Do Free Agent Contracts for MLB Pitchers Create Moral Hazard?
Faculty Sponsor(s)
Jeff Summers
Location
Jereld R. Nicholson Library: Grand Avenue
Subject Area
Economics
Description
We estimate the effect of free agent contract values on pitching performance in Major League Baseball. Our performance variables include strikeouts, walks, and total innings pitched. Explanatory variables include free agent contract value, contract length, and controls for prior years’ performance. We find that contract values have a statistically positive effect on performance and conclude that free agent contracts do not create moral hazard in Major League Baseball.
Recommended Citation
Andrews, Ben and Scott, Connor, "Do Free Agent Contracts for MLB Pitchers Create Moral Hazard?" (2017). Linfield University Student Symposium: A Celebration of Scholarship and Creative Achievement. Event. Submission 20.
https://digitalcommons.linfield.edu/symposium/2017/all/20
Do Free Agent Contracts for MLB Pitchers Create Moral Hazard?
Jereld R. Nicholson Library: Grand Avenue
We estimate the effect of free agent contract values on pitching performance in Major League Baseball. Our performance variables include strikeouts, walks, and total innings pitched. Explanatory variables include free agent contract value, contract length, and controls for prior years’ performance. We find that contract values have a statistically positive effect on performance and conclude that free agent contracts do not create moral hazard in Major League Baseball.
