to what amounts to false speech.

However, Jain scriptures do in fact preserve an old Jain saying, which if we insert it into the Pāli discourse at A 3: 70,

¹⁶ A 3: 70 PTS I 206: *te tadah’ uposathe sāvakaṃ evaṃ samādapenti: ehi tvam ambho purisa sabbacelāni nikkhipitvā evaṃ vadehi: n’ āhaṃ kvacani kassaci kiñcanatasmiṃ, na ca mama kvacani katthaci kiñcanatatthī’ ti. jānanti kho pan’ assa mātāpitaro ayaṃ amhākaṃ putto’ ti, so pi jānāti ime mayhaṃ mātāpitaro’ ti. jānāti kho pan’ assa puttadāro ayaṃ mayhaṃ bhattā’ ti, so pi jānāti ayaṃ mayhaṃ puttadāro’ ti. jānanti kho pan’ assa dāsakammakaraporisā ayaṃ amhākaṃ ayyo’ ti, so pi jānāti ime mayhaṃ dāsakammakaraporisā’ ti. iti yasmiṃ samaye sacce samādapetabbā musāvāde tasmīṃ samaye samādapenti.*

¹⁷ MĀ 202 at T I 770b13, trans. Anālayo (2009: 186 n.41), who cites the source text as: ‘我無父母，非父母有，我無妻子，非妻子有，我無奴婢，非奴婢主 (adopting the 宋, 元, 明 variant reading 主 instead of 生)’.

exactly fits the sense required by the Buddha's argument. It is preserved in the *Ācāraṅga Sūtra* (in Prakrit, *Āyāraṅga Sutta*), a canonical scripture of the Śvetāmbara sect.¹⁸ The Prakrit runs as follows:

ego aham aṃsi na me atthi koi na yāham avi kassai

'I am myself alone, there is nobody who is mine' and I am not anyone's.'

The context for this saying is a series of instructions for a Jain ascetic. This particular instruction is translated by Jacobi as follows:

When the thought occurs to a mendicant: 'I am myself alone, I have nobody belonging to me, nor do I belong to anybody,' then he should thoroughly know himself as standing alone – aspiring to freedom from bonds. Penance suits him. Knowing what the Revered One has declared, one should thoroughly and in all respects conform to it.¹⁹

The saying, therefore, is connected to the instruction to the Jain ascetic that he or she should recognise that, in truth, they are completely alone. This follows from Jain soteriology, in which the aim of the ascetic life is to liberate the soul (*jīva*) from all *karma* and all entanglement in the world, in order to become a *kevalin* (an 'isolated one'), a *nigaṇṭha* ('one without bonds').

Let us now return to the possibility that at A 3: 70 the Buddha might be understood as originally quoting a version of this saying. In order to make a comparison with the Pāli text of the old saying as we now have it, we can put the Prakrit of the old Jain saying into Pāli as follows:

eko ahaṃ asmi, na me atthi koci na c'āham asmi kassaci

The saying consists in three parts: (1) *eko ahaṃ asmi*, 'I am myself alone'; (2) *na me atthi koci*, 'there is nobody who is mine'; (3) *na ca āham amhi kassaci*, 'and I am not anyone's'. In the Buddha's version, as preserved in A 3: 70, (1) is missing, while (2) and (3) are reversed. In a table:

¹⁸ In Schubring (1910: 37), available via GRETIL, of which I became aware via Anālayo (2009: 186 n.41) and (2011: 616 n.156).

¹⁹ Trans. Jacobi (1884: 71). Collette Caillat (1977: 58 & n.59) places this instruction into a gradual preparation of the Jain practitioner for fasting to death.

Jain saying	(3) <i>na c'āham asmi kassaci</i> 'And I am not anyone's'	(2) <i>na me atthi koci</i> 'There is nobody who is mine'
Buddhist version	<i>n'āhaṃ kvacani kassaci kiñcanatasmim</i> 'There is no I anywhere in anyone's property'	<i>na ca mama kvacani kismiñci kiñcanat'atthi</i> 'and neither is there anywhere in anything property which is mine'

My point in making this comparison is to make clear how the argument which the Buddha makes in A 3: 70 would make more sense if in fact the Buddha had quoted the old Jain saying as preserved in the *Āyāraṅga Sutta*. If Jain ascetics had roused their followers to speak falsely on the *uposatha*, enjoining them to say (as they themselves may have said), 'I am myself alone, there is nobody who is mine and I am not anyone's', while those same followers know perfectly well that, before and after the *uposatha*, they go back to their social identities among parents, wife, children and servants, then the Buddha's criticism of those Jain ascetics is perfectly intelligible. I am not claiming that the Buddha's criticism is fair or just, only that it is more intelligible if we substitute the actual Jain saying for what appears to be a modified version of it.

To leap ahead to my re-construction given below, what appears to have happened in the Pāli tradition is that an original quotation by the Buddha of an old Jain saying at A 3: 70 has been lost. In its place has been substituted a Buddhist version of the old saying, identical to two further citations of it in Buddhist literature, in which the Buddha gives it a positive meaning. The key change from the old Jain saying is the shift in the Jain saying from the first-person statement, 'And I am not anyone's' (*na c'āham asmi kassaci*) to the third-person Buddhist version, 'There is no I anywhere in anyone's property' (*n'āhaṃ kvacani kassaci kiñcanatasmim*). I will conjecture that the peculiar word *kiñcanatasmim* may preserve an original memory of the old Jain saying in a garbled form, if it is read as *kiñcanat'asmi*.²⁰ Presumably this was garbled during the process of oral or written transmission.

²⁰ As conjectured by Cone (2001: 685), discussed in note 11 above.

The old Jain saying becomes a ‘brahman-truth’

The old Jain saying appears in a different context at A 4: 185 PTS II 176–7. In this discourse, the Buddha visits a park frequented by ascetic wanderers (*paribbājakas*), on the banks of the river Sappinī near Rājagaha, and he talks with some of them about the ‘brahman truths’ (*brāhmaṇa-saccāni*).²¹ He lists four such truths, in the form of slogans: (i) ‘all living beings are to be spared’ (*sabbe pāṇā avajjhā ti*); (ii) ‘all sensual pleasure are impermanent, unsatisfactory and of a nature to change’ (*sabbe kāmā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā ti*); (iii) ‘all states of existence are impermanent, unsatisfactory and of a nature to change’ (*sabbe bhavā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā ti*); and (iv) our old saying:

*n’āhaṃ kvacani kassaci kiñcanatasmim, na ca mama kvacani
kismiñci kiñcanat’ atthī ti*

There is no I anywhere in anyone’s property, and neither is there anywhere in anything property which is mine.

Whereas the first three brahman truths are practised out of kindness and compassion for living being, and for disenchantment from, dispassion towards and the cessation of sensual pleasures and states of existence, the fourth brahman truth is practised as the practice of ‘the state of having nothing’ or ‘the complete absence of possessions’ (*ākiñcaññaṃ*).²²

The context of the old saying here is not a representation of a Jain teaching, but rather a statement or truth which ought to be broadly acceptable to all *paribbājakas* and *samaṇas*,²³ and with which the Buddha wholeheartedly agrees. It should not be

²¹ Three of them are named as Annabhāra, Varadhara and Sakuladāyīn; the Buddha is said at A 4: 40 PTS II 29–31 to have talked on another occasion to these same three, about four primal factors of *dhamma* (*dhammapadāni*). As with the *brāhmaṇasaccāni* at A 4: 185, these *dhammapadāni* are principles of spiritual practice which the Buddha presents as valuable for all *samaṇas* and *paribbājakas*.

²² Definitions from Cone (2001: 278).

²³ Following Freiburger (1997) I take the word *paribbājaka* to refer generally to a non-Buddhist wandering ascetic, whereas the term *samaṇa* appears to refer to an ascetic belonging to one or other group, such as the Buddhists, Jains and Ājīvikas.

controversial to see how the old saying in this context is a slogan for a lifestyle of complete non-possessiveness, and this is how the Pāli commentary understands the aim of the practice: “The practice which is just the state of having nothing” means that he is practising the practice without being anything, without obligations, without possessions, remaining fulfilled.’²⁴

Since the old saying in this case is one with which the Buddha agrees, it ought to say something which is true for both Buddhist and non-Buddhist ascetics and wanderers. Logically, therefore, it should be slightly different from the old Jain saying itself, which the Buddha (in A 3: 70) evidently did not fully endorse. This would suggest that the identical wording of the old saying in Pāli, in A 3: 70 and A 4: 185, is not appropriate. One would expect the two citations of the old saying to be distinguished in some way. We find some confirmation of this in a discourse parallel to the ‘Brahman Truths’ discourse at A 4: 185, preserved in a Sanskrit version, discovered in the Dunhuang caves. In this discourse, also called *Brāhmaṇasatyāni* (‘Brahman Truths’), the Buddha presents only three truths: (i) ‘all living beings are to be spared’ (*sarve prāṇino ’vadhā iti*); (ii) ‘whatever is of a nature to arise is entirely of a nature to cease’ (*yat kiṃcit samudayadharmam sarvaṃ nirodhadharmakam iti*); and (iii) a slightly changed version of our old saying:

A brahman speaks in this way: ‘There is nothing at all which is anywhere mine, there is nothing at all which is anywhere his: so speaking a brahman speaks truth not falsehood. Thus as previously [while I considered “I was better”, while I considered “I was the same”, while I considered “I was worse”], not having entered that truth I dwelt not making anything mine.’ This is the third brahman truth which I experienced having realized and attained it myself through my own direct knowledge.’²⁵

²⁴ Mp PTS III 162–3: *ākiñcaññaṃ yeva paṭipadan ti kiñcanabhāvavirahitaṃ nippalibodhaṃ niggahaṇam eva paṭipadaṃ paṭipanno hoti pūretvā ṭhito.*

²⁵ From *Brāhmaṇasatyāni*, in Hosoda (1991) via GRETEL: *brāhmaṇā evam āhur. na mama kvacana kaścana kiñcanam asti nāsya kvacana kaścana kiñcanam astīti vadamānā brāhmaṇāḥ satyam āhur na mṛśā. pūrvavad yāvad iti yad atra satyaṃ tad anabhiniviśya sarvaloke amamāyanto viharaṃti. idaṃ tritīyaṃ brāhmaṇasatyam yan mayā svayam abhijñāya sāksīkṛtvopasampadya praveditaṃ.* In the translation, I have interpolated the

In this Sanskrit version, the old saying is still recognizable:

There is nothing at all which is anywhere mine, there is nothing at all which is anywhere his.

na mama kvacana kaścana kiñcanam asti, nāsyā kvacana kaścana kiñcanam asti

However, it has undergone a transformation, from an old Jain saying about the aloneness of the *jīva* and its unconnectedness with persons or property, to a practical teaching about the truth held by advocates of the renunciate lifestyle of the wanderer, that nothing really belongs to anyone.

The old saying becomes a way to enter ‘no-thing-ness’

In a third occurrence of the old saying, in the ‘Discourse on What is Conducive to Imperturbability’ (*Āneñjasappāya Sutta*) at M 106 PTS II 263–4, it undergoes another change, and now becomes a reflection that the Buddha recommends to his disciples as a way to a meditative attainment called ‘the experiential dimension of no-thing-ness’ (*ākiñcaññāyatana*). In the first stage of the discourse, the Buddha recommends that a practitioner considers the hollow, empty and insubstantial nature of sense pleasures, and instead learns to abide with a vast and magnificent mind that has overcome the world with a firm resolution. By so doing the practitioner enters the experiential dimension (*āyatana*) of imperturbability (*āneñja*). The Buddha goes on to teach two further ways to enter the dimension of imperturbability. He, then goes on to teach three ways to enter the next and even more refined non-sensual abiding, the experiential dimension (*āyatana*) of no-thing-ness (*ākiñcañña*). The first way for a practitioner to enter this abiding is through reflecting on how perceptions of sensual pleasures, of physical form, and even of the dimension of imperturbability, all cease without remainder in the peaceful experiential dimension of no-thing-ness. The second way is to reflect, during solitary retreat, on how ‘This is empty of a self or what belongs to a self’ (*suññam idaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā ’ti*). And the third way of reflecting takes up the old saying:

text implied by the *pūrvavad yāvad* from the first brahman truth, i.e. *śreyāṃsaḥ sma iti manyante sadrśā sma iti manyante hīnā sma iti manyante*.

‘Furthermore, monks, a noble disciple considers thus: “There is no I anywhere in anyone’s property, and neither is there anywhere in anything property which is mine”. For one who has practised in this way, one who often dwells in it, the mind gains confidence in this dimension of experience. Once one is confident, one either enters into the experiential dimension of no-thing-ness or one believes through wisdom that one will do so after the breakup of the body after death. It is possible that one’s ongoing consciousness finds entry into the experiential dimension of no-thing-ness. Monks, this is said to be the third way of practice proper to the experiential dimension of no-thing-ness.’²⁶

A discourse parallel, preserved at MĀ 75 in Chinese translation, presents the same series of meditative reflections, including our old saying, here translated by Anālayo as ‘I am not another’s possession and I do not have possessions myself’.²⁷

It is not immediately apparent from our old saying, as it is preserved in Pāli, or indeed in Chinese translation, how it may lead the practitioner to the experiential dimension of no-thing-ness. However, the commentary on the Pāli text interprets the old saying in terms of the ‘four-cornered emptiness’ of experience, an interpretation which unpacks the meaning of the old saying in terms of the non-perception of ‘I’ or ‘mine’ through a careful meditative reflection.²⁸ In this way, the old saying is changed from a slogan or statement about a practitioner’s having nothing (*ākiñcañña*) (as in A 4: 185 on the ‘Brahman Truths’) to a statement concerning the much more subtle absence of any

²⁶ M 106 PTS II 263–4: *puna caparaṃ bhikkhave ariyasāvako iti paṭisañcikkhati: n’ āhaṃ kvacani kassaci kiñcanatasmim na ca mama kvacani kismiñci kiñcanaṃ n’ atthi ’ti. tassa evaṃ paṭipannassa tabbahulavihārino āyatane cittaṃ pasīdati. sampasāde sati etarahi vā ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ samāpajjati paññāya vā adhimuccati kāyassa bhedā paraṃ maraṇā. ihānam etaṃ vijjati yaṃ taṃ samvattanikaṃ viññānaṃ assa ākiñcaññāyatanūpagaṃ. ayaṃ bhikkhave tatiyā ākiñcaññāyatanasappāyā paṭipadā akkhāyati.*

²⁷ From MĀ 75 at T I 542c trans Anālayo and Bucknell (2020: 46). Anālayo comments on his translation of 我非為他而有所為, 亦非自為而有所為 in (2009b: 186 n.41).

²⁸ Ps PTS IV 63–65. Exactly the same form of words is used in Vism 653–4 (discussed below) and in the commentary on A 4: 185 (Mp PTS III 162–3).

perception of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ in a refined meditative abiding called ‘the dimension of no-thing-ness’ (*ākiñcaññāyatana*).

I have already suggested that the Pāli version of the old Jain saying seems to have undergone a process of confusion or garbling, making it unclear how the Buddha has transformed a Jain statement about the true isolation of the individual, into a panascetic statement of having nothing, and now into a Buddhist reflection leading to the meditative state of no-thing-ness. However, some light can be shed on this process by turning to a version of the old saying preserved in a recently discovered Gāndhārī fragment. Through the painstaking work of Stefan Baums, the text of an exegetical commentary has been re-discovered, unique to the Gāndhārī tradition, but with parallels to an early Pāli commentarial text called the *Niddesa*. This text includes a commentary on the verses of the *Pārāyana*, the fifth chapter of the *Sutta Nipāta*. The relevant stanza is the following, from the questions of the brahman Posāla to the Buddha:

‘I ask, Sakya, about the knowledge of one for whom perception of form has vanished,

who has entirely abandoned the body, who sees ‘there is nothing’ internally and externally: how is such a one to be led?’²⁹

This stanza makes the distinction of internal and external in relation to the perception of no-thing-ness, and this distinction makes clear that no-thing-ness in this case is more subtle than an absence of possessions. The Gāndhārī fragment includes this commentary on the line translated ‘internally and externally’:

Internally: as is said: “The I is not anywhere, of anybody, anything.” **Externally:** “And the mine is not anywhere, of anybody, anything.” Just that way is the non-existence of appropriation. The sphere of nothing is shown. (Baums 2009: 305)

The original Gāndhārī here is as follows:

ajatva yasa vucadi nahō kua yi kasa ci ki ci asti bahidha ca na ya mama ko yi kasa yi kici asti eva eva parigrahabhavo agicayadaṇo daśido (Baums 2009: 464)

²⁹ Trans. Bodhi (2017: 342) from Sn 1113 PTS 215: *vibhūtarūpasaññissa | sabbakāyapahāyino | ajjhatañ ca bahiddhā ca | n’ atthi kiñcī ti passato | ñāṇaṃ Sakkānupucchāmi | kathaṃ neyyo tathāvido* ||.

The Gāndhārī text can be put into Pāli for the sake of comparison as follows:

*ajjhatam yassa vuccati n' āham kvaci kassaci kiñci atthi
bahiddham ca na ca mama koci kassaci kiñci atthi, evam eva
parigrahābhāvo akiñcāyatano dassito*

And this allows us to isolate the Gāndhārī version of the old saying, putting it into Pāli for the sake of comparison, as follows:

*n' āham kvaci kassaci kiñci atthi, na ca mama koci³⁰ kassaci
kiñci atthi*

There is no I anywhere, anyone's anything, there is no mine anywhere, anyone's anything.

With this version of the old saying available, it is suddenly easy to spot exactly how the Buddha has transformed the old Jain saying. Firstly, here is that old Jain saying, with its words slightly rearranged, and replacing the word *me* with the word *mama*, for the sake of comparison:

n' āham kassaci asmi, na ca mama koci atthi

And here is the old saying, as preserved in Gāndhārī, put into Pāli, with some words removed and replaced with ellipses (...) simply to make a clear comparison:

n' āham ... kassaci ... atthi, na ca mama koci ... atthi

It does not take much expertise in Middle-Indo-Aryan dialects to spot that the the *asmi* ('I am') of the old Jain saying has been replaced with *atthi* ('there is') in the old saying in its Buddhist guise, hence turning a personal reflection on the isolation of the *jīva* (according to Jain soteriology) into a general reflection on the absence of the 'I' (according to the Buddhist teaching of *anattā*).

There is even some supporting evidence for this conclusion, in that in another version of MĀ 75 (which is parallel to M 106, the *Āneñjasappāya Sutta*) preserved in Tibetan, the old saying is as

³⁰ Baums (2009: 435) notes that 'we [might] expect *kva yi* [in Pāli, *kvaci*] instead of *ko yi* [in Pāli, *koci*]. This could be a misinterpretation of the Eastern Middle Indo-Aryan pronominal locative *ke* 'where' as a direct-case singular form and consequent transposition into G[āndhārī] *ko* rather than *kua*; the same misunderstanding is attested in Pāli'. I follow Baums in assuming that *koci* here has the same meaning as *kvaci*, 'anywhere'.

follows: ‘there is no I in any way at all, there is no mine in any way at all’.³¹ Like the Gāndhārī version, the version of the old saying translated into Tibetan appears to have preserved a form of words that is both different to the old saying as preserved in Pāli, and is also a much more intelligible version of it in relation to the original old Jain saying on which it is based.

A reconstruction of the original Pāli versions

Having reviewed the three occurrences of the old saying in Pāli discourses, and their parallels preserved in Sanskrit, Chinese, Gāndhārī and Tibetan, it is possible to reconstruct a process whereby an old Jain saying was first quoted by the Buddha in order to caricature it, and was then taken up in a modified form by the Buddha, first as a pan-ascetic statement about the importance of the state of having nothing, and second as a Buddhist statement in support of the meditative attainment of the dimension of no-thing-ness.

My reconstruction begins with the conjecture that the version of the old saying preserved in Gāndhārī represents a more accurate memory of the Buddha’s teaching than the Pāli version. That is to say, something like the following represents the old saying in a more authentic form:

*n’ āhaṃ kvaci kassaci kiñci atthi, na ca mama kvaci kassaci
kiñci atthi*

This represents the Buddha’s modified version of the old Jain saying, which runs as follows (put into Pāli and re-arranged for convenience of comparison):

eko ahaṃ asmi, n’ āham kassaci asmi, na ca mama koci atthi

The main change is that *asmi* in the old Jain saying is changed to *atthi* in the Buddha’s version. Now I turn to A 3: 70, and the existing Pāli text of the Buddha’s version of this old Jain saying, which the Buddha ought to be reproducing in a recognisable form:

³¹ Trans. Anālayo (2009b: 186 n.41), from MĀ 75 in D *mngon pa, ju* 228b4 or Q *tu* 261a3: *bdag ‘ga’ zhig tu ‘ga’ yang cung zad med do, bdag gi ‘ga’ zhig tu ‘ga’ yang cung zad med do.*

*n' āham kvacani kassaci kiñcanatasmim, na ca mama kvacani
kismiñci kiñcanat' atthi*

This version would seem to have suffered from some corruption in transmission. It would appear that the Pāli *kiñcanatasmim* ought to be understood, as indeed one textual variant records it, as *kiñcanat' asmi*. With the inclusion of the verb *asmi*, 'I am', we restore a crucial element of meaning to the Buddha's citation of the old Jain saying. Moreover, it would appear that the implied word *kiñcanatā*, found in all the Pāli versions of our old saying, actually means nothing other than *kiñcanam* or *kiñci*, 'something', 'anything'. I would suggest that the word *kiñcanatā* is also the result of some error in transmission, since the original version appears likely to have been a simpler form, *kiñcanam* or *kiñci*. Additionally, the repetition of the indefinite pronouns in the Gāndhārī version of the old saying, *kvaci kassaci kiñci*, is simple, neat and effective as a means of communication. By contrast, the textual variants of the Pāli versions of the old saying, as compared above, show the indefinite pronouns as variously shuffled. This would suggest that the Gāndhārī reading is preferable, whether or not it is the more original.

I continue my reconstruction with the observation that the occurrences of the old saying at A 4: 185 and M 106 ought logically and doctrinally to indicate clearly the difference between the old Jain saying and the Buddha's own use of it. With this in mind, it would appear that the simple recurrence of the Pāli version of the old saying at A 4: 185 and M 106 represents a further error in transmission. Again, the word *kiñcanatasmim* is the problem. Whereas in the case of A 3: 70 it ought to be *kiñcanat' asmi*, or, better, *kiñcanam asmi*, in the cases of A 3: 185 and M 106, it ought to be *kiñcanat' atthi*, or, better, *kiñcanam atthi*. This would accord with the version preserved in Gāndhārī, the accuracy of which is further attested by the Tibetan translation. The version preserved in Sanskrit, meanwhile, suggests that the Buddhist reciters and scribes found it difficult to properly understand the old saying in its Buddhist form. The Sanskrit form of the old saying goes:

*na mama kvacana kaścana kiñcanam asti, nāsya kvacana
kaścana kiñcanam asti*

Comparing this version of the saying with the the Gāndhārī one, the word *āham* ('I') appears to have been replaced

by *asya* ('his'). This would be understandable if the Buddhists who made or transmitted the Sanskrit version were unaware of the old Jain saying on which the Buddha's saying is based. The grammar of *aham asti* ('I is', 'there is an I') would then seem wrong, whereas the replacement of *aham* by *asya* restores the possibility of a grammatically correct sentence.

These reconstructions of garbled transmission processes allow me to suggest corrections to the old saying in Pāli texts as follows:

A 3: 70 should read *n' āhaṃ kvaci kassaci kiñcanam asmi, na ca mama kvaci kassaci kiñcanam atthi*

A 4: 185 should read *n' āhaṃ kvaci kassaci kiñcanam atthi, na ca mama kvaci kassaci kiñcanam atthi* (and likewise M 106)

These corrections not only solve the problems of difficult and somewhat unintelligible Pāli, but they return appropriate meanings to the old saying in its various occurrences in the discourses.

These conjectural reconstructions of original readings gain some support from a consideration of another case of the Buddha re-purposing existing statements or slogans used among the *śramaṇas*. At S 22: 81 PTS III 99, the Buddha quotes a formulation of what he calls an annihilationist view (*ucchedadiṭṭhi*):

I might not be, and it might not be for me; I will not be, [and] it will not be for me (Trans. Bodhi (2000: 923).

no c' assaṃ no ca me siyā na bhavissāmi na me bhavissati

A S 22: 153 and S 24: 4, the Buddha describes this view as arising from clinging to the five constituents; at A 10: 29 he describes it as the foremost view among those outside of his teaching, since those who hold it will be repelled by both existence and cessation. However, it is still a speculative view. At S 22: 55 PTS III 56, the Buddha teaches this same formulation in a slightly different form:

It might not be, and it might not be for me; it will not be, [and] it will not be for me (Trans. Bodhi (2000: 893).

no c' assa no ca me siyā na bhavissati na me bhavissati

In this formulation, the Buddha claims that it can help a practitioner cut off the lower fetters. At A 7: 55 PTS IV 70, a practitioner uses the same formulation to gain equanimity about whether he or she exists or not. At M 106, the *Āneñjasappāya Sutta*, PTS II 264, (just after the Buddha presents our old saying as a vehicle to attain the dimension of no-thing-ness) the Buddha teaches the same formula, again to gain equanimity, at a stage close to the attaining of *nibbāna*.

The Buddha changed the annihilationist view into a meditative reflection by the simple change of *assaṃ* ('I might be') to *assa* ('it might be') and *bhavissāmi* ('I will be') to *bhavissati* ('it will be'). As Bhikkhu Bodhi notes:

The Buddha transformed this formula into a theme for contemplation consonant with his own teaching by replacing the first person verbs with their third person counterparts... The change of person shifts the stress from the view of self implicit in the annihilationist version ("I will be annihilated") to an impersonal perspective that harmonizes with the *anattā* doctrine.³²

In this parallel case it would appear that the Pāli texts successfully preserved the Buddha's transformation of a formula already in circulation among the *śramaṇas*. However, in the case of the old Jain saying the Pāli texts were unsuccessful in properly preserving the exact words, either of the Jain version of the saying, or of the Buddha's subtle modification of it. But with the conjectural restoration of the original readings, it becomes clear that the Buddha's strategy in the case of the old Jain saying was exactly the same as in the case of the annihilationist view. He recycled an existing and presumably well-known statement in circulation among the *śramaṇas*, suitably modified for his own teaching purposes.

'Four-cornered emptiness'

The old saying, despite its somewhat garbled form, was taken up by the Theravādin tradition as a statement that set forth

³² Bodhi (2000: 1061 n.75); discussed further in Bodhi (2012: 1780–2 n.1532); see also Anālayo (2009a: 14).

what was called the ‘four-cornered emptiness’ (*catukoṭīkā suññatā*). This interpretation represents a creative re-reading of the old saying, taking its use by the Buddha in the *Āneñjasappāya Sutta* as a statement that supports entry into the experiential dimension of no-thing-ness, and further transforming it into a statement that supports insight into the way in which experience is empty of a self.

In his *Visuddhimagga*, Ch. XXI, Buddhaghosa describes a stage of ‘purification of knowledge and vision of the way’ which is the opening part of the eighth and final insight knowledge, called ‘knowledge of equanimity about formations’. This stage of investigating emptiness consists of eight practices involving emptiness, and the ‘four-cornered emptiness’ is the second:

Investigating how ‘all formations are empty (*sabbe saṅkhārā suññā*)’ through the knowledge of analysis of reflection in this way, one again investigates emptiness as two-cornered as in ‘this is empty of self or what belongs to self (*suññam idaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā*)’. Seeing that there is neither a self nor anything else the case in being an accessory of a self in this way, again he investigates how: ‘There is no I anywhere in anyone’s property, and neither is there anywhere in anything property which is mine (*n’ āhaṃ kvacani kassaci kiñcanatasmim, na ca mama kvacani kismiñci kiñcanat’ atthi*)’, which is said to be ‘the four-cornered emptiness’.³³

How? [1] ‘There is no I anywhere’ means one does not see a self anywhere. [2] ‘In anyone’s property’ means that one does not oneself see anyone else’s self as applicable in respect of being a possession (*kiñcanabhāve*), meaning that one does not see [it] as applicable when thinking about a brother in the case of a brother, or a companion in the case of a companion, or an accessory in the case of an accessory. [3] ‘And neither is there [mine] anywhere’: here, putting aside the word ‘mine’ for now, the meaning of ‘And neither is there anywhere’ is that one does not see anywhere anyone else’s self. [4] Now including the word ‘mine’, ‘in anything property which is mine’ means that one

³³ Vism 653–4: *so evaṃ paṭisaṅkhānupassanāññena sabbe saṅkhārā suññā ’ti pariggahetvā puna suññam idaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā ’ti* [M 106 PTS II 263] *dvikoṭīkaṃ suññataṃ pariggaṇhāti. so evaṃ n’ eva attānaṃ, na paraṃ kiñci attano parikkhārabhāve thitaṃ disvā puna n’ āhaṃ kvacani, kassaci kiñcanatasmim, na ca mama kvacani, kismiñci kiñcanatatthi ’ti* [M 106 PTS II 263–4] *yā ettha catukoṭīkā suññatā kathitā, taṃ pariggaṇhāti.*

does not see another's self which is mine in anything, in respect of being a possession. This means that one does not see another's self as applicable in anything by being a possession, whether one's own brother in the case of a brother, or companion in the case of a companion, or accessory in the case of an accessory. In this way, because: [1] one does not see a self anywhere, [2] one does not see it as applicable to being another's possession, [3] one does not see another's self, [4] one does not see another's self as applicable to being one's own possession; for this reason, in this way, one has fully grasped 'the four-cornered emptiness'.³⁴

As I understand Buddhaghosa's meaning here, he would have our old saying be taken as a guide to a meditative reflection on how: [1] internally, my own experience is empty of a self, [2] externally, other people's experience of me, as a brother, friend or associate, is empty of a self, [3] externally, my experience of other people is empty of selves, and [4] internally, my own experience of other people, as brothers, friends or associates, is empty of selves.³⁵ Hence, the contemplation of emptiness has four corners.

This complex meditation would appear to depend on the ambiguity of the old saying, as it was transmitted in the Theravāda tradition, and especially on the word *kiñcanatā*. By contrast, my

³⁴ Vism 654: *katham?* [1] *ayañ hi n' āhañ kvacanī ti kvaci attānañ na passati.* [2] *kassaci kiñcanatasmin ti attano attānañ kassaci parassa kiñcanabhāve upanetabbañ na passati. bhātiññhāne vā bhātarañ, sahāyaññhāne vā sahāyañ, parikkhāraññhāne vā parikkhārañ maññitvā upanetabbañ na passatī ti attho.* [3] *na ca mama kvacanī ti etiha mama-saddañ tava thapetvā na ca kvacanī ti parassa ca attānañ kvaci na passatī ti ayam attho.* [4] *idāni mama-saddañ āharitvā mama kismiñci kiñcanat' atthī ti so parassa attā mama kismiñci kiñcanabhāve atthī ti na passatī ti. attano bhātiññhāne vā bhātarañ, sahāyaññhāne vā sahāyañ parikkhāraññhāne vā parikkhārañ ti kismiñci thāne parassa attānañ iminā kiñcanabhāvena upanetabbañ na passatīti attho. evamayam yasmā [1] n' eva katthaci attānañ passati, [2] na tañ parassa kiñcanabhāve upanetabbañ passati, [3] na parassa attānañ passati, [4] na parassa attānañ attano kiñcanabhāve upanetabbañ passati. tasmānena catukotikā suññatā pariggahitā hotī ti.*

³⁵ This may sound like a complicated meditative reflection. The *ṭīka* on the *Brahmajāla Sutta* helpfully explains that attention to the four-cornered emptiness is appropriate for a particular personality type, the theorizing type (*diññicarita*) with keen faculties (*tikkhindriya*), who is prone to attach to the idea of a self in what is not a self but a mere assemblage of *dhammas*. (Bodhi 1978: 252)

reconstructed original old saying, following the Gāndhārī version, is straightforward, and may not so easily support a complex interpretation of the sort undertaken by Buddhaghosa. We see, therefore, that the Theravādin use of the old saying represents a creative recycling based on a mistaken tradition of transmission, which goes to show that good Dharma can be found even in previous mistakes, resembling lotuses growing out of mud.

Conclusion

As a *śramaṇa*, the Buddha would have been aware of the sayings in circulation in the *śramaṇa* community as slogans of belief and practice. Just as the annihilationist view, *no c' assaṃ no ca me siyā na bhavissāmi na me bhavissati* ('I might not be, and it might not be for me; I will not be, [and] it will not be for me') was in circulation as a contemplation of the self's non-existence after death, a saying was in circulation among the Jains, *eko ahaṃ asmi, n' āhaṃ kassaci asmi, na ca mama koci atthi* ('I am myself alone, I do not belong to anyone, there is nothing that is mine') as a contemplation of the ultimate isolation of the self or *jīva* both now and after death. These sayings offered the Buddha the opportunity to formulate his own teaching by making changes to the original sayings, and thereby to give his own followers clear and memorable statements with which to contemplate his teaching. These sayings were not merely sound-bites, but carefully crafted distillations of ideas and practices.

Drawing on a range of textual scholarship, I have reconstructed a conjectural original form of an old saying of the Buddha, which communicates his distinctive teaching of *anattā* by a subtle modification of that old Jain saying:

*n' āhaṃ kvaci kassaci kiñcanam atthi, na ca mama kvaci kassaci
kiñcanam atthi*

'There is no I anywhere, anyone's anything, there is no mine
anywhere, anyone's anything.'

Not only does this new saying suffice as a support for the practical 'brahman truth' of the state of having nothing (*ākiñcañña*), but it can be used as a contemplation to attain the experiential dimension of no-thing-ness (*ākiñcaññāyatana*). But this recycling of old

sayings is not only the Buddha's prerogative. The Theravādin Buddhist tradition took the Buddha's saying and recycled it as a contemplation of emptiness (*suññatā*). I conclude with the thought that this kind of recycling of ideas already in circulation, in order to make the Buddhist teachings available in familiar and effective forms, is an illustration of the virtue of skilful means (Pāli: *upāya-kosalla*, Sanskrit: *upāya-kauśalya*), so central to the Buddhist teaching tradition.

Abbreviations

A	<i>Aṅguttara Nikāya</i> (Morris and Hardy 1885)
B ^c	Burmese Sixth Council (<i>Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana</i>) ed., https://www.digitalpalireader.online
M	<i>Majjhima Nikāya</i> (Trenckner and Chalmers 1888)
MĀ	<i>Madhyama Āgama</i> (CBETA)
Mp	<i>Manorathapūraṇī (Aṅguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā)</i> (Walleser and Kopp 1936)
Ps	<i>Papañcasūdanī</i> (Woods and Kosambi 1928)
S	<i>Saṃyutta Nikāya</i> (Féer 1884)
Sn	<i>Sutta Nipāta</i> (Andersen and Smith 1913)
Vism	<i>Visuddhimagga</i> (Rhys Davids 1920)

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